R v Governor of Holloway Prison, ex parte Jennings

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLord Fraser of Tullybelton,Lord Scarman,Lord Roskill,Lord Bridge of Harwich,Lord Brightman
Judgment Date29 July 1982
Judgment citation (vLex)[1982] UKHL J0729-1
Date29 July 1982
CourtHouse of Lords

[1982] UKHL J0729-1

House of Lords

Lord Fraser of Tullybelton

Lord Scarman

Lord Roskill

Lord Bridge of Harwich

Lord Brightman

In re Jennings
[on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division]
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton

My Lords,

1

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Roskill. I agree with it, and for the reasons stated in it I would allow this appeal.

Lord Scarman

My Lords,

2

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend, Lord Roskill. For the reasons he gives I would allow the appeal.

Lord Roskill

My Lords,

3

This appeal by the Government of the United States of America who seek the extradition of the first respondent—"the respondent"—a British subject, is, of course, of great importance to her but it also raises questions of general importance in connection with the operation of the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America on the 8th June 1972—"the Treaty". By Order in Council dated 15th December 1976, which took effect on the 21st January 1977, entitled "The United States of America (Extradition) Order "1976"— SI 1976/2144—Her Majesty, pursuant to the powers conferred by the Extradition Acts 1870 to 1935, ordered that those Acts should apply to the United States of America in accordance with the Treaty. Since the United Kingdom statutory provisions relevant to this appeal will all be found in the Extradition Act 1870 I need hereafter only refer to that statute—"the Act".

4

My Lords, this appeal is brought from a decision of the Divisional Court (Ormrod L.J. and Forbes J.) dated 6th April 1982. The Divisional Court refused leave to appeal against that decision but leave was in due course granted by your Lordships' House. The Divisional Court had ordered that a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum should issue in favour of the respondent and that she should be discharged from custody in which she was then held. The respondent had on the 23rd April 1981 been committed to prison by the learned stipendiary magistrate sitting at Bow Street Magistrates' Court upon an application for her extradition to the State of California made by the Deputy District Attorney, County of Los Angeles in that State. She was subsequently released on bail upon her undertaking to apply for a writ of habeas corpus as in due course she did.

5

My Lords, the application for the respondent's extradition arose out of events which took place almost four years ago. The respondent was then only some seventeen years of age. These were the main allegations. At about 7.30 p.m. on the 21st August 1978, in light conditions which were described as dusk, the respondent was driving a yellow Ford Mustang car along Grand Avenue in El Segundo in California. Grand Avenue is a dual carriageway with a central reservation. The respondent was travelling in the eastbound carriageway. At the intersection of Standard Street, she turned northward—and in doing so struck the rear of a car travelling in the westbound carriageway of Grand Avenue. She did not stop but drove off up Standard Street pursued by the car which she had struck at a speedestimated by one witness as about 40 miles per hour. That witness said she appeared to be accelerating. The next east-west street crossing Standard Street was Holly Avenue and this was protected by a stop sign. On approaching the intersection the respondent braked violently, failed to stop at the stop sign, skidded over the junction and in so doing struck a thirteen year old boy named Gary Sheehan who was riding his bicycle along Holly Street. Sheehan was very seriously injured. A police officer who was called to the scene of the accident stated that the respondent's breath smelt of alcohol. What is described as a "field sobriety test" was given. The respondent was then arrested for "Felony Drunk Driving" and was taken to a hospital for a blood test which was carried out. The resulting analysis revealed 0·17 grams (i.e. 170 milligrams) of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. Driving in this condition was an offence against Section 23101of the Vehicle Code of the State of California. The respondent was charged accordingly. She was released on bail. On 7th September 1978 the respondent, in breach of the terms of her bail, left California by plane for England, accompanied by her mother. She has remained in this country ever since.

6

My Lords, on the 13th September 1978 Sheehan died, never having recovered consciousness. The post mortem report with your Lordships' papers reveals the full extent of his grave injuries.

7

My Lords, on 6th June 1979 an amended complaint alleging manslaughter of Sheehan by the respondent was filed in the Municipal Court of Inglewood in the Judicial District of the County of Los Angeles in California. The charge alleged "manslaughter in violation of Section 192, Sub-division 3(a), Penal Code of California, a felony" on the ground that the respondent "did unlawfully kill a human being to wit Gary Sheehan without malice but with gross negligence …". The complainant sought a warrant for the arrest of the respondent who of course by then had been in England for nearly nine months. It was that charge which led in due course to the present application for the extradition of the respondent. In a statement by the Governor of California, with your Lordships' papers, made under the Great Seal of that State on the 14th August 1979, the Governor stated that the purpose of the application was to require the respondent to stand trial for "the felony offences of which she stood charged" namely manslaughter and felony drunk driving. But, recognising that felony drunk driving was not an extraditable offence, the Governor certified that if the respondent were extradited it would not be sought to prosecute the respondent for the latter offence.

