Parliaments, constitutional conventions, and popular sovereignty
| Author | Stuart White |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148117700657 |
| Published date | 01 May 2017 |
| Date | 01 May 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117700657
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2017, Vol. 19(2) 320 –335
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148117700657
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Parliaments, constitutional
conventions, and popular
sovereignty
Stuart White
Abstract
There is growing interest in the United Kingdom in holding a constitutional convention (CC)
to deliberate possible reforms to the political system. What form should a CC take? Having
identified a range of possible models, we examine their merits according to stated normative
criteria, focusing specifically on (1) how CC membership is determined, (2) whether a CC should
have agenda-setting power and (3) whether it should have power to send proposals to binding
referendum. We find good reasons to support a ‘citizen majority’ membership (chosen in a near-
random fashion from the general public), agenda-setting power and referendum power. However,
none of these features is likely to be the most appropriate in all contexts. Further design issues
concerning citizen-majority conventions, such as whether they ought to include politicians as a
minority or exclude them, are also considered. While the immediate focus of discussion is the
United Kingdom, the core argument has wider relevance.
Keywords
constitutional convention, democracy, parliament, popular sovereignty, UK politics
Introduction
A constitutional convention (CC) is a body charged with deliberating and proposing a
draft constitution or constitutional amendment(s), typically subject to ratification through
a wider political process. Recently, there has been interest in a CC process to deliberate
the future of the United Kingdom’s political system. Although the current UK govern-
ment is not supportive of the idea, it may find traction in years to come. What form,
however, should a CC take? How should it be structured?
Discussion of a CC in the United Kingdom has been influenced by recent examples of
assemblies in which members of the general public have been directly involved in delib-
erating proposals for political reform. These include two citizens’ assemblies in Canada
that examined electoral reform (British Columbia in 2004, Ontario in 2006/2007), the
Burgerforum on electoral reform in the Netherlands (2006), the Icelandic constitution
Jesus College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Corresponding author:
Stuart White, Jesus College, University of Oxford, Turl Street, Oxford OX1 3DW, UK.
Email: stuart.white@jesus.ox.ac.uk
700657BPI0010.1177/1369148117700657The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsWhite
research-article2017
Article
White 321
drafting process of 2009–2012 and the recent Convention on the Constitution in Ireland,
2012–2014.1 In all these cases, the relevant assembly/convention was established by the
existing parliament. One particularly important feature of the general design question
about CCs, and the main focus of this article, is as follows: How should powers and
responsibilities be divided as between CCs and parliaments? Although our immediate
focus is the United Kingdom, our discussion has wider relevance.
We proceed as follows. First, in section ‘Different models of a constitutional conven-
tion’, following a brief review of the emerging CC discussion in the United Kingdom, I
outline three key design questions and several CC models based on different answers to
them. Section ‘Assessment criteria’ then outlines some normative criteria to use to assess
these options. These criteria relate to epistemic value (how good the institution is at
selecting good outcomes), popular sovereignty (which relates to the values of political
autonomy, inclusive responsibility, civic equality) and avoidance of ‘majority tyranny’.
In sections ‘Should a CC have a citizen majority?’, ‘Should a CC have agenda-setting
power?’ and ‘Should a CC have referendum power?’ I apply the criteria to the three key
design questions: membership of the CC, whether it should have agenda-setting power
and whether it should be empowered to send recommendations to binding referendum. I
argue that, while it is difficult to make any absolute recommendations, there are good
reasons for CCs to have a ‘citizen-majority’ (a membership the majority of whom are
members of the general public, preferably chosen on a near-random basis to be descrip-
tively representative), agenda-setting power and referendum power. In section ‘Elaborating
the citizen-majority convention’, I consider a further set of design questions to refine our
grasp of citizen-majority conventions and clarify some points of reasonable disagreement
about their structure. Section ‘Conclusion: an analysis that serves popular sovereignty’
concludes with a summary and comment on how our analysis, by clarifying the kinds of
CC favoured in principle, itself serves the value of popular sovereignty.
Different models of a CC
Interest in a CC has emerged in the United Kingdom as a way of addressing reform of the
political system, particularly the territorial division of powers across the United Kingdom
and the lack of a codified constitution. The Brown government’s interest in constitutional
reform was one stimulus (Blick, 2015: 215–218). First Minister of Wales, Carwyn Jones
AM (Assembly Member), argued in 2012 for a Convention on the Future of the United
Kingdom (Jones, 2012). The House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform
Committee, chaired by Labour Member of Parliament (MP) Graham Allen, published on
the topic in 2013 (House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee,
2013). In the run up to Scotland’s 2014 independence referendum, discussion intensified
(Renwick, 2014). Immediately after the referendum, the Electoral Reform Society
(ERS) and Unlock Democracy initiated online petitions for a CC that together received
over 15,000 signatures.2 Political parties, including Labour, the Liberal Democrats, UK
Independence Party (UKIP), and the Greens, also called for a CC (Labour Party, 2014).
One outcome of discussions was a statement in the March 2015 legacy paper of the
All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Reform, Decentralisation and Devolution in
the United Kingdom that called on the parties to include a commitment to a CC in their
manifestos (Purvis and Blick, 2015: 7).
The 2015 general election produced a Conservative government that is unlikely to call
a CC. Nevertheless, interest remains. The ERS cooperated with academics to hold two
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