NOTES OF CASES

Published date01 November 1976
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1976.tb01482.x
Date01 November 1976
NOTES
OF
CASES
THE LABOUR
INJUNC~ION
AFTER
1974
THE
judgments of Templeman
J.
and the Court of Appeal in
Camellia
Tanker
Ltd.
S.A.
v.
International Transport Workers Federation
inspire
the
hope that the courts may approach applications for labour
injunctions
in
a less intementionist spirit than was their habit in the
decade before
1971;
now that the Trade Union and Labour Relations
Act
1974
has restored
a
voluntary statutory framework.s The decision
is noteworthy, in the Court of Appeal,
(i)
on the approach to the
facts, and
(ii)
on
the procedural
aspects
of interlocutory injunctions;
and,
in
the judgment bdow, (iii) on the substantive law under the
1974
Act.
The plaintiffs’ tankor,
Camellia,
under
a
Panamanian flag, arrived
at Liverpool on January
11,
1976.
Its crew of
37,
made up
of
various
nationalities, had joined at various
ports
in
1975,
some allegedly
having paid money to
a
“recruiting agency” connected with the
plaintiffs. They were induced to sign employment agreements whereby
they promised not to complain about their wages and to have
nothing to do with the ITF. Their wages were inferior to the rates
specified
in
the
ITF world-wide scale rates. The ITF, to which some
350
autonomous trade unions around the world- are affiliated, had
adopted the policy of having officials
d
national
unions
act
as
its
inspectors
to enforce
its
policies, which are aimed at seeing
that
their adequately-paid members
are
not ousted by poorly-paid labour
and with
a
desire to prevent available poorly-paid labour being
exploited.’y4 Some
of
the
crew
had been discharged from the ship
at Haifa when they had attempted to obtain ITF rates.
In
Liverpool
a
representative of
ITF
and the second defendant,
Nelson (a
local
official of the National
Union
of
Seamen
acting
as
an
ITF
inspector), demanded
inter alia
thai
the crew be paid ITF rates
(with back-pay amounting to some
U.S.$142,987),
that the recruit-
ment charges be returned, that the plaintiffs pay the world-scale union
dues, and that the
crew
members discharged at Haifa be reinstated
without disciplinary action. Nelson addressed the crew and got most
of them to
htruct
the ITF to act on their behalf in obtaining
improved conditions. Nelson “told the master that the ship would
1
[I9761
I.C.R.
274.
2
Sce
Injunction Proccdure in Labour Disputes:
I,”
P.
L. Davics and
S.
D.
Anderman (1973)
2
I.L.J.
213.
3
The T.U.L.R. (Amendment) Act 1976 (which in particular extends protection
in
trade disputes to interfcrcnce with any typc
of
contract:
s.
3 (2)) was not cnacted
until after the rclcvant dates in the
Cumelliu
case.
On
T.U.L.R.A. 1974, and the
(thcn) Amendment
Bill
scc
(1974) 37
M.L.R.
525.
On
the Amendment Act
see
England and Recs,
supra.
p. 698.
Tcmplcman
J.
[1976]
I.C.R.
279.
715
716
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol.
39
not leave the docks until these demands had been met.”5 Despite
abortive negotiations, they were not met. Nelson also
“fully
informed
Transport and General Workers
Union
officials in the
area
about the matter, being under
no
doubt whatever
that that
union would take industrial action
in
support of the crew.E In
conse-
quence, not only did the crew refuse to
sail,
but the lock-men and
tug-men employed at the port made it clear they would not give
the necessary co-operation to allow the
Camellia
to
pass out of the
docks to
the
sea.
In this, the crew, the tug-men and the lock-men were
all acting in actual or threatened breach
of
their employment
contracts. The plaintiffs applied for an interlocutory injunction to
restrain the ITF and Nelson from inducing the lock-men and tug-
men to take this action, “leaving the master
to
overcome any
reluctance
on
the part of the crew or to put them ashore.”‘ The
claim was based primarily upon the defendants’ inducement of
breach
of
those contracts8 The defence in respect of Nelson rested
largely upon the claim that
in
furtherance of a trade dispute he
had done no more than induce breaches of employment contracts
and was therefore protected by section
13 (1)
of the Trade Union and
Labour Relations Act
1974.
Three preliminary points may be briefly mentioned.
First,
the ITF
was
a
tra.de union” within section
28
(1)
(b)
of the Trade Union
and Labour Relations Act
1974.
Therefore,
whether or
not
there was
a trade dispute,
it
was immune
to
any liability in tort under section
14 (1)
of that
ActB
Secondly, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully claimed
that the defendants were guilty of a crime,l0 and of breaches
of
statutory provisions, namely of local byelaws made under statute,
and of section
52
of the Harbours,
Docks
and Piers Clauses Act
1847.
This
ef€ort
to find an
unlawful means
not protected in a trade
dispute by section
13
of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act
was rejected both because
no
such breaches were proved, and because
“no
authority
was
cited
. . .
to show ,that the plaintiffs have any
5
Megaw
L.J.
ibid
p.
293.
It is interesting that throughout the case the plaintifls
appear not
to
have relied upon the simple claim that Nelson had deliberately inter-
fercd with the plaintiffs’ commercial contracts (which must surely have been affected
and inducing breach
of
which before March
25, 1976,
would have becn actionable
even in
a
trade dispute); but they pleaded almost
every
conceivable tort except that.
6
Ibid.
p.
297.
7
Templeman
J.,
p.
280.
8
Intimidation and conspiracy were also pleaded, but they added nothing on these
facts to the tort of inducement, since if the actual or threatened inducement were
protected
as
being in furtherance
of
a trade dispute, those torts were
also
covered
by
s.
13 (1)
and
(4)
of
tho
T.U.L.R.A.
1974:
Templeman
J.
pp.
284-285.,
So
too
the “consequence”
of
interference with trade was protected by s.
13 (2),
a
sub-
section
‘‘
designed
to
prevent section
13 (1)
being rendered nugatory
”:
ibid.
p.
284;
but contrast
Rookes
v.
Bornord
[1964]
A.C.
1129, 1192
and
1236
where Lords
Evershed and Pearce considered that,;he equivq!ent yrds in
s.
3
of the Trade
Disputes Act
1906,
were themselves nugatory or pointless.”
0 Templeman
J.,
p.
285.
Megaw
L.J.
appears to have suggested
per
incurium
that tho immunity
of
the ITF arose
because
of
the trade dispute: p.
294.
But that
would only have been
so
if
the plaintiffs had relied upon
s.
14 (2)
(b)
of the Act,
which they did not do.
10
Blackmail under the Theft Act
1968,
s.
21,
an allegation .
.
. merely a picce
of
rhetoric designed to go to the merits,” Templeman
J.,
p.
281.

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