R v Coutts (Graham James)
|LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL,LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD,LORD HUTTON,LORD RODGER OF EARLSFERRY,LORD MANCE
|19 July 2006
| UKHL 39
|House of Lords
|19 July 2006
 UKHL 39
Lord Bingham of Cornhill
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
HOUSE OF LORDS
Edward Fitzgerald QC
(Instructed by Fisher Meredith)
John Kelsey-Fry QC
(Instructed by Crown Prosecution Service)
The appellant, Mr Coutts, was convicted of murder on an indictment charging him with that crime alone. Evidence was adduced at the trial which would have enabled a rational jury, if they accepted it, to convict him of manslaughter. But the trial judge, with the support of the prosecution and the consent of the defence, did not leave an alternative count of manslaughter to the jury. He directed the jury that they should convict of murder if satisfied that the appellant had committed that offence and, if not so satisfied, acquit. On his appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) the appellant contended that a manslaughter verdict should have been left to the jury for their consideration, irrespective of the parties' wishes, since there was evidence to support it. The Court of Appeal rejected that contention, and by leave of the House the appellant now challenges its decision. The narrow question raised by the appeal is whether, on the facts of this case, the trial judge should have left an alternative verdict of manslaughter to the jury. The broader question, of more general public importance, concerns the duty and discretion of trial judges to leave alternative verdicts of lesser-included offences to the jury where there is evidence which a rational jury could accept to support such a verdict but neither prosecution nor defence seek it.
The facts and the proceedings
The facts of the case were summarised at some length by the Court of Appeal ( , ), and are the subject of a fairly detailed statement agreed between the parties for the purpose of this appeal. For present purposes a bare outline will suffice.
The deceased (Jane Longhurst) lived with her male partner in Brighton. The appellant and his girlfriend Lisa Stephens lived in a flat in Hove. Lisa Stephens was a friend of the deceased, with whom the appellant became acquainted. On 14 March 2003 the deceased died at the appellant's flat. He stored her body first in his car, then in his shed, then in a commercial storage facility. On 19 April he took her body to an area of woodland some distance away and set fire to it. When found, the body was burning and unclothed. It had a ligature made from a pair of tights tied twice around the neck, with a knot on the right-hand side. The appellant was interviewed by the police before and after discovery of the body, but prevaricated for reasons which he later sought to explain and justify. Some weeks later he told a legal representative that he had not intended to kill the deceased or cause her serious harm, and that he had never caused harm to anybody in the past when using ligatures in sexual activities. He was charged with murder and in due course tried before His Honour Judge Brown and a jury in the Crown Court at Lewes.
The expert pathologists called by the prosecution and the defence respectively at the trial were agreed that the cause of the deceased's death was compression of her neck by the ligature, causing her to be asphyxiated. But they disagreed on the most likely mechanism. The prosecution expert thought vascular strangulation or respiratory strangulation the most likely mechanisms, and considered vagal inhibition to be less likely. The defence expert thought vagal inhibition the most likely explanation. Both experts gave reasons for holding the opinions which they did, which were fully explored in evidence before the jury. The evidence suggested that death, if caused by vascular or respiratory strangulation, would have occurred within about 2-3 minutes; if by vagal inhibition, it would have occurred more quickly, possibly within 1-2 seconds.
Much of the evidence at trial was directed to the appellant's sexual habits and propensities. One witness, called by the prosecution, had had a seven-year relationship with the appellant, during which he had, with her consent, placed his hand around her neck, before and during intercourse, and had used tights and knickers around her neck. Another witness had had a shorter and more recent relationship. The appellant had asked her to put her hands around his neck during intercourse, and he had put pressure on her windpipe, sometimes using a stocking tied round her neck, which he would pull from both sides. She had allowed him to do this because of the pleasure it gave him but she had never enjoyed it herself and he had always stopped when she asked. With his current partner, Lisa Stephens, he had on a few occasions indulged in what he called "breath control play". There was some evidence, which was denied, that the deceased had engaged in similar activity with a partner other than the appellant.
The appellant said that he had been fascinated by women's necks for about 20 years, but that he had no interest in violence and his fetish did not extend to strangulation. He testified that on 14 March 2003 he and the deceased had had consensual asphyxial sex and her death had been a tragic accident. He had put his hand around her neck, and she had squeezed his hand to tighten his grip. He had then, with her consent, tied a pair of tights round her neck and tied a knot in them. At some point he had closed his eyes and released the tights. He did not know how the deceased had died.
The prosecution led evidence to show that before and after 14 March 2003 the appellant had visited a number of pornographic websites, showing violence towards women. Reliance was also placed on certain websites and on repeated visits by the appellant to the storage facility where the body of the deceased had been stored to suggest that he had necrophiliac propensities.
At the close of the evidence the trial judge very properly invited the submissions of counsel on whether he should direct the jury that a verdict of guilty of manslaughter was open to them. Prosecuting counsel submitted that it would be unfair to do so. He said:
"It is true that one could mount an argument in law to suggest that the defence account, even if accepted, might amount either to gross negligence, on the one hand, or, arguably, an unlawful and dangerous act on the other; and so there would be room, arguably, for an alternative verdict, even on the defence account, of manslaughter …"
But he submitted that the Crown had throughout put forward the case that this was a deliberate killing and nothing else. If that was not proved, the appellant was entitled to be acquitted. It would be wrong to put the case on any alternative basis. Counsel then representing the appellant agreed, although he later ventilated the possibility of a verdict of "no intent manslaughter" as opposed to "unlawful act or gross negligence manslaughter". The judge asked counsel directly whether he was inviting him to put manslaughter on any basis to the jury, and counsel gave a provisional answer in the negative, while reserving the right to discuss the question with the appellant and raise the matter again. He did not raise the matter with the judge again, but did discuss it with the appellant. According to a statement of the appellant, seen and not controverted by counsel then acting, the latter asked him "Do you want us to make representation, or do you want to roll the dice and be home with Lisa and the boys?" The appellant was advised that if convicted of manslaughter he would receive a sentence of as long as 15 years', and agreed that counsel should not ask the judge to leave manslaughter to the jury. Thus the judge directed the jury on the ingredients of murder in terms of which no complaint is made, and directed them to acquit if they thought that the death was or might have been an accident. No mention was made of manslaughter. The jury convicted the appellant of murder.
In the Court of Appeal it was submitted for the appellant that a trial judge ought in the ordinary way and save in some exceptional cases to leave to the jury an alternative count of manslaughter which there is evidence to support, and that the trial judge in this case should have done so whether or not that was the course which counsel on both sides preferred. The Court of Appeal (Lord Woolf CJ, Cresswell and Simon JJ), having reviewed the leading authorities, rejected that submission: , paras 81-84. The court did not recognise a risk that a jury in a case of this kind, faced with a stark choice between convicting of murder and acquitting altogether, might improperly convict. It would have been unfair and unjust to leave the alternative count "for the very good reason that it involved a different and inconsistent case from that put forward by the prosecution". To have introduced an alternative count would have made the jury's task far more complicated without enhancing the interests of justice.
The parties' submissions
Mr Fitzgerald QC (who did not appear at the trial) submitted for the appellant that if in a trial for murder there is credible evidence which would, if accepted, support a verdict not of murder but of manslaughter, the trial judge ought in the ordinary way to leave manslaughter to the jury for their consideration, unless it would for any reason be unfair to do so. The judge should follow that course even though the defence has not advanced such a case or sought such a verdict, and even though the prosecution has not raised, or has rejected, that possibility. The jury, as the tribunal of...
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