P. v T. Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 30 April 1997 |
| Date | 30 April 1997 |
| Court | Chancery Division |
Practice - Discovery - Action for - Third party supplying information causing employer to dismiss plaintiff - Employer refusing to disclose identity of informant or nature of allegations - Plaintiff seeking discovery against employer in order to bring action against third party - Whether discovery to be ordered
In an action against his former employer the plaintiff sought an order that the employer disclose precise details of allegations made against him which formed the basis for his dismissal and the identity of the person who made the allegations in order that he might use the documents and information so provided in an action against that person.
On the application:—
Held, granting the relief sought, that, since knowledge of the relevant facts could not be acquired without the assistance of the order sought, even though the elements of the torts of malicious falsehood or defamation remained to be made out, justice demanded that the plaintiff should be in a position to clear his name if the allegations made against him were false (post, pp. 896C–E, 897E–G, 898B–D).
The following cases are referred to in the judgment:
Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [
Upmann v. Elkan (
The following additional cases were cited in argument:
Boyo v. Lambeth London Borough Council [
C.H.C. Software Care Ltd. v. Hopkins & Wood [
Crest Homes Plc. v. Marks [
E.M.I. Ltd. v. Sarwar [
Focsa Services (U.K.) Ltd. v. Birkett [
Goodwin, In re [
Hope v. Brash [
Lavarack v. Woods of Colchester Ltd. [
Mahmud v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. [
Riddick v. Thames Board Mills Ltd. [
Sony Corporation v. Anand [
Sybron Corporation v. Barclays Bank Plc. [
Motion
By a writ and statement of claim issued on 7 November 1996 and amended on 21 February 1997 the plaintiff, P., sought against the defendant, T. Ltd., his former employer, inter alia, (1) a declaration that his purported dismissal on 8 August 1996 was void and of no effect; (2) a declaration that he was and continued to be employed by the defendant; (3) an order by way of specific performance that the defendant disclose to him (a) the precise nature of the allegations made against him which formed the basis for his dismissal or purported dismissal on 8 August 1996 and (b) the identity of the complainant who made those allegations; and (4) damages.
By a notice of motion dated 3 March 1997 the plaintiff sought an order that the defendant forthwith disclose to him, inter alia, the information sought in paragraph (3) of the statement of claim.
The facts are stated in the judgment.
Patrick Elias Q.C. for the plaintiff.
Witold Pawlak for the defendant.
Sir Richard Scott V.-C. The application made before me this morning is a rather unusual one. I can best describe it by starting with the circumstances in which the litigation has been commenced. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant company. His employment commenced on 1 October 1982. Immediately before the events which have given rise to this litigation his responsibility in his employment with the defendant was to put out to tender major contracts. In his affidavit, sworn on a date which the document in front of me does not indicate, he commented that the contracts for which he was responsible might be extremely valuable to the contractors concerned, ranging in value from a few thousand pounds up to several million pounds. It seems reasonably clear therefore that his employment involved some considerable responsibility and that his status within the company was, relatively at least, a senior one.
At the end of May 1996 the plaintiff was asked to go to the office of the defendant's managing director. The plaintiff attended and was told by him that the defendant had received what were described as third party allegations against him, which it regarded as very serious. In his affidavit the plaintiff says that he asked for details of the allegations that had been made, but, he said, the managing director refused to provide any details either as to the nature of the allegations or as to their source. He then had a meeting with the managing director on 11 June. Present also was the defendant's personnel manager. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the allegations that had been made against the plaintiff, but again he was not given any details of those allegations. In his affidavit he says that he was told on this occasion that the third party who had made the allegations had made them to the personnel manager, who was present at that meeting. He was told that the individual who had spoken to the personnel manager would be prepared to stand up in court and repeat the allegations. But, as I have said, the plaintiff was not given any details of the allegations that had been made.
His contract with the defendant contains provision for disciplinary hearings and for appeals from the findings made at those disciplinary hearings. By a letter of 29 July 1996 the plaintiff was required to attend a disciplinary hearing in connection with the allegations that had been made against him. The hearing was to take place on 8 August. The plaintiff's solicitor was not permitted to be present. The letter stated that the hearing would consider “allegations of gross misconduct which have been made by an external party with respect to your conduct.” I draw attention to the description of the allegations as allegations of gross misconduct. The disciplinary hearing took place on 8 August. I have before me a transcript of the hearing. It was attended by the managing director and of course the plaintiff and also by a lady described as the personnel director of the defendant. The important opening remarks were made by the managing director. His remarks included this passage:
“The management has carried out an investigation following receipt of allegations from an external party. After much discussion the external party has requested that they are not identified at this stage. We have considered their reasons for not wanting to be named and concluded that it is a reasonable request. As a result of this we are not willing to disclose the exact nature of the allegation as this would immediately identify the external party involved. We are however satisfied that the allegations are genuine and that they have been made in good faith. Our conclusion [is] that the allegations are evidence of gross misconduct in the way in which you have conducted yourself with external contractors. In the case of yourself you have a chance to answer this point, but we recognise that we are not disclosing the exact nature of the allegations and you are unable to state your case in detail.”
I would make the comment that it seems to me a little inaccurate to say that the management were not disclosing the exact nature of the allegations. There had been no detail whatever given of the allegations, save for the conclusionary comments that they constituted gross misconduct. That being the case, it is not surprising that the plaintiff was unable to say anything useful. He did not know what was the case that he had to meet. It appears to me that the normal purpose of having a disciplinary hearing could not have been achieved in the light of the refusal of the management to disclose any details of the allegations that had been made against him. Indeed I would describe the disciplinary hearing as no more than a farce. The farcical elements may not have appeared to the plaintiff of course. He denied any gross misconduct on his part but did not really know what it was that he was supposed to be denying.
The conclusion at the end of the hearing was expressed by the managing director, who said:
“The allegations we have received are evidence of gross misconduct in the way you have conducted yourself with external contractors...
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