Presidential Activism and Success in Foreign and Defence Policy: A Study of Portugal’s Premier-Presidential Regime
| Published date | 01 November 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231183575 |
| Author | Octavio Amorim Neto,André Anselmo |
| Date | 01 November 2024 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231183575
Political Studies Review
2024, Vol. 22(4) 704 –721
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/14789299231183575
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Presidential Activism and
Success in Foreign and Defence
Policy: A Study of Portugal’s
Premier-Presidential Regime
Octavio Amorim Neto1 and
André Anselmo2
Abstract
This article investigates presidents’ foreign and defence policy activism under Portugal’s premier-
presidential system from 1982 to 2021. First, the article discusses the extant literature on intra-
executive conflicts in semi-presidential systems. Then, it provides an overview of Portugal’s
experience with semi-presidentialism since 1976 and the powers of the Portuguese president. The
third section describes all significant foreign and defence policy presidential interventions from
1982 to 2021 that resulted in disputes with the prime minister. This section estimates presidents’
and prime ministers’ ex-ante preferences over the issues at stake. We verify which preference is
closest to the ex-post content of the policy implemented – if it is the president’s, it counts as a
presidential win. We identify the formal and informal means by which presidents acted. Informal
means are essentially going public tactics. In addition, we inductively pin down the necessary and
sufficient conditions under which presidents intervene and succeed. The article’s main findings
are two: first, the president’s second term, absence of a strictly unified executive and a majority
cabinet are separately necessary but jointly sufficient for presidential interventions to occur;
second, formal powers are a necessary but insufficient condition for presidential victory. Finally,
we speculate on the policy, institutional, and electoral consequences of presidential activism.
Keywords
presidential powers, going public, cohabitation, intra-executive conflicts, commander-in-chief
Accepted: 5 June 2023
1Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE), Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil
2Department of Political Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA
Corresponding author:
Octavio Amorim Neto, Full Professor, Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE),
Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), Rua Prof. Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30, Rio de Janeiro, 22231-010, Brazil.
Email: octavio.amorim.neto@fgv.br
1183575PSW0010.1177/14789299231183575Political Studies ReviewAmorim Neto and Anselmo
research-article2023
Article
Amorim Neto and Anselmo 705
Introduction
In premier-presidential systems, the prime minister and the cabinet must coexist with a
directly elected president whose power is usually restricted to specific areas. However, it
is not rare that presidents reach beyond constitutional limits and circumvent formal pol-
icy-making, leveraging their power to influence governmental policies. While many stud-
ies focus on cohabitation and presidential activism, crucial questions remain. As Raunio
and Sedelius (2020: 52–58) point out, most presidential power measures fail to address
presidential participation in national security and foreign policy adequately. To contribute
to filling this gap, this article aims to answer three questions: under which conditions are
presidents active in foreign and defence policy? Under which conditions are they success-
ful? What are the consequences of presidential activism? Empirically, we will investigate
the case of Portugal’s premier-presidential system from 1982 to 2021.
Portuguese presidents wield some influence over foreign and defence policy, but most
powers reside with the government. The literature suggests that the policy-making process in
these areas is highly institutionalised and marked by a robust cross-party consensus (Carreiras,
2022; Freire, 2022; Passarelli, 2010; Raimundo, 2017; Teixeira, 2010; Teixeira and Fernandes,
2005). The prime minister is the first mover in policy issues. However, most Portuguese presi-
dents have had significant attitudes towards foreign and defence policy. Thus, there exists a
latent potential for clashes between the head of state and the government.
Portugal is a particularly suitable case to study presidential activism. It generally has
very stable institutions and is a notable example of a highly institutionalised and consen-
sual foreign and defence policy-making process.1 These attributes reduce the presence of
confounders when pinning down the motivations, tactics and outcomes of presidential
behaviour.
To investigate Portuguese presidents’ activism and success in foreign and defence
policy, we first briefly review what we know of intra-executive disputes in semi-presiden-
tial systems and the special character of those policies. Then, we provide an overview of
Portugal’s experience with semi-presidentialism since 1976 and the powers of the
Portuguese president. The third section describes all the significant episodes of presiden-
tial intervention in foreign and defence policy from 1982 to 2021. This section provides
rough estimates of presidents’ and prime ministers’ex-ante preferences over the issues
under scrutiny. To identify the winner in disputes between presidents and prime ministers,
we verify which preference is closest to the policy’s ex-post content after a presidential
intervention. If the president’s position is the one to which the implemented policy is
pushed, it will be considered as a presidential win. We also identify the formal and infor-
mal means presidents resorted to in each intervention. Informal means are essentially
going public tactics. We inductively pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions
under which presidents intervene and succeed. The article’s main findings are two: first,
the president’s second term, the absence of a strictly unified executive, and a majority
cabinet are separately necessary but jointly sufficient for presidential interventions to
occur; second, formal powers are a necessary but insufficient condition for presidential
victory. Finally, we speculate on presidential activism’s policy, institutional, and electoral
consequences, and discuss deviant cases and an alternative explanation.
Intra-Executive Conflicts in Semi-Presidential Systems
We follow Elgie’s and Raunio and Sedelius’ concept of intra-executive conflicts: severe
and persistent tensions between the president and the cabinet (Elgie, 2018: 130; Raunio
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