R v Manchester Crown Court, ex parte DPP
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Keith of Kinkel,Lord Templeman,Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle,Lord Browne-Wilkinson,Lord Mustill |
| Judgment Date | 25 November 1993 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1993] UKHL J1125-5 |
| Date | 25 November 1993 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1993] EWHC J1125-5
House of Lords
Lord Keith of Kinkel
Lord Templeman
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle
Lord Browne-Wilkinson
Lord Mustill
My Lords,
For the reasons given in the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Browne-Wilkinson, which I have read in draft and with which I agree, I would allow these appeals.
My Lords,
For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Browne-Wilkinson I would allow these appeals.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Browne-Wilkinson. I agree with it and for the reasons he gives I too would allow these appeals.
My Lords,
In this case your Lordships have to consider yet again the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court to review decisions of the Crown Court. The jurisdiction is conferred by section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981, (re-enacting section 10(5) of the Courts Act, 1971) which provides as follows:
"In relation to the jurisdiction of the Crown Court, other than its jurisdiction in matters relating to trial on indictment, the High Court shall have all such jurisdiction to make orders of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari as the High Court possesses in relation to the jurisdiction of an inferior court."
The exclusionary words "other than its jurisdiction in matters relating to trial on indictment" have given rise to considerable uncertainty in the Divisional Court and this is the fourth occasion on which the matter has been brought to your Lordships' House for determination.
The facts of the present case can be shortly stated. Leslie Huckfield was a Member of the European Parliament ("MEP") from June 1984 to June 1989. During that period he obtained two cheques (totalling £2524.25) in respect of a claim which he had made for expenses as an MEP. On 14 January 1991, the three appellants were committed for trial at the Crown Court upon two counts of obtaining the two cheques by dishonesty. They were arraigned on 18 February 1991 and pleaded not guilty.
The trial started in the Manchester Crown Court on 2 September 1991 before Morland J. At the outset the appellants submitted that the Crown Court lacked, or alternatively should not entertain, jurisdiction on the grounds that the exercise of a criminal jurisdiction against Mr. Huckfield in relation to his actions as an MEP would infringe the "sovereignty" of the European Parliament: the exercise of jurisdiction, it was said, would require the court to interpret the rules of the European Parliament and moreover would be in breach of the principles of comity since that Parliament had its own procedure for dealing with improper claims for expenses. Morland J. upheld those submissions, quashed the indictment and declared that the proceedings were invalid and of no effect. After a considerable delay, the Director of Public Prosecutions applied to the Queen's Bench Divisional Court for judicial review of the judge's decision. The appellants contended that the Divisional Court did not have jurisdiction to review the decision since it was a matter "relating to trial on indictment". The Divisional Court (Leggatt L.J. and Pill J.) rejected this contention and quashed the judge's order as being erroneous in point of law.
On the hearing of the appeal before your Lordships, argument was first addressed to the question whether the Divisional Court had jurisdiction to review the order of the Crown Court. Your Lordships reached the conclusion that the Divisional Court did not have such jurisdiction and that the appeal had to be allowed on that ground. It was therefore unnecessary to hear argument on the question whether the decision of Morland J. was correct.
In order to understand section 29(3) of the Act of 1981 it is necessary to put it in its historical context. Before 1971 jurisdiction to try an accused on indictment was divided between the assize courts and quarter sessions. The assize courts, being superior courts of record, were not subject to the prerogative writs. In contrast, decisions made by quarter sessions, whether in relation to a trial on indictment or in exercise of its other jurisdictions, were subject to the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court: mandamus (though possibly not certiorari) lay against quarter sessions even when trying cases on indictment: see In re Smalley [1985] A.C. 622, 640-641.
