Opportunities to promote human rights and democratic values abroad: The case of Canadian foreign policy toward Venezuela
Author | Yvon Grenier |
Published date | 01 September 2021 |
Date | 01 September 2021 |
DOI | 10.1177/00207020211048431 |
Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2021, Vol. 76(3) 446–464
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00207020211048431
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Opportunities to promote
human rights and democratic
values abroad: The case of
Canadian foreign policy
toward Venezuela
Yvon Grenier
St. Francis Xavier University, Canada
Abstract
This article examines Canadian foreign policy toward Venezuela, as a litmus test of
Ottawa’s promise to project a consistently strong voice for the protection of human
rights and the advancement of democratic values in the world. The case is made that
Canada is more likely to gear up to an assertive approach if there is a perception that
there is an opportunity for democratization in the country, and for policymaker s in
Ottawa, if there is an opportunity to prioritize human rights and democracy, as
opposed to more traditional national interest objectives. The article offers an ex-
planation about when and how Canada typically promotes its liberal values abroad.
Keywords
Venezuela, foreign policy, human rights, democracy, Canada
This article examines Canadian foreign policy toward Venezuela, as a litmus test of
Ottawa’s promise to project “a consistently strong voice for the protection of human
rights and the advancement of democratic values”in the world.
1
Corresponding author:
Yvon Grenier, Political Science, St. Francis Xavier University, 1 West Street, Antigonish, Nova Scotia B2G
2W5, Canada.
Email: ygrenier@stfx.ca
1. Government of Canada, “Canada’s approach to advancing human rights,”Ottawa, Ontario, 2017, https://
international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_
homme/advancing_rights-promouvoir_droits.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 31 July 2021).
Beginning under Canada’s twenty-second prime minister Stephen Harper (6 Feb-
ruary 2006 to 4 November 2015), but reaching new heights under Justin Trudeau’s
Liberal government, Ottawa has been exceptionally steadfast in its defence of human
rights and democracy (henceforth HRD) in Venezuela. This policy unfolded in response
to the worsening of the humanitarian, economic, and political crisis in this country over
the past few years.
While one can trace the roots of this crisis back to the presidency of Hugo Ch´
avez
(1999–2013), who was democratically elected for the first time in 1998, the deteri-
oration was gradual under his rule but truly intensified under his successor in Mira-
flores, his former minister of foreign affairs and “yes-man”Nicol ´
as Maduro (2013–).
2
Ch´
avez died in March of 2013, and Maduro managed to win a close presidential
election in April. Since then, the country has descended into conditions normally
associated with state failure and civil war.
Canada was a founding member of the Lima Group, an ad hoc coalition established
on 8 August 2017 in Lima, Peru, to apply international pressure on Venezuela to
democratize and respect human rights. This coalition of the willing was deemed
necessary after years of vain efforts to work within the gridlocked Organization of
American States (OAS) to apply the Inter-American Democratic Charter to the
Venezuela case. The Lima Group includes most Latin American countries, and rep-
resents a majority of the region’s population, but it does not include the United States.
Maduro’s re-election on 20 May 2018 was neither free nor fair.On the first day of his
second mandate (10 January 2019), the government of Canada made this statement:
“Today, Nicol´
as Maduro’s regime loses any remaining appearance of legitimacy.
Having seized power through fraudulent and anti-democratic elections [. . .], the
Maduro regime is now fully entrenched as a dictatorship. The suffering of Venezuelans
will only worsen should he continue to illegitimately cling to power.”
3
In a rebuke to
Maduro’s“usurpation,”on 23 January, the president of the democratically elected
National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, was chosen by his peers to become the interim
president of Venezuela. (He was not “self-appointed,”as if this were even possible, as
some commentators said.) This nomination was immediately endorsed by Canada, the
Lima Group, and dozens of other countries, mostly in the Americas and in Europe. In
the early months of 2019, Venezuela seemed to be at a crossroads, and multilateral
pressures could have conceivably restored democracy in the country and countered a
menacing trend in the hemisphere.
The language used in Canada’s statements to bla me Maduro and his r egime could
hardly bemore categorical. WhenMaduro was not invitedto the Summit of the Americas
in February of 2018 by the host country (Peru), Trudeau’s second foreign minister (10
January 2017 to 20 November 2019), and the member of parliament for University-
2. Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics, Venezuela and the Legacy of Hugo Ch´avez
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 163.
3. Global Affairs Canada (GAC), “Canada rejects the Maduro regime’s illegitimate mandate in Venezuela,”
Ottawa, Ontario, 10 January 2019.
Grenier 447
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