Naylor v Yorkshire Electricity Board

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeViscount Dilhorne,Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest,Lord Guest,Lord Devlin,Lord Upjohn
Judgment Date15 March 1967
Judgment citation (vLex)[1967] UKHL J0315-4
Date15 March 1967
CourtHouse of Lords
Yorkshire Electricity Board
and
Naylor (Married Woman) (Administratrix of the Estate of Paul Naylor Deceased)

[1967] UKHL J0315-4

Viscount Dilhorne

Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest

Lord Guest

Lord Devlin

Lord Upjohn

House of Lords

Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause Yorkshire Electricity Board against Naylor (Married Woman) (Administratrix of the Estate of Paul Naylor deceased), that the Committee had heard Counsel on Thursday the 26th day of January last, upon the Petition and Appeal of the Yorkshire Electricity Board, of Wetherby Road, Scarcroft, Leeds, in the County of York, praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 30th of January 1966, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioners might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet: as also upon the Case of Edna Naylor (Married Woman) (Administratrix of the Estate of Paul Naylor deceased), lodged in answer to the said Apneal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:

It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 30th day of June 1966, complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby, Reversed, and that the Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Ashworth, of the 10th day of February 1966, thereby Varied, be, and the same is hereby, Restored: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondent do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Appellants the Costs incurred by them in the Court of Appeal, and also the Costs incurred by them in respect of the said Appeal to this House, the amount of such last-mentioned Costs to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments.

Viscount Dilhorne

My Lords,

1

On the 23rd April, 1964, Paul Naylor then aged 20 years and 4 months died instantaneously as the result of an electric shock he suffered in the course of his employment by the Appellant Board.

2

In this action his mother claims as the Administratrix of his estate damages for the loss of expectation of life suffered by him and for his funeral expenses.

3

The action was tried by Ashworth J., at Sheffield Assizes in February, 1966. He awarded £500 damages for loss of expectation of life. The Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeal by a majority (Danckwerts L.J., and Salmon L.J., Sellers L.J. dissenting) allowed the appeal and increased the amount to £1,000. From this decision the Appellant Board now appeals.

4

Before the enactment of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, it was recognised that an injured person was entitled, if liability was proved or admitted, to recover damages under this head. That Act provided that causes of action vested in a person survived after his death for the benefit of his estate, so administrators of the estate can now sue for damages in respect of loss of expectation of life.

5

After the passage of this Act widely varying amounts were awarded for damages for loss of expectation of life until this House in Benham v. Gambling[1941] A.C. 157 gave guidance as to the approach to be made in the assessment of damages under this head. In that case the House reduced the damages that had been awarded in respect of the loss of expectation of life of a child age 2 1/2 from £1,200 to £200. Viscount Simon, with whose opinion Viscount Maugham, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Porter and Lord Wright agreed, said at page 166 that in assessing damages under this head what had to be valued was not "the prospect of length of days, but the prospect of a predominantly happy life". He said:

"The age of the individual may, in some cases, be a relevant factor. For example, in extreme old age the brevity of what life may be left may be relevant.… The ups and downs of life, its pains and sorrows, as well as its joys and pleasures—all that makes up 'life's fitful fever'—have to be allowed for in the estimate. In assessing damages for shortening of life, therefore, such damages should not be calculated solely, or even mainly, on the basis of the length of life that is lost.… The question thus resolves itself into that of fixing a reasonable figure to be paid by way of damages for the loss of a measure of prospective happiness."

6

He went on to point out at page 167 that "the right sum to award depends on an objective estimate of what kind of future on earth the victim might have enjoyed" and said:

"The main reason, I think, why the appropriate figure of damages should be reduced in the case of a very young child is that there is necessarily so much uncertainty about the child's future that no confident estimate of prospective happiness can be made. When an individual has reached an age to have settled prospects—having passed the risks and uncertainties of childhood and having in some degree attained to an established character and to firmer hopes—his or her future becomes more definite and the extent to which good fortune may probably attend him at any rate becomes less incalculable."

7

and at page 168:

"The truth, of course, is that in putting a money value on the prospective balance of happiness in years that the deceased might otherwise have lived, the jury or judge of fact is attempting to equate incommensurables. Damages which would be proper for a disabling injury may well be much greater than for deprivation of life. These considerations lead me to the conclusion that in assessing damages under this head, whether in the case of a child or an adult, very moderate figures should be chosen."

