No ‘end of the peace process’: Federalism and ethnic violence in Nepal
| Author | Julia Strasheim |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836717750199 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
750199CAC0010.1177/0010836717750199Cooperation and ConflictStrasheim
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Cooperation and Conflict
2019, Vol. 54(1) 83 –98
No ‘end of the peace process’:
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violence in Nepal
Julia Strasheim
Abstract
How does the reform of territorial state structures shape prospects for peace after war? Existing
research on the institutional causes of peace often focuses on how institutional designs, as the
outcomes of reform processes, reduce post-war violence and promote peace. The literature does
less frequently address how the politics that characterise reform processes affect the legitimacy
of institutions and whether or not violent protest ultimately takes place: this risks omitting key
explanations of how institutional reforms contribute to peace and the mechanisms by which this
occurs. By examining the case of Nepal, where clashes between protesters and security forces
over constitutional provisions for federalism have killed more than 60 people since August 2015,
this study shows that three factors of the territorial reform process contributed to the onset of
post-war ethnic violence. These included: (1) elite control of decision-making; (2) tight deadlines
that promoted backtracking on previous commitments; and (3) the embedding of single territorial
reforms in a ‘concert’ of institutional reforms that, as a whole, sparked fear of discrimination
among ethnic minorities.
Keywords
Ethnicity, federalism, institutions, Nepal, peace
Introduction
How does the reform of territorial state structures shape prospects for peace after war?
This question has been central to previous scholarship on the institutional causes of
post-war peace and is of great interest to practitioners promoting peace in war-torn
societies. The literature on post-war territorial arrangements, such as federalism or
territorial autonomy, has yet produced inconclusive results. While some authors argue
that institutions that increase territorial autonomy promote peace by mitigating fears of
Corresponding author:
Julia Strasheim, Federal-Chancellor-Helmut-Schmidt-Foundation, Kattrepel 10, 20095 Hamburg, Germany.
Email: j.strasheim@helmut-schmidt.de
84
Cooperation and Conflict 54(1)
political exploitation (Lake and Rothchild, 2005), others find that territorial deals lower
the chances for peace by increasing risks of separatism (Brancati, 2006). In this article, I
argue that part of the explanation for these inconsistent findings is that research analys-
ing post-war territorial institutions often suffers from an insufficient conceptual approach
to the relationship between such institutions and peace. Most notably, the scholarship
tends to focus on how territorial institutional designs, as the outcomes of reform pro-
cesses, help promote peace after war (Cederman et al., 2015; Hartzell et al., 2001). The
literature does not to the same extent address how the politics characterising reform
processes affect the legitimacy of institutional outcomes and, ultimately, whether or not
violent protest against these institutions takes place.
This article addresses this limitation and analyses how rather than institutional designs
alone, (1) the dominance of elite actors in decision-making; (2) the effect of tight dead-
lines on these actors’ decision-making quality; and (3) the embedding of single territorial
reforms into a ‘concert’ of institutional reforms that, as a whole, sparks fears of margin-
alisation, are factors that can exacerbate tensions and spark violence.
To this end, the article takes on the case of Nepal, which has thus far received only
limited attention in the academic debate on post-war federalism. Nepal’s peace process
is often regarded as a relative success, as the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or
CPN (M), successfully demobilised and transformed into a political party. In the post-
war period, however, politics have repeatedly taken a violent turn. Most recently, on 20
September 2015, a protracted constitution-making process ended when 507 of 598
Constituent Assembly members approved a new constitution. The document is meant to
consolidate Nepal’s transformation from a centralised Hindu kingdom to a federal and
secular republic. Many observers celebrated it as a ‘progressive milestone’1 and the ‘end
of the peace process’ with the Maoists (Bhattarai, 2015b). But weeks before the constitu-
tion was promulgated, protests erupted in Nepal’s southern Tarai plains. This region is
home to various identity groups, including those who self-identify as Madhesis. Who
constitutes as ‘Madhesi’ has been described as ambiguous by scholars (Miklian, 2008)
and is challenged by some communities in Nepal (Pandey, 2017). I here refer to Madhesis
as people living largely, but not exclusively, in the Tarai, ‘whose mother tongues […
include] Hindi, Urdu, Maithili, Bhojpuri, Bengali, and dialects of these’ (Kantha, 2011:
157) and who ‘maintain close linguistic, cultural, [and] ethnic ties’ with people across the
Indian border (Jha, 2014: 166). According to the 2001 census, this internally heterogene-
ous group makes up 33% of Nepal’s population, although the total population of the
Tarai comprises almost 50% of Nepal’s population (Kantha, 2011).
