On Three-Dimensional Power
| Author | Barry Hindess |
| Published date | 01 September 1976 |
| Date | 01 September 1976 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1976.tb00119.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ON
THREE-DIMENSIONAL
POWER
BARRY HINDESS
Liverpool University
THIS book* claims to present a conceptual analysis of power. It discusses the
manner in which instances
of
power are to be identified. Lukes retains the zero-
sum, or relational, concept
of
power according to which
‘A
exercises power over
B
when A affects
B
in a manner contrary to
B’s
interests’ (p.
34).
‘Views’ of power
are said to differ according to how instances of that concept are to be empirically
identified. Lukes argues both against the one-dimensional view, attributed to
pluralists such as Dahl and Polsby, that power can be identified only in cases of
overt conflict and against the two-dimensional view, attributed to anti-pluralists
such as Bachrach and Baratz, that power may involve the suppression of manifest
discontent below the level
of
overt political conflict. In contrast Lukes advances
a three-dimensional view which he believes to be ‘radical in both the theoretical
and political senses’ (p.
9).
He proposes to count as instances of power those
cases in which individuals or groups fail to recognize their ‘real’ interests. ‘Real’
interests are those which would be recognized under conditions that do allow
people to recognize their real interests. Lukes maintains that the concept of
power is ‘essentially contested’ meaning that the one underlying concept in-
evitably gives rise to distinct ‘views’ as a function of the social values of different
investigators. The three views outlined above are said
to
be liberal, reformist and
radical respectively.
In relation to its size this short book raises a disproportionate number of
extremely problematic issues only two of which can be considered in this review.
I
shall comment first on the ‘radical’ character of Lukes’ view of power and on his
pernicious doctrine ‘that power is one of those concepts which is ineradicably
value-dependent’ (p.
26),
and secondly on his cavalier treatment of theoretical
positions, notably that of Talcott Parsons, which entail the rejection of the zero-
sum conception of power.
I
shall argue that their excessive concern for the
empirical identification of power to the exclusion
of
any serious consideration
of
its social conditions
of
existence condemns the pluralists and their multi-
dimensional opponents to a pointless and sterile debate.
Consider first the ‘radical’ character of Lukes’ view and the alleged relevance
of values. Lukes’ concept
of
power
is
defined by reference
to
other terms, notably
‘affect’ and ‘interests’. Different interpretations of power will depend on different
interpretations
of
those terms, in which case theoretical and methodological
problems will
no
doubt be posed. But why must values be dragged in to
that
debate? On Lukes’ account of the dimensional views of power one could con-
struct
a
concept of, say, ‘boredom’ and identify several views of it, views ranging
from the one-dimensional view which requires explicit assertions of boredom to
the
3-D
view which maintains that while boredom frequently goes unrecognized
it would be recognized under different conditions. In this example the dimensional
*
Steven
Lukes,
Power: a radical view.
Macmillan,
1974,64
pp.,
533.75.
Political
Studies,
Vol.
XXN,
No.
3
(329-333)
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