8

In that case their Lordships were agreed that the proper figure to award was £200 and Lord Simon said "even this amount would be excessive if it were not that the circumstances of the infant were most favourable".

9

Evidence was given before Ashworth J., as to the extent of the fall in the value of the pound which had occurred since 1941. It was said that it was then worth two and one-half times what it is to-day. Ashworth J. had regard to the depreciation in the value of the pound and approached the case on the footing that what was appropriate in 1941 is no longer appropriate to-day. He said:

"At the end of the day the Court's task is to assess what I prefer to call a reasonable sum, but what some judges have called a moderate sum, in respect of the loss of this young man's expectation of life" and that "in terms of money the award of 1941" [in Benham v. Gambling] "would not represent a fair award in terms of money if given to-day."

10

In other words he was saying that what had to be regarded as, to quote Lord Simon, "a very moderate sum" in 1941, would not be so regarded to-day.

11

He assessed the sum to be awarded to the Plaintiff at £500 and expressed the view that it was, if anything, on the high side because the young man's prospects appeared to have been favourable. To this figure he applied two cross-checks which led him to regard the award of £500 "as being, if anything, generous".

12

In the Court of Appeal Danckwerts L.J. said that in Benham v. Gambling the House of Lords evolved "a theory that the damages should be a strictly moderate figure, somewhere between a minimum of £200 and a maximum of £500".

13

I do not find anything in the opinion of Lord Simon stating that the minimum figure should be £200 or the maximum £500. The guidance that he gave was that the figure should be very moderate and the passage I have cited from his Opinion shows that this House would have regarded a sum lower than £200 as appropriate in that case but for the child's favourable circumstances.

14

Danckwerts L.J. said that he thought that in this case £500 was a ridiculous figure and that £1,000 could not be too much. He doubted whether it was not far too little. Salmon L.J. said in relation to Benham v. Gambling:

"It is plain from the language used by Lord Simon, L.C., that the court's problem was still to solve the question what in the circumstances of any particular case was the proper sum to award as compensation for the loss of prospective happiness. In assessing this sum however a very low standard of measurement was to be applied. In effect, this sum had to be measured certainly not through a magnifying glass nor even through a plain glass but through the wrong end of a telescope."

15

Later he said:

"It is, in my view, most important to observe that the House of Lords considered that in these cases damages in respect of the death of a young child should be substantially less than in the case of an adult."

16

Although Lord Simon said that the damages should be reduced in the case of a very young child, he did not say that they should be substantially less than those awarded to an adult. His conclusion was that both in the case of a child and of an adult a very moderate figure should be chosen. Salmon L.J. also said:

"It seems to me to be manifest from what was stated in Benham v. Gambling that if the deceased in that case had been a young man in Paul Naylor's position, the House of Lords would have assessed the damages at much more than £200—probably at £400."

17

I do not see that that is manifest from anything Lord Simon said. While it may be that the House would have awarded a sum larger than £200, there is nothing to indicate that it would have awarded anything in the region of double that sum. Indeed unless it were true to say that £400 was at that time regarded as a very moderate figure, the inference I draw from Lord Simon's opinion is that it would not have done so.

18

It would seem that Danckwerts L.J. and Salmon L.J. are not in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of this House in Benham v....

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    ...has twice been before the House of Lords, first in Benham v. Gambling, ( 1941 Appeal Cases, page 157), and more recently in Kaylor v. Yorkshire Electricity Board, ( 1968 Appeal Cases, page 525). In those two cases their Lordships debated at considerable length the considerations which shoul......
  • Smith v Central Asbestos Company Ltd
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    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 26 May 1971
    ...of life in a sum which may he between £250 and £500: see Benham v. Gambling (1941 A. C. 157); and Naylor v. Yorkshire Electricity Board (1968 A. C. 529): but he is not entitled to be compensated for loss of earnings during the "lost years": see Oliver v. Ashman (1962 2 Q.B. 220); Andrews v.......
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    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 26 May 1971
    ...of life in a sum which may he between £250 and £500: see Benham v. Gambling (1941 A. C. 157); and Naylor v. Yorkshire Electricity Board (1968 A. C. 529): but he is not entitled to be compensated for loss of earnings during the "lost years": see Oliver v. Ashman (1962 2 Q.B. 220); Andrews v.......
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