Png Hock Leng v AXA Insurance Pte Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD,Chua Lee Ming J |
| Judgment Date | 21 March 2022 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | Civil Appeal No 102 of 2021 |
[2022] SGHC(A) 12
Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD and Chua Lee Ming J
Civil Appeal No 102 of 2021
Appellate Division of the High Court
Courts and Jurisdiction — District Court — Transfer of cases — Counterclaim in Magistrate's Court exceeding District Court limit — Whether transfer to General Division of High Court should be ordered — Sections 54B and 54E State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed)
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) In transfer applications of counterclaims exceeding the District Court limit, the court should first consider s 54E before s 54B: at [29].
(2) Under s 54E, the burden of proof lay on the party making the transfer application to establish that the counterclaim exceeded the District Court limit and the court ought to order the transfer sought considering all the circumstances. Section 54E(1) set out the threshold requirement that the counterclaim exceeded the District Court limit. Only when this was satisfied, the court would consider the reasons proffered by the applicant (whether factual or legal) urging the court to exercise its discretion under s 54E(2) to make the transfer order sought: at [30] and [31].
(3) The inquiry as to whether the counterclaim exceeded the District Court limit was not a numerical exercise looking at the counterclaim amount stated in the pleadings. A counterclaimant could not simply make a bare assertion that the quantification of his counterclaim exceeded the District Court limit without any substantiation. Minimally, the applicant had to produce some evidential material which could be taken at face value to support the quantification of his counterclaim. Otherwise, a bare assertion of a large quantification for the purposes of a transfer application could raise questions as to the counterclaimant's motive for filing the counterclaim: at [34].
(4) A prima facie standard for the threshold requirement did not necessarily require the court to enter into a mini trial. The cases showed that the quantification of the counterclaim had to be proven on a prima facie standard. The prima facie standard simply meant that the evidence at first appearance (similar to accepting the evidence at face value) had to be capable of supporting the asserted quantification of the counterclaim. If the applicant's own evidence was incapable of even supporting the quantification of the counterclaim, the threshold requirement would not be prima facie satisfied: at [35] to [39].
(5) Png's claim for damages to be assessed in relation to the tort of unlawful interference with trade and loss of chance of future income could not be taken into account by the court because they were either not pleaded or pleaded improperly: at [41].
(6) Png's claim for loss of income for $1m from May 2017 to April 2021 was only supported by bare assertions in his affidavits and there was no particularisation of the calculations resulting in this figure. However, considering the evidence adduced by Png, he satisfied the threshold requirement on a prima facie basis for a counterclaim of $366,030: at [42] and [46] to [48].
(7) Even if an applicant satisfied the threshold requirement in s 54E(1) on a prima facie standard, this alone did not justify the court's exercise of discretion to allow the transfer application under s 54E(2) (or, for that matter, constituted “sufficient reason” under s 54B(1)). Something more was required in order to exercise the court's discretion. This was consistent with the structure of s 54E of the SCA and correctly interpreted the provision: at [57].
(8) Under s 54E(2), in exercising its discretion to decide on the appropriate order to make, the court would undertake a holistic consideration of all relevant circumstances. The court would consider the reasons proffered by the applicant (whether factual or legal) urging the court to make the transfer order. Depending on the circumstances, factors such as the complexity of the claim and counterclaim, risk of conflicting decisions and prejudice to either party including delay in applying for a transfer application could be relevant: at [58] to [60].
(9) The reasons Png proffered to persuade the court to transfer MC 146 to the High Court were wholly lacking in merit. First, Png's argument that AXA had conducted itself in bad faith was entirely illogical. Second, Png failed to explain why the discovery he sought could not be obtained in the Magistrate's Court. Third, depriving parties of the simplified process for trials in the Magistrate's Court leaned in favour of refusing the transfer. Fourth, Png had not adduced sufficient evidence to show that MC 146 ought to be characterised as a test case. Finally, the causes of action in MC 146 were fairly straightforward and no issues of public importance or important questions of law were raised. Thus, MC 146 should not be transferred to the High Court under s 54E: at [62] to [69].
(10) As regards s 54B, Png largely relied on the same arguments canvassed under s 54E. It was clear that none of the three limbs of s 54B(1) were satisfied. Png failed to produce sufficient evidence showing that MC 146 was a test case or that MC 146 raised an important question of law. The fact that the counterclaim prima facie exceeded the District Court limit was insufficient to amount to “sufficient reason”. None of the other reasons Png relied upon were supported by any evidential basis. They did not amount to “sufficient reason” to transfer the whole of MC 146 to the High Court: at [70].
