Parliamentary scrutiny of executive patronage: The relationship between institutional norms, reputation and accountability
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Author | Felicity Matthews |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12637 |
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Parliamentary scrutiny of executive patronage:
The relationship between institutional norms,
reputation and accountability
Felicity Matthews
Department of Politics and International
Relations, University of Sheffield,
Sheffield, UK
Correspondence
Felicity Matthews, Department of Politics and
International Relations, University of
Sheffield, Elmfield, Northumberland Road,
Sheffield S10 2TU, South Yorkshire, UK.
Email: f.m.matthews@sheffield.ac.uk
Abstract
While executive patronage brings important benefits in
terms of governance and control, political influence over
the selection of agency staff entails a democratic
dilemma: how should the exercise of executive patronage
be controlled? This article addresses this critical issue,
examining Westminster's system of pre-appointment
scrutiny by analysing an original database that encom-
passes every pre-appointment hearing held between
2007 and 2018. The article demonstrates that although
the conduct of hearings accords with select committees’
longstanding commitment to cross-party working, mem-
bers have not prioritized pre-appointment scrutiny rela-
tive to their other committee activities. By systematically
disaggregating the factors which affect how select com-
mittees dispatch this account-holding responsibility, the
article deepens previous analyses of pre-appointment
scrutiny, and dovetails with scholarship examining the
institutional determinants of select committee power. More
broadly, it draws attention to the reputational dynamics of
accountability, and how institutional norms can serve as vital
reputational resources, enabling account-holders to demon-
strate ‘responsible’account-holding.
Received: 19 May 2019 Revised: 13 September 2019 Accepted: 4 November 2019
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12637
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2019 The Author. Public Administration published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Public Admin. 2020;98:625–642. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padm 625
1|INTRODUCTION
While executive patronage brings important benefits in terms of governance and control (Bearfield 2009; Flinders
and Matthews 2010; Kopecký et al. 2016; Panizza et al. 2019), political influence over the selection of agency staff
entails a democratic dilemma: how should the exercise of executive patronage be controlled? This article addresses
this critical issue, focusing on the oversight of executive patronage in the context of parliamentary democracy. In
contrast with the US, where the Senate confirmation process for presidential appointments is effectively enshrined
in the Constitution, few parliamentary legislatures enjoy such oversight (but see Pond 2008a, 2008b); and parlia-
ments have been regarded as ‘the great outsider’because of their limited capacity to scrutinize agencies (OECD
2002). Against this backdrop, the system of pre-appointment scrutiny established in the United Kingdom's national
legislature stands out. Since 2007, Westminster's parliamentary (select) committees have undertaken pre-
appointment hearings with the minister's preferred candidate for top-level appointments to key public bodies; and in
relation to some of the most salient positions, Parliament has acquired formal ‘advice and consent’powers. However,
the way that Parliament has sought to position itself as a proactive legislature in relation to executive patronage also
stands out because, prima facie, there are few incentives to undertake such account-holding activities. First, there is
limited evidence that ministers directly engage in politicized appointment practices; and the prevalence of politicized
appointments in the UK is amongst the lowest in Europe (Flinders and Matthews 2012; Kopecký et al. 2016). Sec-
ond, there is limited evidence that pre-appointment scrutiny directly affects outcomes as hearings are explicitly pred-
icated on the principle of ministerial discretion and rarely reverse ministers’decisions. This raises important
questions about the motivation of select committees to undertake pre-appointment scrutiny; and, in turn, about the
extent to which parliaments can operate as ‘venues of influence’(Waterman et al. 1998) vis-à-vis the exercise of
executive patronage.
To answer such questions, this article brings together literature that has examined the institutional determi-
nants of select committee influence (e.g., Benton and Russell 2013; Fisher 2015; Bates et al. 2017; Russell and
Gover 2017; Matthews 2018) and a wider body of scholarship that advances a reputational-based explanation of
the motivations of accountability actors (e.g., Waterman et al. 1998; Schillemans and Busuioc 2013; Koop 2014;
Busuioc and Lodge 2016) to argue that pre-appointment scrutiny has been driven by a concern of committees to
extend their reputation as autonomous, independent and credible counterweights to executive power. The article
tests this argument by analysing every pre-appointment hearing held between May 2007 and July 2018 (n= 98)
and each individual question posed (n= 5,713); and comparing pre-appointment hearings to a representative sam-
ple of other select committee inquiries (n= 310). This analysis reveals that the institutional norms which structure
select committee behaviour and, in turn, undergird their reputation have governed the conduct of pre-
appointment hearings, with committee members from government and opposition parties setting aside partisan
loyalties to discharge their account-holding responsibilities. However, this analysis also reveals significant differ-
ences in the extent to which committees have engaged in pre-appointment scrutiny relative to their other com-
mittee activities, which suggests that members have prioritized other activities as means of exerting influence
and advancing reputation.
Through this analysis, the article makes four key contributions. First, by systematically appraising the institu-
tional determinants of select committee behaviour, it extends and deepens previous analyses of pre-appointment
scrutiny at Westminster (Hazell et al. 2012, 2017; Flinders and Geddes 2014; Matthews and Flinders 2015; Hazell
2019). Second, by highlighting the way that select committees mobilize institutional norms for reputational purposes,
it dovetails with scholarship that has examined the sources of select committee powers (e.g., Benton and Russell
2013; Fisher 2015; Bates et al. 2017; Russell and Gover 2017; Matthews 2018); and offers a further counterpoint to
comparative scholarship that has typically regarded select committees as toothless and weak (e.g., Mattson and
Strøm 1995; Powell 2000; Saalfeld 2003). Third, in doing so, it provides empirical evidence of the ‘reputational’
dynamics of accountability (Schillemans and Busuioc 2013; Busuioc and Lodge 2016) that encourage account-
holders to enter the accountability space. Finally, through this, the article moves beyond the narrow
626 MATTHEWS
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