R Mattey v Chief Constable of Dorset Police
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Gross,Mr Justice Nicol |
| Judgment Date | 24 May 2016 |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] EWHC 3131 (Admin) |
| Date | 24 May 2016 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/4647/2015 |
[2016] EWHC 3131 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Gross
Mr Justice Nicol
CO/4647/2015
The Claimant appeared in person
Mr J Beer QC (instructed by Dorset Police Department of Legal Services) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
This is a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review brought by Mr Mattey, who represented himself in person today, following refusal of permission on the papers by Hickinbottom J. The defendant was represented today by Mr Beer QC.
When refusing permission, Hickinbottom J, if I may say so, summarised succinctly and clearly both the facts and the reasons for his decision. That summary merits quotation in full:
"The claimant relies on five grounds. However, it seems to me that the claim is simply misconceived. The claimant's sentence automatically triggered a section 1 notification requirement. Following the elucidation in Wiles we know that that period of the requirement is indefinite. The fact that the sentencing judge wrongly told the claimant that the requirement was for 10 years only is neither here nor there. The notification requirement and its length automatically flows from the statutory provision as construed in Wiles, not as a result of a positive order from the court. The court merely tells the offender what the statutory requirement is. Similarly, the defendant's letter does not make any 'decision' which is challengeable. Each of the claimant's grounds flounders upon that rock. None is arguable."
On one view, as for my part I agree with those reasons and adopt them as my own, that is the end of the matter. But I would wish to do justice to Mr Mattey's arguments before us today, so I shall deal with them in turn.
He distilled his arguments under three headings. The first is that the manner in which he has been dealt with involves an impermissible retrospective application of the decision in Wiles which falls foul of the Supreme Court decision in Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43; [2010] 1 WLR 2601.
The short answer to that point is this, and it was given by Mr Beer today: the judge did not impose a sentence in respect of the notification requirements, he simply recorded what those requirements were in law. They have immediate and operative effect. It does not involve the judge passing a sentence. It follows that Cadder has no application. The notification requirements are what they are and that really is an end of the first argument.
It is unnecessary to delve further into the declaratory effects of court judgments under our common law system. A notification requirement is not a part of the sentence of the court, it is instead a consequence of the sentence passed arising by operation of the law.
The second ground which Mr Mattey developed was this: Dorset applied Wiles to all those affected by it, whereas other forces post-dated, so to speak, the manner in which Wiles was to be applied. In that regard, Mr Mattey submits that the system is dysfunctional, produces impractical consequences and also raises questions under Article 7 in particular and possibly Article 14.
There is, with respect, nothing in that point. The answer is that whatever other police forces do, Dorset is applying Wiles correctly in accordance with the decision. The lesson from this point is not that Dorset is wrong but that it is high time the other forces caught up. That is a message which through Mr Beer I will ask the defendant to convey to the Home Office so as to avoid further arguments of this nature in future.
There is no Article 7 point. That is not even remotely arguable. The notification requirements are not a penalty.
The third point is effectively about the law of unintended consequences. What Mr Mattey says is that to go on a treatment course requires a certain minimum sentence. In the event, it was 3 years or thereabouts. The upshot was that you either did not go on a course of treatment or you ended up with a sentence which resulted in the notification requirement being longer.
There are oddities in the law from time to time. Put at its highest this may be one of them but it...
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