Ogle v Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN,LORD JUSTICE MANCE
Judgment Date06 April 2001
Neutral Citation[2001] EWCA Civ 598
Docket NumberB/2001/0155
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date06 April 2001
Between
Ronald Ogle
Claimant/applicant
and
The Chief Constable Of The Thames Valley Police
Defendant/respondent

[2001] EWCA Civ 598

Before:

Lord Justice Simon Brown

Vice President Of The Court Of Appeal, Civil Division

Lord Justice Mance

B/2001/0155

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

((Mr Justice Buckley)

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2

MR B HAWKIN (Instructed by The Free Representation Unit) appeared on behalf of the Appellant

The Respondent did not appear and was not represented

Friday 6 April 2001

LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN
1

This is a second tier appeal brought with the permission of Sedley LJ against part of the order of Buckley J made on 12 January 2000, dismissing the appellant's appeal against the order of District Judge Henson on 30 June 1999, striking out three consolidated actions which the applicant had brought against the respondent, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police.

2

Sedley LJ gave permission to appeal on a limited basis. First, he gave it only in respect of one of the appellant's three actions, an action begun by specially endorsed writ in January 1998 alleging wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. He did not give permission with regard to actions respectively for malicious prosecution and for slander. Secondly, he gave permission only in respect of a particular cause of action, namely a claim pursuant to section 22(1) of the Data Protection Act 1984, and not for a claim (which was apparently floated before him) also in negligence.

3

The facts relevant to the appeal can be briefly stated. In December 1993 the appellant was disqualified from driving for four years by the Windsor Justices, having been prosecuted by the Thames Valley Police and convicted of two drink driving offences. On appeal to the Crown Court, the period of disqualification was reduced to two years, ending on 1 December 1995. Regrettably, however, the Police National Computer record was not properly amended to reflect the outcome of the appeal. It is not altogether easy to see precisely what happened, but the PNC entry was clearly capable of being understood to indicate that the appellant remained subject to a four-year ban. It rather looks as if the Thames Valley Police attempted to have the entry corrected but that the DVLA failed to achieve this, with the result that it read:

"Warning: report expired 01/12/95. DVLA expiry 01/12/97."

4

Thus it was that on 4 September 1997, some 21 months after the appellant's disqualification had in fact ended, he nevertheless came to be arrested by officers of a different police force, the Surrey Police, on suspicion of driving whilst disqualified and was detained on that account for some two and a half hours before being released.

5

The appellant's first claim for damages arising out of his arrest was made against the Surrey Police. Before even proceedings were issued, however, that claim was settled in January 1998 for £950. The solicitor for the Surrey Police Force wrote to the appellant on 6 January 1998 explaining how the DVLA had failed to amend their records, recognising that there was indeed fault on the part of the arresting officers, and stating:

"You may be aware that the Court of Appeal have issued guidelines on the award of damages in the civil actions against the police for false imprisonment. These guidelines suggest a starting figure of £500 for the first hour of detention, up to a maximum of £3000 for the first 24 hours. On this basis I calculate that if a court were to find that you were wrongfully arrested and falsely imprisoned, you would receive an award of between £750 and £800. Taking into account the other aggravating factors to which you have alluded in your correspondence, I am prepared to recommend a payment of £950 in full and final settlement of any claims you may have against the Surrey Police arising from this incident."

On 14 January, the appellant accepted that offer in these terms:

"I accept your offer of £950 which takes care of my arrest, detention and embarrassment. I reserve the right to draw attention to the motoring issue [in circumstances not presently material]."

7

The writ against the respondent police force followed within days. As stated, it is brought, so far as now relevant, pursuant to section 22(1) of the 1984 Act:

"An individual who is the subject of personal data held by a data user and who suffers damage by reason of the inaccuracy of the data shall be entitled to compensation from the data user for that damage and for any distress which the individual has suffered by reason of the inaccuracy."

8

The respondent Chief Constable in fact disputes that he, as opposed to the DVLA, was the data user in respect of the inaccurate entry in this case; and, I think, would dispute too that any fault on his part was causative of the arrest, given that the Surrey Police themselves clearly should have known better than to arrest the appellant in the light of the actual DVLA entry. The Chief Constable accepts, however, as he accepted before both the District Judge and Buckley J, that for the purposes of a strike-out application, such as we are concerned with here, such issues as these cannot be decided and must accordingly be assumed in the appellant's favour.

9

The respondent's central and critical argument is that nevertheless the action was impermissibly brought and has been rightly struck out because it advances a claim for damages in respect of which the appellant has already been compensated by the settlement of his claim against the Surrey Police. The Thames Valley Police and the Surrey Police, submits Mr Warnock in his helpful skeleton argument (on which we did not find it necessary to invite oral elaboration), were concurrent tortfeasors in that, although the respondent is liable by reason of a different cause of action, both Forces, on the facts assumed, caused the same damage to the appellant. In settling his claim against the Surrey Police, the appellant crystallised the value of that damage and he cannot now, in a further action, claim more from the respondent. In short, submits Mr Warnock, this case is essentially indistinguishable from the House of Lords decision in Jameson v CEGB [2000] 1 AC 455.

10

Although perhaps that puts the point rather too high, even if strictly the two Forces here are not to be regarded as concurrent tortfeasors, in my judgment they are plainly in a very closely analogous position, and I would regard the case as falling completely within the dictum of Robert Walker LJ in Kenburgh Investment (Northern) Ltd v Minton[2000] LLR PN 736 at 744:

"… I would not exclude the possibility of the [ Jameson] principle being extended to closely analogous situations (although where the two actual or potential defendants are not liable in respect of precisely the same damage, abuse of process may be a safer foundation for the court to restrict further proceedings…)"

11

Mr Hawkin for the appellant (and let me at this stage record our gratitude to him for conducting this appeal on a voluntary basis, and thereby providing the court with very considerable assistance) contests this analysis. He draws attention to what Sedley LJ said when granting permission to appeal:

"I consider that the argument now advanced under the Data Protection Act 1984 is available on Mr Ogle's homemade pleading and is not necessarily precluded by his settlement with the Surrey police. Arguably the nature of the damage is different.

I do not consider, however, that the case in negligence is separately sustainable. Here the situation seems to me to be governed by the House of Lords' decision in Jameson v CEGB: the damage caused to Mr Ogle was precisely his arrest by the Surrey police."

12

What in essence Mr Hawkin submits is that Mr Ogle's acceptance of the Surrey Police's £950 offer was...

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    • Court of Appeal (Cayman Islands)
    • 13 Junio 2019
    ...Plc v Arip [2014] EWCA Civ. 381, and Norcross v Georgallides [2015] EWHC 1290 (Comm) at [65] per Hamblen J). See also Day v Cook [2001] EWCA Civ. 598, [2002] 1 BCLC 1 at [38] per Arden LJ and proposition (4) of Neuberger LJ's statement of the principles in Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA Ci......
  • Lloyd Christopher Biscoe v Graham William Milner
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    ...for the court to restrict further proceedings…)” (At p.74). 440 This dictum was approved in Ogle v Chief Constable of Thames Valley [2001] EWCA Civ 598. In that case, the appellant had been disqualified from driving for a period which was incorrectly recorded on the Police National Compute......
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    ...some comparison to the claim which did involve physical detention which was considered by the Court of Appeal in Ogle v The Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police [2001] EWCA Civ 598. In that case the claimant had in fact been arrested in consequence of circumstances somewhat similar t......

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