Neither unitary nor federal: Did Bolivians invent something new?

DOI10.1177/0192512119829475
Published date01 June 2020
Date01 June 2020
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119829475
International Political Science Review
2020, Vol. 41(3) 402 –418
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512119829475
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Neither unitary nor federal: Did
Bolivians invent something new?
Franz Xavier Barrios-Suvelza
University of Erfurt, Germany
Abstract
The unitary–federal dichotomy is used as a standard means for taxonomizing state forms. However, its
classificatory power has been increasingly stretched by heterodox cases such as Spain, Italy, South Africa
and, most recently, Bolivia. This article contends that Bolivia’s constitutional changes have definitively
challenged the long-standing assumption that the unitary–federal divide best serves the goal of an accurate
taxonomization in the field of comparative federalism. Despite the noise Bolivia’s latest constitutional reform
has caused in the otherwise settled framework of comparative federalism’s most basic concepts, scholarship
is opting for the most comfortable choice by squeezing Bolivia into the unitary compartment. Subsequent
to the screening of different types of taxonomic approaches, a new classificatory framework for state
forms, based on a dichotomy that combines legal theory and the methodological tools of political science, is
proposed and tested on the Bolivian case.
Keywords
Comparative federalism, decentralization, research methods, constitutional design, methodology
Introduction
Constitutional changes occurring around the world generally do not bring conventional classifica-
tory frameworks into question. At first glance, this is also true of the case of Bolivia’s extensive
constitutional reform of 2009. Contemporary scholars still assume that Latin American countries
are either unitary or federal. Why then should a reform in a single country lead to questioning of
the long-standing divide between the unitary and federal state? It is not surprising that in the latest
Routledge Handbook on Latin American Politics, Eaton (2012: 43) classifies Bolivia as unitarian.
At a closer glance, Bolivia’s latest constitutional reform entails not only a transition away from the
unitary form (Fenwick, 2016: 234), but also leads to something which is not federal, forcing us to
challenge the ‘holy grail’ of the unitary–federal divide.
Corresponding author:
Franz Xavier Barrios-Suvelza, Faculty of Economics, State Law and Social Sciences, University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser
Strasse 63, Erfurt, 99089, Germany.
Email: franz.barrios_suvelza@uni-erfurt.de
829475IPS0010.1177/0192512119829475International Political Science ReviewBarrios-Suvelza
research-article2019
Article
Barrios-Suvelza 403
Building classifications is a basic task of knowledge production. Classification belongs to
conceptualization which, according to Munck (2010: 3), is the first component of knowledge
production alongside theorizing, measuring and assessing causality. When classification is
inconsistent, conceptualization is jeopardized. In comparative federalism this has become appar-
ent when facing the heterodox territorial arrangements in Italy (1948), Spain (1978) and South
Africa (1996). While the emerging theory on hybrids (Watts, 2008: 11) has been an insightful
reaction to this dilemma, it falls short of solving classification problems. The purpose of this
article is to evince the exhaustion of the unitary–federal dichotomy and to propose an alternative
that may improve the classification of state forms and allow to accurately assess the likelihood
of constitutional novelty in this domain. This purpose is met by applying an interdisciplinary
approach. For one thing, the line of reasoning will build upon inputs from political science. The
first input arises from literature on categorical classifications. Categorical classification can be
defined as assigning objects to nominal categories (Coppedge, 2012) constructed as bounded
wholes (Sartori, 1987: 182ff), which are clearly distinguished through cut-points and which are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Collier and Adcock, 1999: 541). Dichotomies are the sim-
plest expression of this technique (Coppedge, 2012).
As a second input, a deviant case selection technique will be chosen. A deviant case resembles
a phenomenon that ‘by reference to some general understanding of a topic … demonstrates a sur-
prising value’ (Gerring, 2010: 655). Deviant case analysis is useful for improving the classification
of political structures (Hague and Harrop, 2010: 45–46). The heterodoxy of Bolivia’s territorial
structure after the latest constitutional reform makes it both a deviant case (it does not fit conven-
tional classifications) and a single case with comparative merit (its features can be discussed
through concepts applicable to other countries allowing general inferences).
On the other hand, as convincing as these techniques of political science may be, compara-
tive federalism may profit from a legal mindset as well. One of comparative federalism’s defi-
ciencies has been the devaluing attitude towards a too ‘legalistic’ approach in classification
efforts (Watts, 2008: 20). These critiques boil down to faulting Wheare for his allegedly, overly
formalistic analysis of federalism (see Burgess, 2012: 35). Yet, legal theory can be serviceable.
First, it illustrates how the distribution of different types of rulemaking authority among territo-
rial levels explains the specific form a state assumes. Second, for building categorical subtypes
it helps to link rulemaking authority distribution to the structural weighting of territorial levels
in order to assess the status of levels within the whole system of territorial relationships, thereby
distinguishing the structural from the constitutional weight of levels. In this context, two warn-
ings are in order. First, relying on legal theory does not signify being blind to the fact that ter-
ritorial autonomy depends on more factors than legal rules. Second, this article could be faulted
for offering a mere de jure analysis. If this critique suggests that devices dressed in legal terms
are meaningful only after checking how they translate into concrete behaviour derived from
them, then this objection is amiss. It would lead one to believe that the formal frame itself lacks
relevance. Quite the contrary, in order to understand de facto behaviour of political actors, one
needs a reference against which to contrast it in the first place (Bednar, 2009: 24). If the critique
means that de jure analysis amounts to reifying rules written in constitutional texts, the critics
would assume that we are unaware of the fact that the formal constitution is not equal to the
structure of a state. In fact, structures on their own have effects upon territorial arrangements
(Keman, 2000: 221).
The first section of the article presents the deviant case. In the second section intrinsic short-
comings of conventional taxonomies are discussed. The third section introduces an alternative
taxonomical model. In the fourth section the ability of this model to assess constitutional novelty
is tested. And in the last section, counterarguments to the article’s findings are addressed.

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