R v Murray (Gordon)

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeTHE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE
Judgment Date22 February 1982
Judgment citation (vLex)[1982] EWCA Crim J0222-2
CourtCourt of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Date22 February 1982

[1982] EWCA Crim J0222-2

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Before:

The Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Lane)

Mr. Justice Stephen Brown

and

Mr. Justice Taylor

Regina
and
Gordon Ellison Murray

MR. H. OGNALL, Q.C. and MR. R. SMITH appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

MR. J. F. MULLER, Q.C. and MRS. M. O. BICKFORD-SMITH appeared on behalf of the Crown.

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE
1

On the 20th July, 1981, in the Crown Court at Leeds (before His Honour Judge Beaumont and a jury) this Appellant, Gordon Ellison Murray, was convicted on a majority verdict of the jury of attempting to pervert the course of public justice and was sentenced to 9 months' imprisonment. He now appeals against that conviction on a point of law, and despite the fact that it was a point of law, it was certified by the learne The question posed is as follows:-"Whether the act of tampering with a blood sample provided to the Defendant under the relevant provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1972 and its subsequent submission for analysis to an analyst of the Defendant's choice, without more, albeit that both acts are accompanied by an intent to pervert the course of public justice, is capable as a matter of law of having a tendency to pervert the course of public justice."

2

The facts of the case are these. The Appellant was stopped by the police whilst driving his motorcar. It was New Year's Eve, the 31st December, 1979. The Appellant was asked to give a breath test and refused. He was taken to the police station and there he agreed to give a sample of blood. All the necessary procedures were carried out by the police. The specimen of blood was divided into two, half of which was retained by the police for analysis by their scientist, and the other half in the sealed container was handed to the Appellant for him, if he wished, to have it analysed by his own analyst. He did so have it analysed by one of the gentlemen who was on the list of analysts which was handed to him by the Police, who happened to be a man (Mr. Davies) employed by the public analyst in Leeds. That half of the sample was found to contain only 47 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood, as against the prosecution sample which contained no less than 157 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood.

3

The prosecution case, which was plainly accepted by the jury as the verdict indicates, was that the vial into which the Appellant's sample of blood was put had been duly labelled and initialled, either by the doctor or by the policeman. The vial in its turn had been put into a "jiffy" envelope, sealed with sellotape and stamped across the margin of the sellotape with a constabulary stamp in order to prevent, if possible, the envelope being opened and tampered with. When closely examined, it was apparent that both the envelope and the sellotape and the seal on the septum of the vial and the septum itself (that is the rubber cap of the vial) had all been tampered with; the suggestion being, from those facts and from other facts about the amount of chemical preservative which was in the sample, that some of the initial sample had been withdrawn by way of a hypodermic syringe through the septum of the vial and in its place had been put in to the vial blood which was not contaminated by alcohol. Hence the vast disparity between the two samples. The prosecution submitted that on those facts it was open to the jury to come to the conclusion that this man was guilty of the offence as alleged.

4

There is no doubt that, although there was no evidence before the jury on this point, in due course information as to the low alcohol content of the Appellant's sample had reached the prosecuting authority. We are told very properly by Mr. Ognall, although I repeat it was not part of the evidence in the case, that what happened was that Mr. Davies the analyst, when he discovered this remarkably low percentage of alcohol, took steps to get in touch with the Appellant's solicitor. The Appellant's solicitor not surprisingly, as Mr. Ognall put it, in his turn got in touch with the prosecuting authority and investigations then started.

5

At the conclusion of the prosecution case, a submission was made to the learned judge that there was no evidence fit to go to the jury to substantiate this count. That is a submission which is repeated by Mr. Ognall in his attractive argument before this court today. The way he puts it is this. First of all, he submits that before conduct can be described as "an attempt to pervert the course of public justice" it must go beyond mere private action. By that, he means that there must be proof of some steps taken by the Appellant of the following possible different natures: firstly, by way of interference with possible witnesses; secondly, by tampering with documents or other exhibits or potential exhibits; thirdly, by the manufacture of false exhibits which are likely to become or may possibly become exhibits at the instance of the crime (and he gives the example of the forging of a driving licence); and fourthly, by the deliberate provision or indication of misleading information known to be misleading, either at his subsequent trial or to a representative of the prosecution in advance of any trial, so as to make it possible that a decision will be made by the court or a discretion exercised by the prosecution on a false premise. He submits, and correctly so far as it has been possible to discover, that there is no reported instance of a conviction being recorded of this offence without the defendant in some way involving himself with the potential or possible prosecution of himself or another by conduct which may directly affect the prosecuting authority in its discretion of its witnesses or its exhibits, or by interference with or subornation of possible defence witnesses, or the manufacture of false evidence and its introduction into the system of justice.

6

In order to make his point, Mr. Ognall has referred us to a number of cases, some of which it is necessary for us to refer to, and some of which are perhaps unnecessary to deal with except by way of mention out of deference to Mr. Ognall's arguments. The first and locus classicus of the offence is the case of The Queen v. Vreones (1891) 1 Q.B. 361, where the defendant tampered with a sample of wheat preparatory to a possible arbitration on the quality of the wheat which was the subject of a contract. Mr. Ognall points out that there was nothing there which the defendant...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • Hatty v Pilkinton (No 2)
    • Australia
    • Federal Court
    • Invalid date
  • Re JD Brian Ltd ((in Liquidation)) and Others
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 11 July 2011
    ...[1987] 1 Ch. 200; [1986] 2 W.L.R. 197; [1986] 3 All E.R. 673; [1986] B.C.L.C. 418. In re Christonette Limited [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1245; [1982] 2 All E.R. 225. In re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd. [1998] Ch. 495; [1998] 2 W.L.R. 131; [1997] 4 All E.R. 115; [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 205. Crilly v. T. & J. F......
  • R v Archer (Jeffrey Howard)
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
    • 22 July 2002
    ...The learned judge directed himself in accordance with the appropriate authority when considering this matter, which was the case of R v Murray 75 Cr App R 58. In the course of giving judgment in that case Lord Lane said this: "There must evidence that the man has done enough for there to be......
  • Foord v Whiddett
    • Australia
    • Federal Court
    • Invalid date
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT