Perspectives on Government and Opposition in Unified Germany
| Date | 01 September 1998 |
| Author | Ludger Helms |
| Published date | 01 September 1998 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9256.00072 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Perspectives on
Government and
Opposition in Uni®ed
Germany
Ludger Helms
This paper is dedicated to the analysis of the
ural antagonist of the executive. Thus, Ger-
con®guration of government/opposition rela-
many was not just an historic late-comer as
tions in uni®ed Germany. It seeks to assess
far as the introduction of parliamentarism is
the impact of institutional, political as well as
concerned, but also with regard to an appro-
more situational factors on the relationship
priate understanding of the functional logic of
between the two key actors of the parliamen-
modern parliamentary democracies.
tary arena. In the concluding section, the
The crucial importance of the functional
performance of government and opposition
division between government and opposition
during the 1990s will additionally be judged
and their complex inter-relationship for the
against the background of the basic norma-
proper working of parliamentary democracies,
tive considerations concerning the most
seems, however, to have become seriously
important institutional and functional divi-
underestimated not only by German scholars.
sion in parliamentary democracies.
Both the rise of the globalisation-paradigm
with some of its proponents heralding already
Thinking in the dualistic categories of govern-
the age of `global government and global
ment and opposition did not form the basis
opposition' (Strange, 1994), and the growing
for the analysis of political processes in Ger-
in¯uence of `post-parliamentary' network ana-
many until much later than in most other
lysis have systematically detracted scholarly
West European parliamentary democracies.
attention from the decision-making processes
What is meanwhile taken for granted (and is
within the parliamentary arena of traditional
now often expressed in the contrast of `coali-
nation-states. As I have tried to show else-
tion and opposition' in the media), was initi-
where, the underlying empirical perceptions
ally neither anchored in the deputies'
of these two approaches require some major
perception of parliament nor established as a
quali®cations (Helms, 1997a, pp. 14±16). As
point of reference in the ®eld of political
for the normative aspects of the subject it
research. Instead, an out-dated constitutional
might suce here to recall the crucial orienta-
understanding of government and parliament
tion function of the institutional division
prevailed that considered the latter as the nat-
between government and opposition for any
Ludger Helms, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna.
# Political Studies Association 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
151
Government and Opposition in Germany . Helms
Politics (1998) 18(3) pp. 151±158
political system which has been highlighted in
rather informal structures in the core execu-
particular by Niklas Luhmann (1989). Indeed,
tive territory over the last one and a half dec-
government and opposition parties do not
ades or so. Overall, decision-making within
only control the political decision-making
the core executive has further tended to
system in the more narrow sense, they also
become a matter of party politics under the
take a leading part in structuring the political
chancellorship of Helmut Kohl, partly sus-
communication process in advanced parlia-
pending the established constitutional provi-
mentary democracies. `Their activities ± what
sions. The de facto centre of coalition
they say and what they do in the legislature ±
decision-making at the federal level is not the
aect how voters come to see the political
cabinet but the so-called `Koalitionsrunden'
world' (Ware, 1996, p. 327). It is exactly this
(coalition committees or meetings).2 Perma-
orientation function of the institutional divi-
nent members of these coalition meetings are
sion between government and opposition ±
the chancellor, the head of the federal chan-
including the voters' opportunity to judge
cellery, the chairmen and secretary-generals of
clearly both sides' performance ± that lies at
the coalitions parties as well as the Fraktion
the heart of the normative concept of respon-
leaders and chief parliamentary whips
sible party government on which modern par-
(including the chairman and parliamentary
liamentary democracies are founded.
whip of the CSU-regional group). While the
number of consulting federal ministers, which
take part on a permanent basis, has drastically
Institutional parameters
decreased since the 1980s (Ismayr, 1997,
p. 402), there is a considerable number of
The impact of German uni®cation on the
leading party politicians taking part in the
established institutional system was extremely
negotiations, even though they are neither
low. Even the most adventurous constitution
members of the Bundestag nor members of
drafts which emerged in Germany after 1989
government.
did not seriously question the established
As in the `old' Federal Republic, govern-
fundamental institutions of the parliamentary
ments in uni®ed Germany face an opposition
governmental system. Whereas uni®ed Germa-
extremely well equipped with a wide range of
ny's scope of action in foreign aairs called
`co-governing' instruments and veto powers.3
into question Katzenstein's concept of the
It is above all the two-thirds majority required
`semi-sovereign state' (Paterson, 1996), it
for constitutional amendments as stated in the
would appear that it has lost little relevance
Basic Law, the Bundesrat's veto power and the
on the domestic level. This not only holds
ability of a quali®ed Bundestag majority or a
true for the institutional system on the meta-
state government to invoke the Federal Con-
constitutional level, but also for the factual
stitutional Court which represent important
institutional nature of the political decision-
instruments of the opposition and which more
making system in the narrower sense.
often than not have a signi®cant preventative
On the federal governmental level political
in¯uence on the decision-making process
power is dispersed primarily due to the con-
favouring a strong opposition minority.
tinuing necessity to form coalition govern-
Furthermore, the institutional parameters of
...
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