Principle 5: Natural Meaning

JurisdictionUnited Kingdom
Pages65-118
AuthorRichard Calnan
Principles of Statutory Interpretation. Richard Calnan, Oxford University Press. © Richard Calnan 2023.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192864673.003.0006
5
Principle 5: Natural Meaning
Principle 5: e words of the statute are nearly always given their ordinary meaning in
context, taking account of the purpose of the statute.
A. Natural and Ordinary Meaning
e starting point when interpreting a statute is to give the words of the statute their natural
and ordinary meaning.1
is is also true of contractual interpretation: the starting point is the natural and ordinary
meaning of the words of the contract.
In Selvey v Director of Public Prosecutions,2 Viscount Dilhorne said: ‘e words of the statute
must be given their ordinary natural meaning.’
Lord Simon made the same point in Black- Clawson International v Papierwerke
Waldhof- Aschaenburg:3
Aer all, the rst and most elementary (and, I would add, salutary) rule of construction is
that the words of a statute must be read in the most natural sense which they bear in their
context.
More recently, in Re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill,4 the Supreme Court had to decide
whether a particular proposed Bill was within the competence of the Welsh Assembly. It said:
[e] question whether a provision is outside the competence of the Assembly must be
determined according to the particular rules that [the relevant sections] have laid down.
ese rules must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words used. In
that way a coherent, stable and workable outcome can be achieved.
is statement is of interest because it not only states the principle but also explains its ra-
tionale. By interpreting words according to their normal meaning in context, a coherent,
stable and workable outcome can be achieved.
ere is also a constitutional reason for giving eect to the natural and ordinary meaning of
the words of the statute. is point was made by Lord Diplock in Duport Steels v Sirs:5
My Lords, at a time when more and more cases involve the application of legislation which
gives eect to policies that are the subject of bitter public and parliamentary controversy, it
1 e words ‘natural’ and ‘ordinary’ are used interchangeably in the cases. ere is nothing wrong with that.
ey are synonyms in this context. ey are also frequently used in conjunction. at approach is generally
avoided in this book. It seems wasteful to use three words where one will do just as well.
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
66  :  
cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British constitution, though largely unwritten,
is rmly based upon the separation of powers; Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary
interpret them. When Parliament legislates to remedy what the majority of its members at
the time perceive to be a defect or lacuna in the existing law . . ., the role of the judiciary is
conned to ascertaining from the words that Parliament has approved as expressing its in-
tention what that intention was, and to giving eect to it. Where the meaning of the statu-
tory words is plain and unambiguous, it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities
as an excuse for failing to give eect to its plain meaning because they themselves con-
sider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.
In controversial matters . . . there is room for dierences of opinion as to what is expe-
dient, what is just and what is morally justiable. Under our constitution it is Parliament’s
opinion on these matters that is paramount.
Lord Diplock went on to say that if a statute turned out to have injurious results, then it is for
Parliament not the judiciary to change it. He continued:6
It endangers continued public condence in the political impartiality of the judiciary,
which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of inter-
pretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their
operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom
the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest.
As Holt CJ said in 1701:7 ‘An Act of Parliament can do no wrong, although it may do several
things that look pretty odd.’
e way in which the principle is applied in practice can be illustrated by cases concerning
criminal law, tax law and the law of contract:
• R v Bentham;8
• R v Boyesen;9
• Police v Emirali;10
• Customs and Excise Commissioners v Mechanical Services (Trailer Engineers);11
• Customs and Excise Commissioners v Zielinski Baker and Partners;12 and
• Actionstrength v International Glass Engineering.13
In R v Bentham,14 the defendant put his hands inside his jacket and, forcing out the material
to give the appearance of a gun, he pointed his ngers at the victim, demanding money. e
defendant was charged under section 17(2) of the Firearms Act 1968 with having ‘in his pos-
session a rearm or imitation rearm’. e House of Lords decided that, since a person’s hand
or ngers were not a separate thing but were part of himself, he could not possess them and
therefore that he could not have been in possession of an imitation rearm.
7 City of London v Wood (1701) 12 Mod Rep 669 at 687– 688.
10 [1976] 2 NZLR 476.
5.8
5.9
5.10
5.11
    67
e principal judgment was given by Lord Bingham. He said that one cannot possess some-
thing that is not separate and distinct from oneself. Parliament might have created an oence
of falsely pretending to have a rearm. But it did not do so.15 He went on to say:16
Rules of statutory construction have a valuable role when the meaning of a statutory pro-
vision is doubtful, but none where, as here, the meaning is plain. Purposive construction
cannot be relied on to create an oence which Parliament has not created.
is was a case in which the court gave eect to the ordinary meaning of the words of the
statute and refused to extend the scope of a clear statutory provision in order to nd someone
guilty of an oence, however culpable his conduct. In the next case, the court relied on the
ordinary meaning of the words in order to nd someone guilty of an oence, even though
it might have been argued that, on the facts, the purpose of the legislation had not been
infringed.
In R v Boyesen,17 the respondent was charged with unlawful possession of 5 mg of cannabis
resin contrary to section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. e relevant provision made it
an oence ‘for a person to have a controlled drug in his possession’. e respondent had a
measurable quantity of the drug, but he argued that the amount was so small that it was not
usable in the way that the Act was intended to prohibit.
e House of Lords decided that the respondent was nevertheless guilty of an oence. ere
was no express requirement that the amount of the drug should be usable, and it refused to
imply one. e words were clear. ey were not ambiguous and no absurdity was produced.
ese are both examples of the court giving eect to the natural meaning of the words in
context. e second case is particularly interesting because the purpose of the Act was to
prevent the misuse of drugs, and it could therefore sensibly have been argued that possession
was only unlawful if it enabled misuse to occur. If the amount involved could not be used
because it was such a small amount, then it was arguable that the purpose of the Act had
not been contravened. But the court refused to accept this argument. It gave eect to the or-
dinary meaning of the words, even though that led to a conviction.
e result in Boysen can be contrasted with the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal
in Police v Emirali.18 e facts in Emirali were very similar to those in Boysen. e defendant
was found in possession of measurable quantities of cannabis, but the amounts were so small
that they were not usable. e New Zealand Court of Appeal took the opposite approach
to that of the House of Lords in Boysen, deciding that the defendant could not be convicted
where the amount of the drug in his possession was not usable.
e judgment of the court was given Woodhouse J. He said19 that although the court should
give every proper support to those who have the responsibility of controlling the serious
problem of drug abuse, the point was to understand the purpose of the statute. He continued:
15 ibid, [8] and [9].
16 ibid, [10].
18 [1976] 2 NZLR 476.
19 ibid, 480.
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18

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