Now or Never? How Imminent Must a Fear of Violence be for the Purposes of s. 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997?

AuthorZach Leggett
Published date01 February 2017
Date01 February 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0022018316685489
attacked. Majewski and s. 76 of the 2008 Act would havedone the rest for it. Had the appellant contended
that his mistakeof fact was not attributable to his intoxicationthen the Crown would of course haveneeded
to prove that it was, but under the circumstances that would surely not have been an onerous task.
Negligent representation is always regrettable. Whatshould not surprise anyone, however, is the result
of this appeal. There was nothing new about the court’s approach. It is not only well established in
authority, but is consistent with other matters the criminal courts need to make decisions on regularly.
For example, when evidence is obtained as a consequence of an unlawful search, or following the failure
to properly cautiona suspect, then a s. 78 PACE submission at trialwill often follow, but the court will not
exclude evidence pursuant to that section merely because the evidence was obtained improperly. The
operation of s. 78 to exclude evidence requires that a consequent unfairness be identified before the
section can be utilised in the defendant’s favour (see RvO’Brien [2016] EWCA Crim 678; Damian
Warburton, ‘Argumentsfor excluding a Co-accused’s Guilty Plea andthe s.78 Duty’ 80(5) J Crim L 294),
and so it is for negligent legal advice. The court made clear that ‘the ultimate question ...is whether the
failure of the appellant to give evidence renders the conviction unsafe.’ The answer was, properly, no.
Damian Warburton
Now or Never? How Imminent Must a Fear
of Violence be for the Purposes of s. 4A of
the Protection from Harassment Act 1997?
R v Qosja (Robert) [2016] EWCA Crim 1543
Keywords
Harassment, stalking, course of conduct, fear of violence, assault, immediacy.
The complainant in this case, KL, began working in a bar in Nunhead on 9 July 2015. Soon thereafter,s he came
across theappellantwho was a regular at the bar. A relationship developed between the two, although this
was platonic and somewhat unwelcome as far as KL was concerned. Between the periods of 10 July to 31
July the following events took place. The complainant reluctantly gave the appellant her number when
he requested it and then subsequently accepted his offer for a replacement phone when she lost hers. One
evening, she accepted a lift home from the appellant and he offered her a job opportunity as a babysitter
or cleaner for one of his friends. On arriving at the complainant’s home, the appellant stayed to use the
toilet and have a cup of tea. He then offered the complainant a room in his house rent-free, which she duly
declined. On one occasion, when the complainant was ill, she was visited by the appellant, who stayed
and chatted for over two hours, although the complainant did not expect him to stay for so long. During
the friendship, the appellant made various phone callsandsenttextmessagestoKL,someofwhichshe
found inappropriate and unwelcome. One particular text referred to her as ‘baby girl’.
The events culminated on the evening of 31 July when, during her shift at the bar, KL and the
appellant entered into a public argument. The appellant was unhappy that she had not returned his phone
calls and text messages and in response, KL returned the phone to him. Angry, the appellant threw the
phone out outside and words were exchanged. At this stage, another customer and the bar manager
intervened. Later, the appellant confronted the complainant and asked her why she had turned down his
job offer. She responded that she was happy in her current job and the appellant left, having bought some
beer to take home with him.
Court of Appeal 17

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