Private versus Public Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from Chile

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhu002
Date27 June 2014
Pages691-709
Year2014
Published ByOxford University Press
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM CHILE
Aldo González& Alejandro Micco
†
ABSTRACT
This article measures the impact of Fiscalía Nacional Económica (FNE), the
agency responsible for enforcing competition law, on the outcome of antitrust
trials in Chile. Using statistics on lawsuits since the inception of the new
Competition Tribunal in 2004, we find that involvement of the public agency
increases the probability of obtaining a guilty verdict in an antitrust lawsuit by 40
percentage points. Conditional upon a verdict, prosecutor participation raises the
likelihood of a conviction by 38 percentage points. The results are robust to pos-
sible selection bias by the public agency. The prosecutor is likely to take part in
cases involving sensitive markets and in accusations of collusion. The state-
related character of the accused entity, in addition to its size, does not affect the
probability of agency intervention.
JEL: K21; K41; K42
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most debated issues in the execution of competition law is the
importance of public enforcement in relation to private enforcement. In the
United States, private parties are responsible for a large majority of legal
actions in competition cases, while in Europe enforcement is mainly public.
In Chile, the competition system, which is based on a legal format, allows
both public and private entities to initiate lawsuits against competition
infringements.
Our article seeks to measure the impact of Fiscalía Nacional Económica
(FNE), the public agency responsible for safeguarding competition in Chile.
The Chilean institutional system, given its adversarial format, offers favorable
conditions to conduct comparisons in effectiveness between public and private
actions in antitrust cases. Sanctions against companies for anticompetitive
conduct, as well as prohibitions or obligations imposed on them, must be
resolved through trial. Legal proceedings can be initiated either by the antitrust
Department of Economics, University of Chile. Email: agonzalez@econ.uchile.cl.
†
Department of Economics, University of Chile. Email: amicco@econ.uchile.cl. The authors are
grateful to Daniel Rubinfeld, Andrés Gómez-Lobo, and Francisco Aguero for helpful
comments. Alejandro Micco acknowledges support from the Iniciativa Cientifica Milenio Project
NS 100041.
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 10(3), 691–709
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhu002
Advance Access publication 27 June 2014
© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
public prosecutor or by individuals or firms directly affected. The judicial
body that resolves these disputes is a tribunal specializing in antitrust law,
which does not have any administrative relation to the prosecuting entity.
Besides the investigative powers conferred to it by law, the FNE does not
possess any procedural advantages compared with private parties.
Using statistics on lawsuits filed before the Tribunal de Defensa de Libre
Competencia (TDLC) since its inception in 2004, we compared the outcome of
cases where the FNE participated with those where it did not. If a lawsuit is
filed solely by private parties, the probability of a conviction is 16 percent. If
the prosecutor (FNE) initiates the lawsuit or is party thereto, the probability
increases to 56 percent. Considering only those cases where a decision was
issued, in lawsuits filed by private parties the probability of conviction is 27
percent, versus a 64 percent probability of conviction for lawsuits filed by the
FNE. The results obtained are not attributable to the selection bias of cases on
the part of the FNE. By using instrumental variables to control for self-
selection, the probability of an FNE-involved conviction is even more greatly
increased.
Our results support the hypothesis of the superiority of public enforcement
over private enforcement. According to the explanations provided by the
theory, public enforcement’s higher probability of conviction may reside in the
superior expertise of the public agency concerning the application of competi-
tion principles. This would allow the prosecutor to better defend its cases
before the Tribunal. Another possible reason, as we will explain below, is the
strategic use of the lawsuits by firms. However, with the available information,
it is not possible to determine the prevailing cause behind public action’s
greater effectiveness.
Regarding those factors that influence the FNE’s participation in a case,
data show that the prosecutor is most likelyto initiate legal actions when the ac-
cusation concerns collusion, the affected market is considered “sensitive,”or
the accused party is not listed on the Chilean stock exchange. This last variable
can be considered a proxy for the size of the accused company.
The state-related nature of the accused party—state-owned company,
public agency, ministry, or municipality—does not influence the FNE’s deci-
sion of becoming party to a case. As such, we can rule out a capture bias that
inhibits the public agency from acting against other entities that are also
state-related. These results point toward the strengthening of the public pros-
ecution as the most effective mean to achieve the objective of protecting com-
petition in the markets.
The article is structured in the following manner. Part II reviews the litera-
ture comparing public and private enforcement in antitrust law. Its emphasis is
placed on summarizing the different theories that explain the relative advan-
tages of one type of enforcement over the other. Part III describes the competi-
tion system in Chile in relation to the legal procedure for lawsuits. Part IV
describes the data and provides an analysis of factors influencing the
692 Journal of Competition Law & Economics

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