PRACTICAL REASON IN LAW AND MORALITY by NEIL MacCORMICK
| Published date | 01 September 2009 |
| Date | 01 September 2009 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2009.00473.x |
Book Reviews
PRACTICAL REASON IN LAW AND MORALITY by NEIL MacCORMICK
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 300 pp., £40.00)
Practical Reason in Law and Morality is the last volume in the quartet on
`Law, State and Practical Reason' in which Neil MacCormick summarizes
and expands upon his lifetime contribution to legal theory ± a discipline he
understands as a wide-encompassing branch of practical philosophy
concerned not only with the issues traditionally addressed by analytical
jurisprudes, but also with central themes in political theory, moral
philosophy, and constitutional theory. The central question, and unifying
theme, of Practical Reason in Law and Morality is whether reason can be
practical at all. This leads MacCormick to take sides in fundamental
philosophical debates on topics like the concept of a reason for action
(chapter 1), the universality of moral judgements (chapter 2), the role played
by emotions and sentiments in establishing what one has a reason to do
(chapters 3 and 4), the autonomy of moral agents (chapters 5 and 6), the role
the law has and ought to have in regulating practical affairs (chapter 7),
global distribution, preservation of the environment, and intergenerational
relationships and how these issues bear on our conception of justice (chapter
8), the objectivity of reasoning in practical affairs (chapter 9), and the
relation between reasoning in moral matters and reasoning within legal
settings (chapter 10).
This summary of the main themes addressed by MacCormick in Practical
Reason in Law and Morality suffices to show how ambitious, rich in content,
and broad in scope the book is. Nor are the reader's expectations dis-
appointed as the argument unfolds and MacCormick defends the possibility
of practical reason resorting to an unconventional synthesis between Adam
Smith's psychology centred on the notion of the `impartial spectator' and
Immanuel Kant's practical philosophy to arrive at the statement of `the
Smithian categorical imperative'. This theoretical tool demands that we
reason on practical matters by incorporating and at the same time
generalizing the point of view of those directly involved in or affected by
the incident or relationship occasioning the need for practical reasoning. This
point of view delineates a perspective that, while shaped by the feelings of
those involved in the situation, is informed by a quest for impartiality. This
construct enables MacCormick to combine the universalist claim of practical
reason and the transcendental presupposition of our autonomy in the
practical sphere, characteristic of the Kantian tradition of practical thought,
with the recognition that human emotions and sentiments have a decisive say
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ß2009 The Author. Journal Compilation ß2009 Cardiff University Law School. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
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