On Nasser and His Legacy
| Published date | 01 March 1974 |
| Author | Fouad Ajami |
| Date | 01 March 1974 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234337401100104 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
41-
On
Nasser
and
His
Legacy*
FOUAD
AJAMI
Center
of
International
Studies,
Princeton
University,
Princeton,
New
Jersey
The
purpose
of
this
essay
is
an
examination
of
some
of
the
fruits
of
Nasserism,
both
as
a
source
of
particular
policies
and
choices
throughout
Nasser’s
political
career
and
as
a
legacy
which
impinges
upon
political
choices
in
post-Nasser
Egyptian
and
Arab
politics.
While
seeking
to
illuminate
the
positions
and
argu-
mentations
of
the
proponents
and
detractors
of
the
man
and
his
policies,
the
essay
is
not
in-
tended
to
arrive
at
a
final
and
simple
judge-
ment
concerning
Nasserism
and
its
achieve-
ments
and
shortcomings.
Given
the
mixed
nature
of
Nasserism,
any
such
effort
is
futile
and
more
the
domain
of
legitimate
political
partisanship
and
activism
rather
than
that
of
critical
analysis.
While
the
faithful
may
point
to
his
advocacy
of
Arab
nationalism
and
his
commitment
to
the
welfare
of
the
Egyptian
masses,
critics
are
not
without
an
abundance
of
setbacks
to
dwell
upon:
the
Yemeni
fiasco,
which
was
dubbed
Nasser’s
Vietnam;
his
many
regional
quarrels,
which
consumed
his
re-
sources
and
attention;
his
failure
to
bring
about
a
peaceful
settlement
of
the
Arab-Israeli
conflict;
the
performance
of
his
armies
in
1956
and
1967;
the
failure
of
his
agrarian
reform;
and
his
inability
to
create
a
durable
and
viable
base
of
power
and
legitimacy
outside
the
sheer
impact
of
his
charisma.
Almost
two
decades
of
Nasserist
rule
did
not
eradicate
the
eternal
problem
of
Egyptian
poverty
and
scarcity,
and
one
of
his
dreams,
ambitious
in
the
Egyptian
context,
of
making
meat
a
regular
feature
of
the
Egyptian
diet,
never
materialized.
It
remains
a
treat
for
spe-
cial
occassions
and
holidays.
On
a
different
track,
his
record
is
equally
dismal.
As
an
at-
tempt
at
ideological
change
and
transforma-
tion
Nasserism
was
abortive
and
the
new
socie-
ty
that
he
claimed
to
be
his
goal
has
yet
to
be
built.
The
feudalistic
structure
that
he
inherited
may
have
been
weakened,
but
the
cultural
bias
in
favor
of
class,
privilege
and
status
that
has
always
been
a
part
of
Egyptian
culture
is
largely
intact.
New
masters
have
replaced
the
old,
but
the
masses
remain
submissive
and
re-
signed
to
their
lot.
A
new
generation
of
offi-
cers
and
technocrats
came
to
power
at
the
expence
of
landed
feudal
aristocracy,
but
the
hierarchical
vision
of
the
world
and
the
defer-
ence
toward
power
and
its
symbols
are
still
the
dominant
features
of
the
Egyptian
political
landscape.
He
flirted
with
socialism,
but
in
such
a
context
it
never
really
had
much
of
a
chance.
He
tried
to
undermine
tradition,
but
still
had
so
much
reverence
for
it
that
his
at-
tack
did
not
have
sufficient
impact
and
al-
though
here
and
there
some
dents
can
be
seen,
as
a
whole
it
is
alive
and
doing
quite
well.
He
felt
the
power
of
Islamic
institutions
and
values
and
tried
to
undermine
them
in
favor
of
secular
schemes,
but
at
best
he
was
only
semi-secular
himself.
In
the
end,
what
obtained
in
Egypt
was
a
compromise
between
Islamic
tradition
and
Nasserist
ideology.
An
equipoise
was
arrived
at,
and
Nasser
and
his
leading
in-
tellectuals
could
point
to
their
socialist
blue-
print
as
a
synthesis
of
socialism,
Islam,
and
Arab
nationalism.
An
insightful
study
by
Morroe
Berger
found
no
serious
opposition
to
Islam
on
the
part
of
the
regime
but
an
attempt
to
use
it
’to
buttress
nationalism,
socialism,
and
the
one-party
popular
democracy’.2
Quite
suggestive
indeed
is
Berger’s
further
assertion
that
the
conditions
in
Nasser’s
Egypt
may
have
enhanced
rather
than
weakened
the
position
of
religion:
’In
such
conditions
of
rapid
political
change,
stress,
unachieved
goals
and
denial
of
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