Parliament, Boards and Autonomy: The Case of Agricultural Marketing Boards
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1975.tb00229.x |
| Author | PHILIP GIDDINGS |
| Date | 01 December 1975 |
| Published date | 01 December 1975 |
Parliament, Boards
and
Autonomy:
The
Case
of
Agricultural Marketing Boards
PHILIP GIDDINGS
Dr.Giddings
is
Lecturer in Politics at the University
of
Reading.
A:
INTRODUCTION
The extent
of
parliamentary accountability of a public board has often
been used
as
an index
of
its
autonomy: if ministers answer for matters
in Parliament, it is likely that they exercise some influence or control
over
those matters.
It
is therefore reasonable to assume ‘answering’ is
a
prima
facie
indicator
of
responsibility? This has, at least until recently, been
illustrated in the case of the nationalized industries. According to the
Morrisonian conception of
a
public corporation,
it
is necessary to draw
a line between ministerial functions and those
of
the boards, since without
it
if
ministers began dealing with the day-to-day affairs
of
the corporations
on the floor of the House the boards would be rendered superfluous.
A
line has therefore been drawn between long-term policy, with which
ministers may become involved on the grounds of the public interest,
and administration or management, with which ministers should not
become involved, since this is seen as the exclusive concern of the boards.
In spite of the conceptual fuzziness of ‘policy’ and ‘administration’ or
‘management’, it has nevertheless been felt that underlying those terms
there are distinct functions
-
and Parliament
has
operated accordingly:
it has been assumed that ministerial activity, and hence responsibility, is
limited to the policy side
of
the dividing line.
Thus,
although we are
of
course only dealing with the tip of the iceberg: we can justifiably conclude
that where ministers are prepared to answer, there at least they are res-
ponsible and the boards not autonomous. In short, ‘answering’ can throw
some light on the extent to which the theory underlying the distribution
of responsibilities between boards and ministers corresponds with practice.
The close link between autonomy and
responsibility/accountability
reflects the democratic norms
of
our administrative system. Where public
functions are being performed, and
a
fortiori
public money spent or the
force of the law employed, there must be provision for accountability and
control. In Britain these are conventionally provided by ministers through
383
PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
Parliament,
so
that the critical question is: whom is Parliament to hold
responsible for what? Where statutory powers are granted to nondepart-
mental organizations, the answer is clear only in the extreme case where
the organization has all the powers, and
so
is autonomous
-
then Parlia-
ment has no-one to hold accountable at all. Tn the more usual case where
there
is
a
division
of
powers between the organization (henceforward
board) and minister(s), then the board cannot be
fulb
autonomous. Then
accountability will only be clear and precise when
the
division of powers
between minister(s) and board is clear and precise. Moreover, in cases
where the boards are also intended to be representative of some social or
economic interest, then there will be
a
tension between the representa-
tiveness, with its concomitant pressure for autonomy, and the conventional
demand for accountability through the political system, which is likely
to limit board autonomy by operating through some ministerial powers.
It
is this tension between representativeness and autonomy on the one
hand, and accountability and ministerial powers on the other, which
requires examination.
To
illustrate the utility of approaching the matter
in this way, we have taken as an example Parliament’s treatment of the
affairs of one rather unusual set of statutory organizations, argicultural
marketing boards.
B:
THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
First,
as
background, a brief account of the nature
of
agricultural marketing
boards must be given. They are set up under an enabling through
which schemes may be established to regulate the marketing
of
particular
products, subject to the consent of
a
(substantial) majority of producers,
and of the agricultural ministers and Parliament. Boards have been
set
up for hops, milk, bacon pigs, potatoes, tomatoes-and-cucumber, wool and
eggs, although only hops, milk, potatoes and wool remain in operation.
Institutionally, the marketing boards are rather
a
paradox. They are
established by statute, with the approval
of
ministers and Parliament,
yet they also need the approval
of
registered producers
-
and withdrawal
of that approval means dissolution of the board.4
A
handful of board
members are appointees of ministers, most are elected
by
producers,S
to whom the boards present their reports and accounts at the annual
general meeting.6 Some boards are trading concerns, and others merely
regulate the market, but in principle all the boards are self-financing.’
Once established, they may impose levies on their producers (without
recourse to ministers or Parliament)
*
and have statutory powers to coerce
producers who do not pay. They may also make rules governing the
marketing of their product, and producers breaking such rules may be
disciplined, by
a
fine.Q
So
the boards have an impressive range
of
inde-
pendent ‘governmentaly powers.
384
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