Privatising Prisons
| DOI | 10.1177/095207678600100105 |
| Date | 01 January 1986 |
| Published date | 01 January 1986 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Privatising
Prisons
Roger
Hall,
Leicester
Polytechnic
Introduction
Why
prison?
The
question
is
reasonable
given
that
the
privatising
impulse
up
till
now
has
affected
commercial
enterprises
rather
than
welfare
services.
Prisons
would
appear
to
be
well
down
anyone's
list
of
candidates.
All
the
same,
the
pro-
posal
is
a
serious
one
springing
like'
most
privatising
scenarios
from
the
proven
failure
of
state
provision
and
the
hypothetical
benefits
of
the
application
of
market
disciplines.
The
issues
which
need
to
be
tackled
are
the
following:
what
are
the
precise
arguments
for
declaring
the
state
control
of
prisons
to
be
seriously
flawed?
Would
not
the
implied
advantages
of
private
control
not
be
just
as
well
provided
by
a
reform
of
public
provision
given
some
commitment
to
decentralisation,
public
accountability,
efficiency
or
whatever?
On
the
second
point,
it
is
quite
possible
that
a
searching
look
at
current
penal
theory
or
its
application
might
pay
dividends.
But
there
can
be
little
optimism
on
this
score.
There
are
several
shortcomings
with
the
existing
administration
of
prisons.
There
is
no
incentive
for
the
service
to
be
efficient.
Given
the
lack
of
clear
penal
objectives,
public
awareness,
parliamentary
scrutiny
and
any
serious
evaluation
of
performance,
it is
scarcely
surprising
that
costs
escalate
alarmingly
without
any
corresponding
improvement
in
outcomes.
Collective
Provision
and
the
Market
Much
of
the
general
case
against
collective
provision
of
goods
and
services
has
already
appeared.
Le
Grand
has
shown
(Le
Grand,
1982)
that
in
terms
of
equity
and
equality
alone,
to
say
nothing
of
efficiency,
the
public
administration
of
education,
housing,
health
and
transport
has
been
a
grave
disappointment.
On
the
whole,
public
expenditure
is
non-redistributive
and
often
ineffective
in
achieving
its
goals
(ibid).
This
is
a
serious
point
given
that
the
case
for
state
provision
rests
largely
on
those
very
grounds
of
redistribution,
effectiveness,
eradication
of
externalities
and
the
existence
of
a
large
range
of
'public'
good
which
the
private
sector
cannot
or
will
not
provide.
The
case
against
market
provision
normally
rests
on
the
'exclusivity'
factor;
a
good
either
has
to
be.maide
available
to
everyone
within
a
jurisdiction
or
the
problem
of
free-riders
occurs.
The
standard
examples
are
street-lighting,
defence
and
clean
air.
In
reality
the
difficulties
are
less
acute.
Public
Policy
and
Administration
Volume
1
No.
1
1986
50
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