Police reform in the aftermath of armed conflict: How militarization and accountability affect police violence

Published date01 May 2024
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221128846
AuthorLucía Tiscornia
Date01 May 2024
https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221128846
Journal of Peace Research
2024, Vol. 61(3) 383 –397
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221128846
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1225162JPR0010.1177/00223433221128846Journal of Peace ResearchTiscornia
research-article2023
Regular Article
Police reform in the aftermath of armed
conflict: How militarization
and accountability affect police violence
Lucı
´a Tiscornia
School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin
Abstract
Police reform implementation has been widespread in post-conflict transitions. Responding to conflict recurrence
and past human rights violations, among other factors, motivate reform s. However, we know little about the
effectiveness of reforms in reducing police propensity for violence. How does police reform affect police violence
after armed conflict? I argue that the nature of reforms poses a challenge to peace and stability: police reform may
aggravate the problems it seeks to resolve. Increasing deterrent capacity reinforces militarization, a logic of organi-
zation to produce violence that accountability mechanisms – the generation of information and the imposition of
costs on abuses – are unlikely to curb. I test these propositions on a panel of 55 post-conflict countries between 1985
and 2015. My findings challenge research suggesting that security reforms lead to peace. Results support policies that
reduce police’s propensity to use force. Implications are relevant for domestic and international actors engaged in
police reform.
Keywords
police militarization, police reform, post-conflict police violence
Introduction
Since the 1990s, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been
widely implemented in order to reduce violence in the
aftermath of armed conflict and has become a critical
feature of reconstruction efforts (Berg, 2022). Police
reform is an important component of SSR efforts. In
fact, 41% of peace agreements signed after 1989 incor-
porate provisions for police reforms (Ansorg, Haass &
Strasheim, 2016). Nevertheless, even after extensive
reforms deemed successful by the international commu-
nity, high levels of police violence remain a key concern
in many post-conflict countries, suggesting wide varia-
tion in the outcomes of reform efforts. Why does police
reform not consistently result in the reduction of police
violence after internal armed conflict? How does police
reform affect police violence?
Post-conflict SSR has focused on strengthening capac-
ity in order to provide the security apparatus with the
ability to deter others from violence while exercising self-
restraint (Lake, 2022). This approach typically involves
technical components such as increasing trainin g and
weaponry, as well as a variety of accountability mechan-
isms. I argue that the nature of reforms poses a challenge
to peace and stability: police reform may aggravate the
problems it seeks to resolve. Increasing deterrent capacity
reinforces militarization, a logic of organization to pro-
duce violence that accountability mechanisms – the gen-
eration of information and the imposition of costs on
abuses – are unlikely to curb. This is especially proble-
matic for police, who are expected to implement the rule
of law post-conflict through regular interactions with
populations.
By analyzing 55 post-conflict countries between 1989
and 2015, I show that accountability needs to be accom-
panied by a reduction in militarization to be effective.
When the police are less militarized, they do not behave
as if civilians are enemies and they are less prone to use
Corresponding author:
Email: lucia.tiscornia@ucd.ie

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