Autoexport & EPZ Pte Ltd v TOW77 Pte Ltd [2021] SGHCR 1 (refd)
Autoexport & EPZ Pte Ltd v TOW77 Pte Ltd [2021] 4 SLR 1201, HC (refd)
Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd v Ng Chan Teng [2010] 2 SLR 1015 (refd)
Ng Djoni v Miranda Joseph Jude [2018] 5 SLR 670 (refd)
Ong Pang Wee v Chiltern Park Development Pte Ltd [2003] 2 SLR(R) 267; [2003] 2 SLR 267 (refd)
Rightrac Trading v Ong Soon Heng [2003] 4 SLR(R) 505; [2003] 4 SLR 505 (distd)
Tan Kok Ing v Tan Swee Meng [2003] 1 SLR(R) 657; [2003] 1 SLR 657 (refd)
Wong Siew Mee v Jee Lee [2020] 5 SLR 1391 (refd)
The appellant, Png Hock Leng (“Png”), was an insurance agent with the respondent, AXA Insurance Pte Ltd (“AXA”). On joining AXA in November 2013, Png entered into a front-loaded incentive agreement and an adviser's agreement with AXA (“the EHP Agreement and the Adviser's Agreement”, respectively) which conditionally paid Png certain sums of moneys (“Payout Sums and SOF”) upfront upon his appointment as an agent of AXA. Png resigned on 25 April 2017.
On 6 January 2020, AXA commenced MC/MC 146/2020 (“MC 146”) against Png in the Magistrate's Court claiming that Png had breached the EHP Agreement and the Adviser's Agreement by failing to meet his production and persistency requirements. AXA claimed an outstanding sum of $54,904.38 (ie, clawbacks of proportions of the Payout Sums and SOF).
Png denied that he breached the EHP Agreement and the Adviser's Agreement and that he was contractually obliged to repay any amount to AXA. He also counterclaimed for the sum of $1m being his loss of income from May 2017 to April 2021 and/or damages to be assessed in respect of other heads of claim.
Thereafter, Png commenced HC/OS 171/2021 (“OS 171”) to transfer the whole of MC 146 from the Magistrate's Court to the General Division of the High Court pursuant to s 54B or 54E of the State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCA”). The assistant registrar (“the AR”) dismissed OS 171. In HC/RA 162/2021 (“RA 162”), Png appealed against the AR's decision. The High Court judge (“the Judge”) dismissed RA 162.
AD/CA 102/2021 was Png's appeal against the Judge's decision in RA 162, which affirmed the AR's decision in OS 171. He contended that he had the right to transfer MC 146 to the High Court under ss 54B and 54E of the SCA because his counterclaim exceeded the District Court's limit.
Financial Advisers Act (Cap 110, 2007 Rev Ed)
Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) O 108 r 2(7), O 108 r 2(9)
State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) ss 54B, 54E (consd); ss 54B(1), 54E(1), 54E(2), 54E(2)(b), 54E(4)
Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 1999 Rev Ed) ss 22–24, 24, 38
Carolyn Tan Beng Hui and Kevin Leong (Tan & Au LLP) for the applicant;
Ang Tze Phern and Shaun Ou Wai Hung (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP) for the respondent.
21 March 2022
Belinda Ang Saw Ean JAD (delivering the judgment of the court):
1 AD/CA 102/2021 (“AD/CA 102”) concerns an application to transfer proceedings from the Magistrate's Court to the General Division of the High Court. In AD/CA 102, the appellant, Png Hock Leng (“Png”), appeals against the decision of the High Court judge (the “Judge”) in HC/RA 162/2021, which affirmed an assistant registrar's (the “AR”) decision in HC/OS 171/2021 (“OS 171”), to dismiss his application to transfer the whole of MC/MC 146/2020 (“MC 146”), consisting of a claim and counterclaim, to the High Court.
2 Png primarily contends that he has the right to transfer MC 146 to the High Court under s 54E of the State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCA”) because his counterclaim in MC 146 exceeds the monetary cap on the District Court's jurisdiction of $250,000. Alternatively, MC 146 ought to be transferred under s 54B of the SCA because there is “sufficient reason”, an important question of law or MC 146 is a test case and there would be no irreparable prejudice to the respondent, AXA Insurance Pte Ltd (“AXA”). AXA opposes the transfer application.
3 In our judgment, Png's appeal has no merits. MC 146 should not be transferred to the High Court under ss 54B and 54E of the SCA. We accordingly dismiss AD/CA 102.
4 Png was an insurance agent with AXA. On joining AXA in November 2013, Png entered into a front-loaded incentive agreement called the “AXA Experienced Hire Programme 2013...
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