Political Leaders, Economic Hardship, and Redistribution in Democracies: Impact of Political Leaders on Welfare Policy
| Published date | 01 November 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321720938992 |
| Author | Kangwook Han,Sung Min Han |
| Date | 01 November 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720938992
Political Studies
2021, Vol. 69(4) 921 –943
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321720938992
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Political Leaders, Economic
Hardship, and Redistribution
in Democracies: Impact of
Political Leaders on Welfare
Policy
Sung Min Han1 and Kangwook Han2
Abstract
This study analyzes how political leaders’ material backgrounds affect redistributive policies in
democracies. Building on political socialization theory, we argue that politicians with personal
experience of economic hardship are more likely to have sympathetic attitudes toward
redistribution than those without such experience, particularly where political constraints are
weak. We posit that firsthand knowledge of economic hardship helps political leaders understand
why the poor need government redistribution, and leads them to support more generous social
welfare policies. Analyzing an original dataset of leaders’ material background in 74 democratic
countries between 1980 and 2011, we find that leaders who experienced economic hardship
in their youth increase social welfare spending during their tenure, particularly when political
constraints are weak. Following prior studies on leaders’ personal experiences and policy
outcomes, this study provides a new approach to redistribution and welfare policy.
Keywords
political leaders, material background, redistribution, welfare policy
Accepted: 8 June 2020
Why do some democracies redistribute more than others? For decades, studies on the
welfare state and redistribution have discussed the circumstances under which some
countries redistribute more resources than others. Past research has explored how the
level of inequality, electoral institutions, and government partisanship affect government
redistribution in developed democracies (Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Kenworthy and
Pontusson, 2005; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Moene and
Wallerstein, 2001). Studies focusing on developing democracies have suggested that new
1 Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of
Korea
2Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Jeonbuk National University, Jeonju, Republic of Korea
Corresponding author:
Kangwook Han, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Jeonbuk National University, 567 Baekje-
daero, Deokjin-gu, Jeonju-si, Jeollabuk-do 54896, Republic of Korea.
Email: kangwook@jbnu.ac.kr
938992PSX0010.1177/0032321720938992Political StudiesHan and Han
research-article2020
Article
922 Political Studies 69(4)
explanations are needed; they have highlighted other determinants of redistributive pol-
icy such as the strength of democracy, economic downturns, and globalization (Avelino
et al., 2005; Rudra and Haggard, 2005). Thus, previous studies have not identified pat-
terns of government redistribution that apply to all democracies. We contend that this is
mainly because few have examined the role of political leaders. This oversight is surpris-
ing, considering the important role that political leaders play in initiating welfare and
social policy reforms in many democracies.
We argue that political leaders’ material backgrounds importantly influence redistribu-
tive policies. Anecdotal evidence suggests why this factor, rather than government parti-
sanship or political institutions, often plays an important role in initiating welfare and
social policy reforms, which are critical for explaining changes in welfare expenditure in
democracies. Although leftist leaders are generally more likely than their right-leaning
counterparts to seek greater redistribution, there are also examples of non-leftist leaders
doing so. Under the presidency of Kim Dae-jung, the South Korean government substan-
tially increased the level of social spending and made significant efforts to develop the
welfare system. For instance, it extended the coverage of the national pension system to
the entire population and reformed the public assistance program by enacting the National
Livelihood Security Act in 1999, which was designed to secure a basic minimum standard
of living for the poor (Kwon, 2002). Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo likewise
adopted a new healthcare program in 2002 that provided free medical care to the poor,
which helped to reduce health inequality between the country’s rich and poor (Neelsen
and O’Donnell, 2017).
What do these leaders and countries have in common? Presidents Kim and Toledo are
not leftist politicians, and both are the sons of poor farmers. Furthermore, neither South
Korea nor Peru experienced major institutional/electoral changes around the time of the
reforms. Thus, in these two cases, welfare reforms do not seem to be triggered by either
government partisanship or political institutions, two factors that are widely discussed in
the literature. Scholars have only recently begun to pay more attention to whether family
and class backgrounds affect how politicians behave, and whether these circumstances
influence legislative decisions (Carnes and Lupu, 2015; Carnes and Sadin, 2015). For
instance, Carnes and Lupu (2015) find that legislators from working-class families tend
to display more leftist attitudes than those from families engaged in professional occupa-
tions in Latin American countries. This finding implies that the previous experiences of
chief political executives, particularly their material and class backgrounds, are also
likely to explain changes in other policy areas such as welfare reform.
We created an original dataset on leaders’ backgrounds in 74 democratic countries
between 1980 and 2011. We analyze these data and find that political leaders with per-
sonal experience of economic hardship increase welfare spending, particularly where
political constraints are weak. We argue that such experiences help leaders better under-
stand why redistribution is needed for the poor, because they are more likely to sympa-
thize with the material condition of the poor. However, political constraints moderate the
impact of economic hardship on welfare policy. Leaders with fewer political constraints
can more successfully build on their experiences of economic hardship to implement
welfare policy changes, because they have greater discretion over the exercise of power.
Our empirical results are robust to endogeneity concerns, the possibility of alternative
explanations, and alternative specifications.
This study makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, it introduces a
new approach to redistribution and welfare policy. Using a sample that covers all
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