Punishing tax offenders in France and Great Britain: two criminal policies
| Pages | 574-588 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-05-2016-0030 |
| Published date | 02 October 2017 |
| Date | 02 October 2017 |
| Author | Katia Weidenfeld,Alexis Spire |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & Finance,Financial risk/company failure,Financial crime |
Punishing tax offenders in France
and Great Britain: two
criminal policies
Katia Weidenfeld
Ecole Nationale des Chartes –PSL, Paris, France, and
Alexis Spire
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique –PSL, Paris, France
Abstract
Purpose –Since 2008-2009, the governments in Franceand Great Britain have encouraged more rigorous
penalizationof tax evaders. This paper aims to investigate the implementationof these policies on the basis of
an importantand original empirical material.
Design/methodology/approach –The study done in France relies on interviews conducted with
representativesof law enforcement agencies on public statistics and on an innovative databasecompiled from
nearly 600 cases submitted to the judiciary. The comparison with Great Britain is developed through
interviewsconducted with different participants in the fight against tax fraud and statisticalinformation.
Findings –This paper describes the recent evolution of the machinery for screening tax-related
wrongdoings in France and in the UK. It demonstrates that whilst publicly calling for harsh punishment
against tax dodgers, in practice, bothgovernments tend to seek a balance between the growing demand for
tax equality andthe belief that the State should not intervene in the economic realm. This strategy leads to the
over-representationof certain categories of taxpayers.Despite the commonalities resulting from the numerous
filters before prosecution, the penal strategy takes on two different shapes on either side of the Channel:
whereas the Britishinstitutions support an “exemplary punitive”system,French regulatory system favours a
“quasi-administrative”treatment. The French tax authority continuesto use the criminal procedures mainly
as a financial instrument for the improved restitution of stolen taxes. The policy of Her Majesty’s Revenue
and Customs, supported by the “Sentencing Guidelines”, aims much more at obtaining exemplary
convictions.
Originality/value –Based on a large empirical material,this paper highlights the different outcomes of
the criminaltrials against tax evaders in the two countries.
Keywords France, Great Britain, White-collar crime, Tax fraud, Penalization
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Tax fraud is a white-collar crime that has long been subjected to the indifference of courts
and criminologists (Sutherland, 1949;Levi, 1981). With rare exceptions such as the
pioneering research of Schwartzand Orleans (1967), it is only since the end of the 1970s that
this issue has truly arousedthe interest of researchers.
For the most part, the literature has focused on the effects of criminalizing tax fraud in
terms of regulatory enforcement. The usual objective is to understand how taxpayer
compliance results from three mechanisms of inhibition: formal sanction (the penalty
stipulated by law), informal sanction (social stigma) and internalization of the legal norm
This work was supported by the “Mission de Recherche Droit et Justice”in France.
JFC
24,4
574
Journalof Financial Crime
Vol.24 No. 4, 2017
pp. 574-588
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1359-0790
DOI 10.1108/JFC-05-2016-0030
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