Physician Assisted Suicide and the United States Constitution
| Date | 01 May 1995 |
| Author | Brian Bix |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1995.tb02018.x |
| Published date | 01 May 1995 |
The
Modern
LAW
Review
[Vol.
58
Given the critical nature of trust issues arising in relation to the remedy awarded
or to be awarded in such cases in the future, it is little short
of
astonishing to find
that none of them is even alluded to, let alone discussed or resolved by the House.
What is perhaps even more surprising is that a senior common law judge, Lord
Bridge, who at the Bar had no trust practice and has never sat as a chancery judge,
should give the only speech, whilst Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who at the Bar had a
flourishing trust practice and sat successfully for many years as a chancery judge,
and Lords Keith, Jauncey and Nolan (who all enjoyed significant trust elements in
their respective practices at the Bar) said nothing. Does this tell us something about
the relationship of senior and junior Law Lords generally, or is it merely indicative
of the rather haphazard, renaissance-man approach which the English legal system
takes towards judicial legislation?
Conclusion
The decision of the House in
Hunt
can be attacked on two grounds. First, the
methodology employed by the House defies explanation. The combination of
selective use of material, lack of analysis of the impact
of
the decision and the only
reasoned speech being given by the member
of
the House perhaps least qualified to
deal with the trusts issues is not the ideal recipe for an acceptable decision. With
this methodology, it is hardly surprising that the decision can also be attacked on
substantive grounds. The failure to distinguish between pre- and post-trial damages
and the imposition of a trust remedy have introduced doubt into relatively certain
areas of both tort and trusts law, apparently without their Lordships realising it.
The only consolation is that the decision may be sufficiently inadequate to invoke
prompt legislative action to answer the many questions left unanswered.
Physician Assisted Suicide and the United States
Constitution
Brian
Bix*
In
Compassion in Dying
v
State
of
Washington,’
a federal trial court (the District
Court for the Western District
of
Washington) held that a state statute prohibiting
assisted suicide was void as contrary to the United States Constitution, at least in
its application to physician-assisted suicide for mentally competent, terminally ill
patients.
The State of Washington does not prohibit suicide or attempted suicide,2 but by
statute someone who ‘knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide’
had been held guilty of a felony punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine
*School of Law, King’s College London.
(WD Wash, 1994)
850
F Supp
1454.
No
American state prohibits suicide
or
attempted suicide:
Quill
v
Koppell
(SDNY 1994)
870
F
Supp
78, 84. However, assisted suicide is punishable by statute in 28 states other than Washington. Marzen,
“‘Out, Out Brief Candle”: Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally
Ill’
(1994) 21
Hastings Constitutional
LQ
799,
804
and n 21 (stating that 30 states have prohibited assisted suicide,
but as to one of them, Oregon, see
n
23
infra).
1
2
404
0
The
Modern Law Review Limited
1995
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