National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty v Knipe and Another

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE PILL,LORD JUSTICE JUDGE,LORD JUSTICE BUTLER-SLOSS
Judgment Date15 May 1997
Judgment citation (vLex)[1997] EWCA Civ J0515-8
Date15 May 1997
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Docket NumberCCRTF 97/0306/H

[1997] EWCA Civ J0515-8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE KENDAL COUNTY COURT

(SITTING AT LANCASTER COUNTY COURT)

(MR RECORDER BRIGGS)

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2

Before:

Lord Justice Butler-Sloss

Lord Justice Pill

Lord Justice Judge

CCRTF 97/0306/H

The National Trust for Places of Historic Interest

Or Natural Beauty
Plaintiff/Appellant
and
(1) Donald Richard Knipe
(2) Richard George Knipe
Defendants/Respondents

MR M JONES (Instructed by Messrs Burges Salmon, Bristol, BS1 4AH) appeared on behalf of the Appellant

MR P MORGAN QC (Instructed by Messrs Cartmell Shepherd, Carlisle, CA1 2RW) appeared on behalf of the Respondent

LORD JUSTICE PILL
1

This case turns upon the meaning of the expression "premises let as a dwelling" within the meaning of s 5 of the Protection From Eviction Act 1977 ("the 1977 Act"). The National Trust, the plaintiffs, appeal against a decision of Mr Recorder Briggs sitting at the Lancaster County Court on 24 February 1997 whereby he dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for possession against Ronald Richard Knipe and Richard George Knipe (the defendants) of a landholding known as Cinderbarrow Holeslack at Flashback in the parishes of Levens and Helsington, Cumbria ("the holding").

2

The holding was let by the plaintiffs to the defendants by a tenancy agreement dated 12 August 1985 on an annual tenancy. The holding included Holeslack farmhouse and buildings, Cinderbarrow farmhouse and buildings and over 350 acres of pasture land. In 1989 a further dwelling house, Holeslack cottage was added to the letting. The defendants are father and son and members of their family have farmed part of the holding for very many years. Father lives in one of the farmhouses and son in the other.

3

The agreement is in the plaintiffs' common form and the word "tenant" appears in the singular. The tenant agreed "to farm and manage the holding in accordance with the rules of good husbandry", not to use "the holding or any part thereof for any purpose other than agriculture" and "personally to reside in the farmhouse and make the same his usual place of residence". It is common ground that the tenancy was protected by the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 ("the 1986 Act").

4

On 21 November 1994 the plaintiffs' served on the defendants under the 1986 Act a notice to pay rent in respect of arrears then due. In default of compliance, the plaintiffs served a notice to quit purporting to terminate the tenancy on 12 May 1996. The defendants did not exercise their right under the 1986 Act to challenge the notice to quit by arbitration and the plaintiffs took proceedings for possession. It is common ground that if the holding came within the definition "premises let as a dwelling" in s 5 of the 1977 Act the notice to quit was invalid for failure to comply with the Notice to Quit etc (Prescribed Information) Regulations 1988 ("the 1988 Regulations").

5

S 5 of the 1977 Act provides, so far as is material:

"(1) 1/4 no notice by a landlord or a tenant to quit any premises let (whether before or after the commencement of this Act) as a dwelling shall be valid unless 3/4

(a) it is in writing and contains such information as may be prescribed, and

(b) it is given not less than four weeks before the date on which it is to take effect.

(2) In this section "prescribed" means prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument, and the statutory instrument containing any regulation shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either house of parliament.

(3) Regulations under this section may make different provision in relation to different descriptions of lettings and different circumstances."

6

The 1988 Regulations provide:

"2. Where 1/4 a landlord gives a notice to quit premises let as a dwelling, or a licensor gives a notice to determine a periodic licence to occupy premises as a dwelling 1/4 the information prescribed for the purposes of s 5 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 shall be that in the Schedule to these Regulations 1/4

7

In the Schedule the information is set out as follows:

1. If the tenant or licensee does not leave the dwelling, the landlord or licensor must get an order for possession from the court before the tenant or licensee can lawfully be evicted. The landlord or licensor cannot apply for such an order before the notice to quit or notice to determine has run out.

