Power-sharing, conflict resolution, and the logic of pre-emptive defection
Author | Chelsea Johnson |
DOI | 10.1177/0022343320924699 |
Published date | 01 July 2021 |
Date | 01 July 2021 |
Power-sharing, conflict resolution,
and the logic of pre-emptive defection
Chelsea Johnson
School of Public Policy, The London School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract
Conclusions about the potential for peace via power-sharing are mixed. For some, power-sharing does little to
overcome the commitment problem characterizing a transition from conflict, while others argue that such conces-
sions provide signals of parties’ willingness to incur costs. This article develops and tests a new theory, aiming to shed
light on the mechanisms through which power-sharing bargains help to overcome the commitment problem. I argue
that government parties tend to hold an electoral and military advantage, which heightens incentives for rebel leaders
to defect from a settlement prior to conceding their capacity to use violence. Where settlements provide discrete
guarantees that offset the risks of electoral defeat and the co-optation of forces, these incentives for pre-emptive
defection should be mitigated. I offer a novel disaggregation of provisional power-sharing subtypes, distinguishing
between long-term and short-term arrangements. The analysis rests on an original, cross-national dataset of
government-and-rebel dyads to negotiated settlements signed between 1975 and 2015 (N ¼168). The logistic
regression results clearly indicate that power-sharing settlements stipulating ‘consociational’-style reforms are signif-
icantly more likely to resolve conflict between settlement dyads, all else equal. Meanwhile, standard conceptualiza-
tions of power-sharing, which include transitional coalitions and troop integration, appear unlikely to secure rebel
commitment beyond the transition period, which helps to explain the contradictory findings in existing research.
Keywords
conflict resolution, negotiated settlement, power-sharing, post-conflict democratization
Introduction
Recent events in Syria have only reified lessons learned in
Somalia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere – military interven-
tion is a costly and often counterproductive strategy,
which risks prolonging conflict and entrenching interna-
tional actors in domestic disputes (Howe, 1997; Lutt-
wak, 1999; Von Hippel, 2000; Fortna & Howard,
2008). There is an emerging consensus that, wherever
possible, international efforts should instead focus on
convincing belligerent parties to come to the table and
reach agreement on the terms of peace. Protracted peace
processes in Afghanistan, Libya, Cyprus, and South
Sudan are just a few recent examples of the international
commitment to brokering negotiated solutions, even
when facing highly unfavorable conditions. The result
of this normative shift has been a marked increase in the
frequency of settlements signed to end intrastate conflict
(Fazal, 2014; Toft, 2010; Licklider, 1995), from just
15 prior to the end of the Cold War to more than 80 over
the subsequent decade and a half (see Figure 1). At the
same time, negotiated settlements have evolved from a
tool for conflict resolution to a cornerstone of post-
conflict democratization, exhibited by a corresponding
transformation in substantive content. While agreements
to share power were relatively rare prior to 1990, more
than two-thirds of settlements have entailed some form
of power-sharing in the period since.
Despite these trends, there is little agreement among
scholars and policymakers about the kinds of terms that
might increase the prospects for peace. Often, the blame
for settlement breakdown is placed on exogenous factors,
Corresponding author:
c.johnson14@lse.ac.uk
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(4) 734–748
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022343320924699
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
To continue reading
Request your trial