Promoting Justice Across Borders
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321719875402 |
| Author | Lucia M Rafanelli |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719875402
Political Studies
2021, Vol. 69(2) 237 –256
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321719875402
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Promoting Justice
Across Borders
Lucia M Rafanelli
Abstract
Political theorists have written a great deal about the ethics of “intervention,” defined as states
using coercion or force to interfere in foreign societies’ politics. But this work leaves much of
global politics un-analyzed—both because non-state actors play an increasingly significant role in
it and because its practitioners use many tactics besides force and coercion. We need an ethics of
foreign influence to help us navigate the global political arena in all its complexity. Here, I begin to
develop a unified theory of the ethics of deliberate attempts to promote justice in foreign societies,
whether undertaken by state or non-state actors, and whatever tactics they employ. I identify two
important but under-appreciated dimensions along which instances of foreign influence can differ
and argue that, once we appreciate the full range of forms foreign influence can take, we’ll see it’s
often immune to the common moral objections against intervention.
Keywords
intervention, foreign influence, global justice
Accepted: 21 August 2019
Political theorists have written a great deal about the ethics of “intervention,” defined as
states using coercion or force to interfere in foreign societies’ politics (e.g. Caney, 2005:
227; Doyle, 2015: 2–5; Fabre, 2012; Tesón and Van Der Vossen, 2017; Walzer, 2015;
Weiss, 2016: 7; Welsh, 2003: 3). But this work leaves much of global politics un-ana-
lyzed—both because non-state actors play an increasingly significant role in it (Falk,
2016) and because its practitioners use many tactics besides force and coercion. We need
an ethics of foreign influence that can help us navigate the global political arena—alive
with myriad state and non-state actors trading influence in every way imaginable—in all
its complexity.
Recently, some have begun to address this need. Though admirable, their work is nar-
rowly focused in its own ways. Some transcend the literature’s usual focus on coercion to
discuss the ethics of non-coercive foreign influence but remain narrowly focused on state
activity (e.g. Fabre, 2018a; Pattison, 2018a). Some discuss non-state actors but focus only
on foreign influence meant to alleviate extraordinarily grave injustices (e.g. Bellamy,
The George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA
Corresponding author:
Lucia M Rafanelli, The George Washington University, Department of Political Science, 2115 G Street NW,
Monroe Hall, Suite 440, Washington, DC 20052, USA.
Email: lmrafanelli@gwu.edu
875402PSX0010.1177/0032321719875402Political StudiesRafanelli
research-article2019
Article
238 Political Studies 69(2)
2018; Fabre, 2018b; Pattison, 2018b). Similarly, Rubenstein’s (2015) insightful treatment
of the ethical issues faced by humanitarian international NGOs (INGOs) is so specifically
tailored to the distinctive features unique to these organizations that its findings can’t be
generalized to other kinds of actors exerting influence on the global stage. Rubenstein
(2015: 3) herself suggests as much when she writes that the ethical challenges INGOs
face are “built into their very structure as organizations,” and when she presents her ethi-
cal conclusions as designed particularly for a “distinctive type of political actor”—“large-
scale, Western-based, donor-funded humanitarian INGOs.”
This article, in contrast, begins to develop a unified theory of the ethics of deliberate
attempts to promote justice in foreign societies—no matter what kind of political actor
makes these attempts, and no matter the gravity of the injustices they seek to remedy. (I’ll
often simply say foreign influence, but this will always be short for foreign influence
aimed at promoting justice in the recipient society.1) Discussing foreign influence exer-
cised by both state and non-state actors, and aimed at redressing all kinds of injustice,
allows me to address a class of cases neglected by others in the literature. Though I’ll
discuss some coercive and forceful interventions as contrast cases, I’ll mainly focus on
justice-promoting foreign influence that uses non-coercive and non-forceful means—
since this phenomenon is both common in global politics and under-treated in the litera-
ture. Similarly, though I’ll reference some efforts to avert atrocities, my main focus will
be foreign influence meant to address “ordinary” injustice2—another phenomenon exist-
ing literature neglects. Moreover, developing a unified theory of the ethics of foreign
influence allows me to improve upon the normative conclusions (even the correct ones)
of more narrowly focused theories: just as ethical standards meant to guide the use of a
particular tactic in resisting domestic injustice would be improved if incorporated into a
broader theory of how we should pursue domestic justice generally, ethical standards
meant to guide the use of a particular tactic in resisting global injustice would be improved
if incorporated into a broader theory of how we should pursue justice on the global stage.
The next section engages with several real-world cases of foreign influence to identify
two morally significant but under-appreciated dimensions along which instances of for-
eign influence can differ: (1) the degree of control foreign influencers exercise over recip-
ients and (2) to what extent they interfere with the operation of recipients’ political
institutions. How a case of foreign influence fares on these dimensions affects the condi-
tions under which it’s permissible or not. Indeed, once we appreciate these differences,
we’ll see that not all foreign influence is vulnerable to the powerful objections often lev-
eled against intervention.
Intervention is often thought to treat members of recipient societies intolerantly
(Rawls, 1999; Walzer, 1994, 1997; see also Godfrey-Smith and Kerr, 2019, who essen-
tially define toleration as non-interference), to fail to properly recognize their legitimate
political institutions (Altman and Wellman, 2009; Buchanan, 2003; Luban, 1980; Walzer,
1980, 2007), and/or to perpetuate colonial hierarchies (Anghie, 2006; Koskenniemi,
2001; Mutua, 2000). But here, I’ll argue that some types of foreign influence are, at least
pro tanto, morally permissible because they’re immune to these standard objections.
Though the standard objections may be easily overridden when foreign influence is
needed to redress very grave injustices, I’ll argue that some foreign influence escapes
these objections even when their moral force is the strongest—when foreigners only aim
to remedy “ordinary” injustices. I’ll then argue that our findings about what types of for-
eign influence are permissible suggest we should adopt two presumptions—one in favor
of influence that exerts comparatively little control over its recipients, and one in favor of
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