Madhesis are one of several identity groups in Nepal who have long exhibited sub-
stantial anger against political elites in Kathmandu for the latter’s failure to alleviate
widespread political and economic discrimination against minorities (cf. Gellner, 2007).2
They hold that particularly the federalist reforms foreseen in the new constitution will
result in their further marginalisation. Madhesi activists thus staged protests against the
proposed reforms and erected a blockade of the Nepal–India border. By January 2016,
almost 60 people had died in clashes between security forces and activists. As the gov-
ernment mobilised the army for the first time since the end of the war with the Maoists,
observers feared that the events were only the beginning of an ethnic war in the Tarai
(International Crisis Group, 2016). While this fear has not materialised to date, tensions
Strasheim
85
are still high and violence has not stopped. Notably, the Tarai saw several violent clashes
and multiple deaths in the lead up to Nepal’s long-awaited local elections in May and
June 2017. Protesters cited the government’s refusal to amend the constitution according
to their demands before the polls. Due to these protests, local elections have been post-
poned in one Tarai province until September 2017.
To what extent did the politics of Nepal’s territorial reform process contribute to the
violence in the Tarai? By analysing this question, the article makes important contribu-
tions to several research agendas. With its conceptual focus on the politics, rather than
the outcomes, of territorial reform processes, my analysis adds to theory-building in the
research on institutions and peace. With a focus on Nepal’s peace process, I empirically
advance a debate that has been dominated by statistical research and case studies on
Africa. Moreover, the article contributes to the research on Nepalese politics, as previous
analyses have tended to focus on the socio-economic, rather than institutional, determi-
nants of violence or peace in Nepal (e.g. Murshed and Gates, 2005).
I also present novel empirical data on post-war politics in Nepal. My analysis is
informed by two rounds of fieldwork carried out in September and October 2015 as well
as in April and May 2017. Thus, my fieldwork took place in the immediate aftermath of
the promulgation of the constitution in 2015 as well as during the first round of local
elections in 2017. In sum, I conducted 55 semi-structured interviews with political party
and government representatives, Maoist ex-combatants and commanders, current and
former police officers and army generals, civil society leaders, Madhesi activists, jour-
nalists, and members of the international community. Some interviewees whom I met in
2015 I interviewed again in 2017, in order to confirm previous statements or ask for
updated accounts on the peace process. I conducted most interviews on the condition of
anonymity and in Lalitpur or Kathmandu. Some interviews were carried out with the aid
of an interpreter; this concerned those with Maoist combatants, commanders, as well as
police or army officers. Interviews were arranged with the help of the local non-govern-
mental organisation (NGO) Nepal Peacebuilding Initiative, as well as through specific
targeting and snowball sampling.
Relying on interviews as a primary source of data clearly entails challenges. Most
notably, the information received in interviews can be biased or selective. Therefore, I
asked the same questions to people from all political orientations in order to check facts
across the political spectrum. However, my 2015 sample of interviewees includes more
Maoist ex-combatants, commanders, and politicians, than representatives from other
parties, as the latter were engaged in coalition talks at the time. This problem did no
longer exist in 2017. An additional check on the ‘Maoist bias’ of the 2015 sample is that
because the Maoist movement experienced several splits in the post-war period, many
Maoist interviewees spoke very critically of their...
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