Personal vote, spatial registration rules, and party system nationalization in Latin America
| Published date | 01 March 2018 |
| Date | 01 March 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512116676354 |
International Political Science Review
2018, Vol. 39(2) 192 –208
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512116676354
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Personal vote, spatial
registration rules, and party system
nationalization in Latin America
Yen-Pin Su
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Abstract
While many studies of party system nationalization examine the effects of various institutional factors,
few take into account the impact of party formation cost. This paper aims to fill the empirical gap by
focusing on the interactive effect of electoral systems and party registration rules. I argue that the effect of
electoral systems on party system nationalization is conditional on spatial registration rules, a requirement
that requires a party to collect signatures or organize local branches in a specified geographical manner to
maintain the party’s legal status. Based on data for 97 legislative elections in 18 Latin American countries from
1978 to 2011, the empirical analysis demonstrates that a country with an electoral system that encourages
a personal vote tends to have a much lower level of party system nationalization when that country does
not have spatial registration requirements. The result is robust across different model specifications and
estimation techniques.
Keywords
Political parties, party system nationalization, electoral systems, party laws, Latin America
Introduction
Party system nationalization matters for party system institutionalization, accountability, and rep-
resentation in modern democracies (Caramani, 2014). Moreover, a higher level of party system
nationalizationcreates favorable conditions for the adoption of policy programs based on issues at
the national level instead of particularistic local benefits (Alemán and Kellam, 2008: 193). A highly
nationalized party system tends to focus more on non-targetable expenditures in the composition
of spending (Castañeda-Angarita, 2013; Crisp et al., 2013). In contrast, the lack of nationalized
parties leads to an undersupply of nationally-focused public health services (Hicken et al., 2016),
and, at least in Europe, a larger number of regional parties has been shown to increase government
instability (Brancati, 2005). In short, party system nationalization is a research area of substantive
Corresponding author:
Yen-Pin Su, National Chengchi University, No.64, Sec.2, ZhiNan Rd., Wenshan District, Taipei City 11605, Taiwan.
Email: yenpinsu@nccu.edu.tw
676354IPS0010.1177/0192512116676354International Political Science ReviewSu
research-article2016
Article
Su 193
importance because public policies made in a country with a higher level of party system nationali-
zation tend to be based on national interests.
Given that party system nationalization affects government policy priorities, what explains the
variation in the extent to which party systems are nationalized? Existing studies have focused on
the effects of political institutions, such as executive systems (Cain et al., 1987), decentralization
(Chhibber and Kollman, 2004), and electoral systems (Bochsler, 2010a). However, these studies
have largely ignored one important institutional factor that can shape party system nationalization:
party registration rules. Specifically, when studying party system nationalization, it is crucial to
take into account whether a country has a spatial registration rule. Such a rule requires that, to
register a party and maintain the party’s legal status, party leaders must collect a certain number of
signatures or organize subnational branches in more than one electoral district.
The major task of this paper is to address this empirical gap in the literature by examining the
interactive effects of electoral systems and party registration rules on party system nationalization.
While some recent studies have found that a country with an electoral system that has a high pro-
pensity to cultivate a personal vote1 tends to have a much lower level of party system nationaliza-
tion (e.g. Golosov, 2016), others find that the effect is inconclusive (Simón, 2013). I argue that a
spatial registration requirement is an important intervening variable in the relationship between the
personalism of the electoral system and party system nationalization.
In a country where district-level parties are disallowed for registration, an electoral system with
a high personal-vote propensity has limited effects on party system nationalization because a cer-
tain level of cross-district coordination of candidates is ensured by the party law. In contrast, the
effect of the personalism of the electoral system in reducing party system nationalization will be
stronger if the country does not have a spatial registration rule for parties. Under such an institu-
tional context, politicians are more likely to register a district-level party, not only because it is less
costly than establishing a national party, but also because doing so further highlights the personal
attributes of the candidate.
Considering the effects of electoral systems and party registration rules, my hypothesis suggests
that an electoral system that encourages amore personal vote will reduce party system nationaliza-
tion to a greater extent when the country permits the registration of district-level parties. I test this
theoretical assertion using data from 97 legislative elections in 18 Latin American countries
between 1978 and 2011. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis about the interactive
effects of electoral systems and party registration rules.
Theoretical perspectives
Party nationalization2 considers the degree to which a party has similar support across different
districts in an election. Party nationalization reflects parties’ campaign strategies (Conway, 1986)
but not party discipline (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003: 142). Leaders of nationalized parties are
likely to emphasize platforms on national issues and organize campaigns at the national level
(Morgenstern et al., 2009: 1325; Stein et al., 2005: 40).3 Moreover, from an organizational perspec-
tive, a nationalized party is expected to have effective local party organizations for channeling
popular demands in every region of a country. Therefore, a nationalized party system indicates that
major parties have strong ties with their electorates across districts in the country (Jones and
Mainwaring, 2003: 143). In contrast, in a poorly nationalized party system, each major party tends
to run electoral campaigns based on local politicking and mainly focuses on certain regionally-
based channels.
What explains the variation in party system nationalizationacross countries? Existing studies
havefocused on the effects of political institutions. For instance, Cain et al. (1987) argue that the
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