R v Griffiths
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR. JUSTICE PAULL |
| Judgment Date | 07 April 1965 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1965] EWCA Crim J0407-1 |
| Court | Court of Criminal Appeal |
| Docket Number | Nos: 1783; 1782 1649; 1691 1639; 1674 1847 |
| Date | 07 April 1965 |
[1965] EWCA Crim J0407-1
Mr. Justice Paull
Mr. Justice Phillimore
and
Mr. Justice Fenton Atkinson
Nos: 1783; 1782
1710; 1692
1649; 1691
1639; 1674
1847
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
Royal Courts of Justice
MR. A. T. DAVIES, Q.C. and MR. J. G. MARRIAGE appeared as Counsel on behalf of Griffiths.
MR. F. H. L. PETRE appeared as Counsel on behalf of Booth.
MR. J. F. A. ARCHER and MR. G. M. M. WAKEFORD appeared as Counsel on behalf of Bishop.
MR. R. M. O. HAVERS, Q.C. and MISS A. E. O. HAVERS appeared as Counsel on behalf of Brown.
MR. E. M. OGDEN and MR. G. M. M.WAKEFORD appeared as Counsel on behalf of Pinner.
MR. R. M. O. HAVERS, Q.C. and MR. A.ARLIDGE appeared as Counsel on behalf of Read.
MR. W. M. F. HUDSON and MR. D. J. COCKS appeared as Counsel on behalf of Riches.
MR. F. P. CROWDER, Q.C. and LORD STORMONT appeared as Counsel on behalf of Topham.
MR. R. M. O. HAVERS, Q.C. and MR. F. IRWIN appeared as Counsel on behalf of Tyrrell.
MR. M. J. MORRIS, Q.C. and MR. L. K. E. BOREHAM appeared as Counsel for the Crown.
This is an appeal by nine appellants against conviction. The case was tried at Bury St. Edmunds Assizes and lasted from the 5th May until the 17th July, that is, over ten weeks. There were 60 witnesses for the Prosecution and 35 for the Defendants, including the Defendants themselves, making 95 all told. There were 25 counts involving in all 78 verdicts. It was a case with complicated details, the exhibits numbering 263, including accounts and schedules. It was a case where the first count was a count of conspiracy against all the accused and the other 24 counts were substantive counts said to be selected as examples of overt acts done by various members of the conspiracy and also as proving that all the accused did take part in a conspiracy.
From time to time the Courts have complained about cases which have proved to be long and complicated because the Prosecution have added a charge of conspiracy to substantive counts which would otherwise have been reasonably easy to try on their merits, or alternatively when it would have been reasonably easy to try the count of conspiracy if taken by itself. In the case of Dawson, (1960) 44 Criminal Appeal Reports, page 87 (a case where the trial lasted 9 weeks), Mr. Justice Finnemore in giving the judgment of the Court said, at page 91, when dealing with the adding of a conspiracy charge: "We think it right to say as has been said by other Judges before us that it is an undesirable practice and can easily in some cases work hardship on defendants", and, at page 92: "We think Wenlock was really a typical example of a man who was sunk by means of a mass of evidence about frauds of different kinds with the great majority of which he had no connection either direct or indirect and in which he took no part whatever".
At page 93 he said: "With regard to the first count of conspiracy ….. this Court has more than once warned of the dangers of conspiracy counts especially conspiracy counts which one counsel has referred to as a marathon conspiracy count ….. If there are substantive charges which can he proved, it is in general undesirable to complicate and to lengthen trials by adding a charge of conspiracy ….. That course can work injustice because evidence which would be inadmissible on the substantive charges against certain people becomes admissible ….. It adds to the length and complexity of the case so that the trial may well be nigh unworkable and imposes quite an intolerable strain both an the Court and on the jury".
This case is one to which every word which I have quoted applies. It is not surprising that at one stage the jury were complaining strongly at their having to try the case with all its details and ramifications. We have no hesitation in saying it was a case where it was almost impossible for any judge to sum up the various issues clearly and at sufficient length without making his summing-up so long as to make it almost certain that the jury would carry no clear picture of all the issues into the jury room.
