Philosophic Tramps
Date | 01 May 2000 |
DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00263 |
Published date | 01 May 2000 |
Subject Matter | Article |
Philosophic Tramps
W. H. Greenleaf
I have no exquisite reason for’t, but I have reason good enough. Twelfth Night, II.iii.144–5
I
While the relation between the theory and practice of politics no doubt takes many
forms, the focus here will be on themes which in Britain have influenced the
exercise of (what Locke called) the federative power, the conduct of relations with
the world outside. And one immediately obvious feature of the attitude of those
concerned with this task is that they are notably indifferent to reflection of an
abstract kind as well as to speculative surveys or long-term projections, regarding
these as lying quite apart from their particular business. In this sense they may be
said to share the motto of Maitland’s ‘philosophic tramp’, that problems are best
solved ambulando.
It is a characteristic which has long been recognized as when the fifteenth Earl of
Derby remarked that it was not possible ‘to lay down any formula or any general
rule which shall bind us in our foreign policy for all time and on all occasions. We
must deal with the circumstances of each case as it arises.’1 Similarly Viscount Grey
described how the plans of a British Foreign Secretary were more likely to be
guided by current perceptions of national interest than by ‘far-sighted views or
large conceptions or great schemes’. Ministers do not, he declared, look beyond the
moment and the direct consequences of policy: the indirect results are incalculable
anyway.2 In the same fashion a memorandum on international arbitration drew a
clear contrast between discussion which is of ‘a theoretical and abstract character’
and that based on ‘actual experience’; and the judgement was made that reliance
on the former leads to conclusions not warranted by the facts.3 Naturally there has
been the same constrained response to any proposal deemed visionary in character:
and it is hardly fanciful to link the British reaction in 1815 to the Tsar’s suggestion
of a Holy Alliance and that of the Thatcher government in 1985 to the idea of
European monetary and economic union. The first was seen as a ‘piece of Sublime
mysticism and nonsense’, the latter as based on ‘cloudy and unrealistic aspira-
tions’.4 In the event, and despite the British reservations, both conceptions were
pushed ahead determinedly by their advocates. But the point is the response itself:
that such projects, being merely chimerical, could not be proper objects of policy.
In the conduct of affairs it is vital to remain firmly in touch with reality and (as
with Antæus) disaster follows if this foundation is lost. The touch of federative
business is death to dreams; and the idealist will hardly be at home in Downing
Street or Whitehall. Of course there is a role for vague rhetoric or sweeping dogma
but this is as public justification. When Pitt was at last driven into war with France in
1793 it was for strategic and diplomatic not ideological reasons; but once hostilities
© Political Studies Association, 2000.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
P H I L O S O P H I C T R A M P S
335
had opened Burke’s philosophy immediately became of use as government
propaganda.5
The stance is clear enough. Yet two observations need to be made about it.
One is that the attitude must not be attributed to a fear of abstract inquiry or to
wide-ranging review as such for when occasion demands either will be ventured.
Thus in the official papers there are analyses of such ideas as sovereignty, human
rights, self-determination, suzerainty, contraband and the power of search, para-
mountcy, dominion, protectorate, prerogative, trusteeship, and guarantee (among
many others). About the precise meaning and implications of such notions the dili-
gent clerks of the federative departments will, if necessary, logomachize at length.
Of course these terms merit attention not through any unengaged conceptual
interest but as they arise for consideration in some practical context such as writing
a constitution, drawing up a treaty, responding to a resolution at an international
assembly, justifying a blockade, framing a law, conducting a negotiation, dealing
with protests from foreign Powers, and the like. Similarly, because official action
must be taken with as much forethought as possible, it is usual to produce back-
ground material to aid the process of decision: abstracts of previous correspond-
ence, summaries of past proceedings, lists of precedents, historical synopses, reports
ranging over an entire subject, reviews of policy options, and so forth. And again
such surveys are undertaken with a particular purpose in view: hard-pressed mini-
sters and their advisers are naturally loath to spend time on extensive memorials
that have no immediate bearing on current problems.6 Perhaps one of the most
celebrated such tours d’horizon may stand as example. The Eyre Crowe memo-
randum of 1907 is a splendid general essay on relations between the Great Powers
of Europe and the recent course of German policy towards Britain. However it was
written not for its own sake but with specific practical intent, to heighten official
awareness of the growing menace of an aggressive German nationalism.
The second comment is that, although officialdom is dubious about abstract or
extensive speculation, its attitudes are not merely arbitrary: policy-making is not a
series of ad hoc responses to events, a matter of ‘waking up each morning and
considering, “What would I like to do?”…, and doing it’.7 For, while there are no
ineluctable principles by which the conduct of affairs may be directed, there are
certain broad categories of concern which suggest (or limit) possible courses of
action; and these are derived from a long experience and an understanding of
Britain’s changing position in the world and of the character of that world. Because
circumstances must always come in, the make-up of these rule-like considerations
varies over time (as does what might be called their ‘mix’). As well any of them
may become obsolete or irrelevant: clearly the business of Britain as a world power,
the possessor of a global empire, cannot be the same as that of today’s relatively
weak offshore island. Yet this manifold of categories, relating to various key aspects
of the national interest as this is conceived from time to time, makes up the frame-
work of maxims within and by reference to which the external policy of the state
is formed and carried on: the ‘theory’, so to say, which moulds federative ‘practice’.
336
W . H . G R E E N L E A F
II
(a) First there are the factors relating to diplomatic policy, strategy, and defence.
The condition of international affairs is one of anarchy tempered by arrangements
and ranges from rampant violence to peaceful co-operation. There is always rivalry
between states and each pursues its national interest, the objective being to gain by
negotiation or threat that form of accommodation which offers the greatest benefit;
or, where this is not possible, to secure the best outcome from any conflict. Given
this condition of things the disposition deemed most suitable to Britain’s purposes
has varied. It might be sustaining a concert of the Great Powers to resolve major
issues and disputes; or maintaining an international balance to prevent the emer-
gence of some hegemon. And both such aims imply a shifting pattern of engage-
ments and also interference should the consensual determination need to be
enforced or the equilibrium restored. In contrast the object has sometimes been
isolation, the avoidance (except for some definite and immediate object such as a
war or the protection of a specific advantage) of the obligations involved in stand-
ing alliances and other such commitments, so as to preserve the greatest freedom
in making federative decisions and in maintaining world-wide the posture of an
imperial power. Latterly there has been support for means of international
amelioration, for participation in world organizations and regional groupings, a
course which, if it might have once seemed idealistic or unnecessarily restrictive,
has become more attractive as Britain’s relative strength waned. Naturally other
states had their own vital resolves which it was necessary to respect and which
constituted limits on what British policy might attempt. One obvious example of
this was the Monroe Doctrine which, declared as a central principle of American
foreign policy, restricted (or at least affected) the activity of European Powers in the
New World.
But this is all rather general in form; and these broad diplomatic projects are always
related to, or construed as, a series of considerations of a more specific and concrete
kind. And the particular nature of the demands involved may be exemplified by
reference to the special position occupied in the British scheme of things by India
and to the not unrelated Eastern Question: both matters which for so long
dominated British external policy.
After the loss of the American colonies the received view saw Britain and India as
twin centres of imperial wealth and strength. Not only was the sub-continent a
major element in the working of the British economy (in terms of both the invest-
ment located there and the value of the goods exchanged) it was also the focus of
an important regional system of trade. As well there was the Indian Army, a force
crucial to the structure of British influence throughout the great land arch which
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