Personnel governance of corporatized public services: Effects of executive resources and corporation forms on turnover
| Published date | 01 June 2022 |
| Author | Ulf Papenfuß,Christian A. Schmidt |
| Date | 01 June 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12752 |
SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE
Personnel governance of corporatized public
services: Effects of executive resources
and corporation forms on turnover
Ulf Papenfuß | Christian A. Schmidt
Public Management and Public Policy,
Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen,
Germany
Correspondence
Ulf Papenfuß, Public Management and Public
Policy, Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen,
Germany.
Email: ulf.papenfuss@zu.de,puma.zu.de
Abstract
Corporatization has potentials for public service provi-
sion but also induces far-reaching governance chal-
lenges. Appointing executives for public corporations is a
powerful personnel governance mechanism for public
authorities to manage public service provision and
resource dependencies. However, the theoretical under-
standing of executive turnover is limited. Drawing on
resource dependence theory and embedding publicness
fit perspectives, Cox regressions for 491 executives of
275 German municipal corporations between 2006 and
2016 show that politicized executives, executives with
higher pay, and internally hired executives have a longer
tenure and a lower turnover likelihood. Furthermore,
the findings reveal different governance rationalities
between different corporation forms by showing a higher
likelihood of executive turnover in not profit-making
corporations than in profit-making corporations. This
highlights the theoretical needs and potentials to con-
ceptually differentiate between these two corporation
forms in future research. Overall, this study enhances the
theoretical understanding of executive turnover and
provides important research perspectives.
Die politischen Entscheidungen zur Auslagerung öffentlicher
Aufgaben auf öffentliche Unternehmen haben hohe Potenziale
Received: 30 June 2020 Revised: 25 April 2021 Accepted: 28 April 2021
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12752
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2021 The Authors. Public Administration published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
250 Public Admin. 2022;100:250–272.
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padm
für eine effektive und effiziente öffentliche Aufgabenerfüllung,
führen aber zugleich zu weitreichenden Governance-
Herausforderungen. Die Besetzung von Mitgliedern des Top-
Managementorgans öffentlicher Unternehmen ist ein
besonders relevanter personeller Governance-Mechanismus
für öffentliche Anteilseignern zur Steuerung der öffentlicher
Aufgabenerfüllung und Ressourcenabhängigkeiten. Basierend
auf der Theorie der Ressourcenabhängigkeiten und
Publicness-Fit-Perspektiven zeigt eine Cox-Analyse von 491
Top-Managementmitgliedern aus 275 deutschen kommunalen
Unternehmen zwischen 2006 und 2016, dass politisierte,
intern-nachbesetzte und Top-Managementmitglieder mit
höherem Vergütungsniveau eine längere Amtszeit und eine
geringere Wechsel-/Turnoverwahrscheinlichkeit aufweisen.
Darüber hinaus zeigen die Ergebnisse unterschiedliche
Governance-Rationalitäten zwischen verschiedenen Unter-
nehmensformen. Demnach ist die Turnoverwahrscheinlichkeit
von Top-Managementmitgliedern in nicht gewinnbringenden
öffentlichen Unternehmen signifikant höher als in gewinn-
bringenden Unternehmen. Dies verdeutlicht den theoretischen
Bedarf, diese beiden Unternehmensformen in der zukünftigen
Forschung konzeptionell zu differenzieren. Insgesamt erweitert
diese Studie das theoretische Verständnis zum Turnover
von Top-Managementmitgliedern und liefert wichtige
Forschungsperspektiven.
1|INTRODUCTION
Public sector reforms have made the corporatization of public service a global phenomenon (Andrews et al., 2020).
The creation of public corporations—majority-owned enterprises of public authorities (OECD, 2015)—is a prominent
approach to improve the performance in public service provision by enhancing executive autonomy and profession-
alism (Krause & Van Thiel, 2019; Tavares & Camões, 2010). However, operating with independent corporate status
outside the traditional administrative system induces far-reaching challenges for governance and political control
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2003; OECD, 2015; Papenfuß & Schmidt, 2020).
Within public corporations, executive directors (hereafter, executives) occupy positions with great autonomy in
the management of public services (Krause & Van Thiel, 2019). Charged with high managerial flexibility, leeway, and
power, executives and the resources they bring to the organization make key differences in the public corporation's
strategy and performance (Boyne & Dahya, 2002).
The executive turnover—appointment of new and departure of existing executives—is a powerful personnel gov-
ernance mechanism for public authorities to enforce/adapt strategic/political priorities (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014a;
Petrovsky et al., 2015; Rutherford & Lozano, 2018). Further, however, it is a highly disruptive event because losing
PAPENFUß AND SCHMIDT 251
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