8

My Lords I have mentioned that the charge of manslaughter brought against the respondent was one of unlawful killing without malice by gross negligence contrary to Section 192 3(a) of the Penal Code of the State of California. It will be convenient to set out the text of Section 192 of the Code in full.

"Section 192. Manslaughter; voluntary, involuntary, and in driving a vehicle defined; …

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:

1. Voluntary—upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion;

2. Involuntary—in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produced death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection; provided that this subdivision shall not apply to acts committed in the driving of a vehicle.

3. In the driving of a vehicle—

  1. (a) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, with gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.

  2. (b) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, without gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.

This section shall not be construed as making any homicide in the driving of a vehicle punishable which is not a proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, or of the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner."

9

My Lords, it was common ground that, subject to what I am about to say, by the law of California manslaughter is a felony. Further, the remaining relevant provisions of the law of California were not in dispute. The punishment for manslaughter is prescribed by Section 193 of the Penal Code of the State of California which your Lordships were told had been amended in 1977. Your Lordships were further told that the relevant maximum punishment for involuntary manslaughter contrary to Section 192 3(a) was three years in the state prison (see the affidavit of Mr. Billy Webb) but your Lordships were referred to Section 17 of the Code which when read with Section 193(c) had the effect, at the date of the alleged offence, that a jury was entitled by their verdict in the event of conviction of this offence to recommend that the punishment should be by imprisonment in the county jail and not in the state prison, whereupon the judge no longer has power to pass a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison—but not so as to prevent him placing a defendant on probation. In the event of such a recommendation by the jury the conviction would not be one of felony but of misdemeanor—see Section 17(b)(i). Your Lordships were also told that this provision has since been amended.

10

My Lords, I turn to the relevant English law. I draw attention to the provision in Section 26 of the Act which defines an extradition crime as "one of the crimesdescribed [my emphasis] in the First Schedule" The Second crime named in the First Schedule is manslaughter. It seems therefore clear, both from the Act and from Article III (1) of the Treaty, that the first prerequisite to a successful application for the extradition of the respondent is that the charge against her is of a crime which in England is properly described as manslaughter. The second prerequisite to such an application is that the offence is punishable under English law and under the relevant law of the United States of America—in this case the law of the State of California—by imprisonment for more than one year—see Article III (1)(a) of the Treaty. The third prerequisite is that the offence is a felony under the relevant law of the United States of America—again Californian law—see Article III (1)(c) of the Treaty. The fourth prerequisite is that the evidence produced in support of the application is found to be...

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23 cases
  • R v Seymour (Edward)
    • United Kingdom
    • House of Lords
    • 21 July 1983
    ...of reckless driving, it left the common law crimes of culpable homicide, and manslaughter, in existence. This House decided in Reg. v. Governor of Holloway ex parte Jennings [1982] 3 W.L.R. 450 that the crime of manslaughter had not been impliedly repealed and the decision is in principle ......
  • Henry Boot v Malmaison
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 28 July 2000
    ...an earlier Act that the two cannot stand together?’ 16. There is a presumption against implied repeal. In Jennings v United StatesUNK[1982] 3 All ER 104 (HL), Lord Roskill said at page 116: ‘My Lords, counsel for the defendant also referred your Lordships to a number of cases in the last ce......
  • R Sophie Wilkinson (Claimant) Hm Coroner for the Greater and Another (Defendant) Wendy Livesley (Interested Party)
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 11 October 2012
    ...death by dangerous driving 50 In the 1980s very bad driving which caused death was charged as manslaughter ( USA Government v Jennings [1983] 1 AC 624), commonly known as 'motor manslaughter'. But juries were reluctant to convict and hence the creation first in 1956 of the offence of causi......
  • Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 28 July 2000
    ...of an earlier Act that the two cannot stand together? 16 There is a presumption against implied repeal. In Jennings v United States [1982] 3 All ER 104, (HL) Lord Roskill said at page 116: My Lords, counsel for the defendant also referred your Lordships to a number of cases in the last cent......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • House of Lords
    • United Kingdom
    • Journal of Criminal Law, The No. 49-1, February 1985
    • 1 February 1985
    ...that he found this decision astounding, sincecriminal law in America is a matter of state, not federal, law: see exp. Jennings [1983] 1 A.C. 624. Both members of the DivisionalCourt relied on the need to establish"doublecriminality"; but theHouse reiterated that the true testis that laid do......

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