2. A tenant or licensee who does not know if he has any right to remain in possession after a notice to quit or a notice to determine runs out can obtain advice from a solicitor. Help with all or part of the cost of legal advice and assistance may be available under the Legal Aid Scheme. He should also be able to obtain information from a Citizens' Advice Bureau, a Housing Aid Centre or a rent officer."

8

The notice to quit in this case did not include that prescribed information. It is common ground that if the holding constituted "premises let as a dwelling" within the meaning of s 5 of the 1977 Act, the defect was fatal to the notice to quit and the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession. It can be said at this stage that the prescribed information is quite inappropriate to an agricultural tenancy in that if information or advice is required, it is of the tenant's right to serve a counter-notice to the landlord in writing not later than one month from the giving of the notice to quit (s 26 of the 1986 Act).

9

The defendants' case can be put succinctly. "Premises" means the subject matter of the letting and "let as a dwelling" means let wholly or partly as a dwelling. The premises need not be let predominately as a dwelling. If premises which are primarily agricultural are let, and there is a dwelling house on the premises, the premises are let as a dwelling within the meaning of s 5. The plaintiffs contend that, in this context, the word "premises" is confined to premises which would be held to be a dwelling house and an agricultural holding does not rank as premises for the purposes of the section. Even if the word "premises" can include an agricultural holding on which there is a dwelling, the premises are let not as a dwelling house but as an agricultural holding and, as such, fall outside s 5. The expression "premises let as a dwelling" cannot be strained to include a tenancy of an agricultural holding on which there is a dwelling.

10

Sections 1 to 3 of the Act provide, in so far as is material:

"1 (1) In this section 'residential occupier', in relation to any premises, means a person occupying the premises as a residence, whether under a contract or by virtue of any enactment or rule of law giving him the right to remain in occupation or restricting the right of any other person to recover possession of the premises.

(2) If any person unlawfully deprives the residential occupier of any premises of his occupation of the premises or any part thereof, or attempts to do so, he shall be guilty of an offence unless he proves that he believed, and had reasonable cause to believe, that the residential occupier had ceased to reside in the premises.

(3) If any person with intent to cause the residential occupier of any premises 3/4

(a) to give up the occupation of the premises or any part thereof; or

(b) to refrain from exercising any right or pursuing any remedy in respect of the premises or part thereof;

does acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier or members of his household, or persistently withdraws or withholds services reasonably required for the occupation of the premises as a residence, he shall be guilty of an offence.

(4) A person guilty of an offence 1/4.

2. Where any premises are let as a dwelling on a lease which is subject to a right of re-entry or forfeiture it shall not be lawful to enforce that right otherwise than by proceedings in the court while any person is lawfully residing in the premises or part of them.

3. (1) Where any premises have been let as a dwelling under a tenancy which is not a statutorily protected tenancy and 3/4

(a) the tenancy (in this section referred to as the former tenancy) has come to an end, but

(b) the occupier continues to reside in the premises or part of them,

it shall not be lawful for the owner to enforce against the occupier, otherwise than by proceedings in the court, his right to recover possession of the premises."

11

Section 8(1) provides:

"In this Act 'statutorily protected tenancy' means 3/4

(a) a protected tenancy within the meaning of the Rent Act 1977 or a tenancy to which Part I of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 applies;

(b) a protected occupancy or statutory tenancy as defined in the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976;

(c) a tenancy to which Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 applies:

(d) a tenancy of an agricultural holding within the meaning of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948."

12

Submissions have been made upon the 1977 Act in the context of statutes which preceded it. The Court has also been referred to cases in which the word premises, as used in statutes dealing with tenancies, has been interpreted in the strict legal sense of "the subject-matter of the habendum" (Viscount Hailsham in Whitley v Stumbles [1930] AC 544 at 547 and Bracey v Read [1963] Ch 88). In Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373, however, the House of Lords held, by a majority, that in the context of s 18(5) of the Rent Act 1968 "premises" had the narrower meaning of premises which, as a matter of fact, would be held to be a dwelling house for the purposes of the Act. A farm was not "premises" within the meaning of that particular section so that the cottage...

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3 cases
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    ...previously acted for him. By that time the county court case from Kendal had reached the Court of Appeal as National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty v Knipe [1998] 1 WLR 230. It had been held that this did not constitute "premises let as a dwelling" for the purpose o......

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