The Courts Act, 1971, created a new court, the Crown Court, which henceforward was to exercise the former functions not only of the assize courts but also of quarter sessions, including the latter's jurisdiction over matters other than trial on indictment. The Crown Court was made a superior court of record: section 4(1) of the Act of 1971 (now section 45(1) of the Act of 1981). The Crown Court was given exclusive jurisdiction over trials on indictment: section 6(1) of the Act of 1971 (now section 46(1) of the Act of 1981). This amalgamation of two courts, one of which was amenable and the other not amenable to judicial review, meant that Parliament had to determine the extent to which judicial review was applicable to the new Crown Court. Being a superior court of record, judicial review would not lie to it in the absence of express provision.
Parliament sought to resolve this question by section 10(5) of the Act of 1971 (now section 29(3) of the Act of 1981) which I have already set out. That section confers on the Divisional Court a general power to review decisions of the Crown Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction "other than its jurisdiction in matters relating to trial on indictment". These exclusionary words are extremely imprecise. In In re Smalley Lord Bridge of Harwich said, at p. 643A that it may be impossible to lay down any precise test to determine what is and what is not excluded. As a result the law has developed on a case by case basis, not always with happy results.
In In re Smalley this House held that an order estreating a recognisance entered into by the brother of the accused did not fall into the excluded class and was therefore subject to judicial review. Lord Bridge suggested, (p. 644A) that a "helpful pointer" to the correct application of the exclusionary words is to ask whether the order sought to be reviewed was an order "affecting the conduct of a trial on indictment". In In re Sampson [1987] 1 W.L.R. 194 it was contended that a decision by the Crown Court that the accused (who had been acquitted) should pay a sum towards his defence costs did not fall within the exclusionary words because, once the trial had ended with the acquittal, a decision could not in Lord Bridge's words "affect the conduct of the trial" (p. 199G). In rejecting this submission, Lord Bridge in Sampson reiterated what he had said in Smalley viz. that his words were a helpful pointer, not a test. This House held that since the order as to costs was an integral part of the trial process it necessarily related to trial on indictment.
Notwithstanding this reminder that Lord Bridge was not seeking to give a statutory definition, in Reg. v. Central Criminal Court, Ex parte Randle [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1087 and Reg. v. Norwich Crown Court, Ex parte Belsham [1992] 1 W.L.R. 54 the Divisional Court held that it had jurisdiction to review decisions of Crown Court judges to stay criminal proceedings on the grounds that such proceedings were an abuse of the process of the court. The Divisional Court reached that conclusion because an order for stay neither "formed an integral part of the trial" ( Sampson) nor would "affect the conduct of the trial" ( Smalley) since a trial would never take place i.e. the Divisional Court treated the "pointers" of Lord Bridge as though they together constituted a comprehensive definition of the exclusionary words.
The decisions in Randle and Belsham were overruled by this House in In re Ashton [1993] 2 W.L.R. 846. Lord Slynn again emphasised that Lord Bridge's helpful pointers did not purport to be a judicial definition of the meaning of the exclusionary words in section 29(3). This House held that an order for stay was plainly an integral part of the trial, affected the conduct of the trial and fell within the ordinary meaning of the words of section 29(3). Unfortunately, in the period between the decisions of the Divisional Court and the judgment of this House in Ashton the instant case came before the Divisional Court. The decision of the Divisional Court in the instant case [1993] 1 W.L.R. 693 was largely influenced by the decisions and reasoning in Randle and Belsham. Leggatt L.J. said, at p. 700G-H that "without the benefit of authority, it would be difficult to say that the quashing of an indictment is not a matter 'relating to trial on indictment'". But, after referring to Belsham and Randle he reached the conclusion that a decision whether or not a court had jurisdiction did not fall within the exclusionary words. I strongly suspect that, had it not been for the erroneous earlier decisions of the Divisional Court, the Divisional Court in the present case would have reached a different conclusion.
For myself, once the law as laid down in Randle and Belsham is seen to have been erroneous, it becomes plain that the order of the Crown Court in the present case must have been made in the exercise of "its jurisdiction in matters relating to trial on indictment". What...
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