The practice of adding what may be called a rolled up conspiracy charge to a number of counts of substantive offences has become common. We express the very strong hope that this practice will now cease and that the courts will never again have to struggle with this type of case, where it becomes almost impossible to explain to a jury that evidence inadmissible against the accused on the substantive count may be admissible against him on the conspiracy count once he is shown to be a conspirator.
We do not believe that most juries can ever really understand the subtleties of the situation. In our judgment, except in simple cases, a conspiracy count (if one is needed at all) should be tried separately to substantive counts. The danger of not doing so becomes startlingly clear in this case where it is now admitted without argument that in two counts upon which Mr. Bishop was convicted, there was literally no receivable evidence at all against him, the evidence being entries in Griffiths' books of account, evidence in the conspiracy count once Mr. Bishop is brought into a conspiracy but not evidence upon which he can be brought into the conspiracy.
It would have been simple, as was indicated in Dawson's case to be the proper procedure, to have charged Mr. Griffiths and his accountant book-keeper Mr. Booth with a conspiracy to defraud and to have had separate prosecutions against each farmer who was alleged to have obtained fraudulently any money from the Ministry of Agriculture by false pretences. In such a case what was evidence against any farmer would have been simple to resolve. Certainly Mr. Griffiths' books could not be evidence against any of the farmers, none of whom had any knowledge of them. Yet the whole of Mr. Griffiths' method of accounting and whether that method was an honest method or a dishonest method became, in the words of the Judges "the central factor in the case for the Prosecution", a matter hopelessly prejudicial to each and every farmer.
In order to understand the issues and how the case developed, it is necessary to analyse precisely what it was that the Prosecution set out to prove.
Under the Agricultural Act, 1947, there is authority to bring into existence an Agricultural Lime Scheme under which the Treasury may make contributions towards the cost incurred by an occupier of agricultural land (whom we will call the farmer) in acquiring and transporting lime for the purpose of adding to the fertility of the land. Under the Scheme which has come into existence, the farmer may obtain a subsidy to cover part of the cost of obtaining, transporting to his farm and spreading on his land lime up to 10 tons an acre. The subsidy in this case was 70% with one or two exceptions where it was 65%. Under the Scheme the supplier agrees with the Ministry what costs should rank for subsidy. Although these costs are expressed as maximum costs, in practice, as is natural, the prices charges by the suppliers are those maximum prices, the lime being charged at so much a ton, the transport at so much a mile per ton, and the spreading at so much a ton spread. Needless to say, there are Government inspectors who must be satisfied, as far as possible, that the land requires the lime and that the lime claimed for has been spread. For this purpose they also examine a supplier's books of account.
The subsidy is only payable after the supplier and the farmer have between them filled in a form called A.L.S.7. This form differed in detail at different times, but, whether it was the form in force up to 1957, or the one in force in 1958 and the first half of 1959, or the one in force from then until 1962, there was no material difference so far as this case is concerned. The supplier has to state the grade of the lime, the point of delivery, the dates of delivery, the net cost to the occupier, the quantity delivered and the quantity spread. The supplier had then to state his cash charges to the occupier under the heads, total cash charge for material, total cash charge for transport and total cash charge for spreading. The farmer has then to make a statutory declaration giving:-
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(1) the total quantity of lime bought and received;
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(2) the total quantity of lime spread by the supplier;
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(3) the area of agricultural land spread by the supplier;
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(4) the total cash charge for lime transport and spreading;
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(5) any other road or rail charges;
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(6) the total cost including the supplier's total cash charge.
There is a column for the amounts opposite numbers 4, 5 and 6, and 6 is presumably to be the addition of 4 and 5. The farmer then claims payment, to be made to him or the supplier at the farmer's option.
No doubt the farmer is often a person who is not quick to understand forms. In this case at least two of the appellants were admitted by the Prosecution to be almost illiterate. In consequence frequently the farmer simply signs his name on a form on which the supplier has filled in all the details, having first agreed with the farmer the amount whioh has been delivered and spread.
Clearly on the wording on this form a number of queries may arise. Examples are:-
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(1) Although it does not so appear at first sight, it is admitted that, provided the lime is delivered and spread, the amount of the subsidy does not vary according to whether the delivery and spreading is done by the supplier or the farmer. There are additional forms to fill in, but the farmer is entitled to...
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