Owners and/or Bareboat Charterers and/or Sub Bareboat Charterers of Samco Europe v Owners of MSC Prestige [QBD (Admiralty)]

This was a claim arising out of a collision between a VLCC (SAMCO EUROPE) and a containership (MSC PRESTIGE) in the Gulf of Aden.

As a result of the collision both vessels suffered considerable damage. The claim of SAMCO EUROPE was estimated at US$34.5m and that of MSC PRESTIGE at US$16m. Each vessel claimed that the other was primarily to blame for the collision.

SAMCO EUROPE was steering a course of 3000 and making about 16.5 knots. Twenty-seven minutes before the collision (C-27) the echo of a vessel which proved to be MSC PRESTIGE was observed about 1 point on the port bow at about 1617 miles. At C-16 the ARPA radar revealed the speed of MSC PRESTIGE to be about 24 knots. MSC PRESTIGE was, according to the ARPA data, set to cross ahead of SAMCO EUROPE from port to starboard with a passing distance (CPA) of 4 cables. SAMCO EUROPE maintained her course and speed.

The data from the ARPA indicated that MSC PRESTIGE had altered course by about 60 to starboard by about C-8. The data from the ARPA continued to show that MSC PRESTIGE was shaping to cross ahead of SAMCO EUROPE. By C-7.5 the ARPA was indicating that she would pass SAMCO EUROPE on her starboard side at a distance of about two cables.

The Second Officer decided to alter course to port. The heading of SAMCO EUROPE began to alter to port at about C-6. As a result of this alteration to port the bearing of MSC PRESTIGE from SAMCO EUROPE passed from the port bow to the starboard bow. During the alteration to port SAMCO EUROPE was called by MSC PRESTIGE on VHF at about C-5. By C-4 the ARPA was indicating to the Second Officer a passing distance of less than a cable, starboard to starboard.

SAMCO EUROPE again called MSC PRESTIGE by VHF. The heading of SAMCO EUROPE continued to alter to port. There was a further exchange on VHF.

At Collision Samco Europe's Heading Was About 2300. The angle of collision between the starboard bow of SAMCO EUROPE and the port bow of MSC PRESTIGE was about 900.

The first radar observation by MSC PRESTIGE of SAMCO EUROPE was at about C-14. The echo was about a point on the starboard bow of MSC PRESTIGE distant about nine miles. MSC PRESTIGE's voyage data recorder (VDR) showed that at about C-11 the heading of the vessel altered to starboard. After the first alteration of heading by 60 to starboard SAMCO EUROPE remained on the starboard bow of MSC PRESTIGE. The Second Officer instructed the helmsman to steer manually at about C-7 and thereafter to apply starboard helm. The heading of MSC PRESTIGE began to alter from 1070. By C-6 she was heading about 1090 and by C-5 she was heading about 1170.

At C-5 the Second Officer called SAMCO EUROPE by VHF. It was apparent from that conversation that the Second Officer was intending to pass SAMCO EUROPE port to port.

At C-4 the heading of MSC PRESTIGE had reached about 1210 and by C-3.5 it was about 1250. As a result of the VHF conversations and as stated in them the course of MSC PRESTIGE was then maintained but shortly before collision hard starboard helm was ordered. At collision the heading of MSC PRESTIGE was swinging to starboard.

SAMCO EUROPE submitted that the Second Officer on MSC PRESTIGE failed to keep a good radar and visual lookout; MSC PRESTIGE's duty as the give way vessel was to take early and substantial action to keep out of the way.

Held, ruling accordingly:

1. MSC PRESTIGE's navigation was at fault in that she failed to keep a good radar and visual lookout. She failed to take early and substantial action to keep out of the way of SAMCO EUROPE by making a substantial turn to starboard at about C-12. She failed to announce that she was altering to starboard at C-6.5 by appropriate sound and light signals. She failed to observe at C-5.5 that SAMCO EUROPE was altering course to port and failed to apply hard starboard helm either then or at any time before about C-3.5

2. SAMCO EUROPE's navigation was also at fault in that she altered course to port at C-7.5 when she ought to have altered course to starboard. She failed to announce her alteration to port by appropriate sound and light signals. She failed to keep a good visual lookout and so failed to apply hard starboard helm at C-5.5 when a good visual lookout would have revealed that MSC PRESTIGE was altering course to starboard.

3. MSC PRESTIGE ought to have made a substantial alteration to starboard at about C-12 when the vessels were about 8 miles apart. Had she done so the vessels would have been likely to pass port to port at a distance of about 1 mile which would have been a safe passing distance. Instead, the alterations of course to starboard in fact made by MSC PRESTIGE at C-11 and C-6.5 would have resulted in the vessels passing at a distance of about or little less than half a mile, assuming that SAMCO EUROPE had maintained her course and speed. For a laden VLCC and a container ship closing at a combined speed of 40 knots that would not have been a safe passing distance. However, when SAMCO EUROPE chose to take action, as she was entitled to pursuant to rule 17(a)(ii) of the Collision Regulations, she made matters worse by altering course to port towards a vessel on her port bow. At about C-5.5 when the vessels were about 3.5 miles apart both vessels had an opportunity to avoid a dangerous close quarters situation developing. Each ought to have observed the opening and closing of the other's side lights and applied hard starboard helm. Neither vessel observed the opening and closing of the other's lights at that time and neither took the correct action to avoid a dangerous close quarters situation either then or later. SAMCO EUROPE continued turning to port and MSC PRESTIGE, although turning to starboard, failed to apply hard starboard helm. She then maintained her course before, at the last, altering hard to starboard.

4. The dangerous close quarters situation which resulted was therefore not the fault of the give-way vessel alone but was brought about by the faults of both vessels. The causative potency of MSC PRESTIGE's initial fault was the greater because it resulted in her appearing on SAMCO EUROPE's ARPA to be shaping to cross ahead of SAMCO EUROPE and so led to SAMCO EUROPE's alteration to port to increase the CPA. An early and substantial turn to starboard by MSC PRESTIGE would have resulted in her shaping to pass port to port. In those circumstances it was unlikely that SAMCO EUROPE would have altered course to port. The blameworthiness of MSC PRESTIGE's faults was high. The blameworthiness of SAMCO EUROPE's fault in going to port at C-7.5 when the vessels were 5 miles apart was also high. But SAMCO EUROPE's fault in going to port was not as culpable as the fault of MSC PRETIGE in failing to take early and substantial action to keep out of the way of SAMCO EUROPE. Overall the blameworthiness of MSC PRESTIGE was greater than that of SAMCO EUROPE. MSC PRESTIGE's greater culpability in the early stages was not eliminated by SAMCO EUROPE's greater culpability at C-5.5 but was reduced by it.

5. The use of VHF by each vessel was inappropriate and, in relative terms, increased each vessel's culpability by about the same extent.

6. MSC PRESTIGE should bear 60% responsibility for the collision and SAMCO EUROPE should bear 40%.