R v Nedrick
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE |
| Judgment Date | 10 July 1986 |
| Neutral Citation | [1986] EWCA Crim J0710-1 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1986] EWCA Crim J0520-2 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Docket Number | No. 712/B/85 |
| Date | 10 July 1986 |
[1986] EWCA Crim J0520-2
The Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Lane)
Mr. Justice Leggatt
and
Mr. Justice Kennedy
No. 712/B/85
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
LORD HOOSON, Q.C. and MR. D. GUISHARD appeared on behalf of the Applicant.
MR. J. COWARD, Q.C. and MR. B. LEECH appeared on behalf of the Crown.
We grant the applicant leave to appeal against conviction, and with the consent of counsel treat this as the hearing of the appeal.
We do not apply the proviso in this case. We substitute a verdict of manslaughter for the verdict of murder, under the provisions of section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The reasons for our decision will be given later.
( )
We deal simply now with the question of sentence in respect of the conviction for manslaughter which is now registered against this appellant who, on 25th January last year at Stafford Crown Court, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. As already indicated, we are proposing to substitute for that conviction a conviction for manslaughter. The sentence now becomes at large and we have to consider the proper sentence to impose.
The facts of the case briefly were these. The appellant, Ransford Delroy Nedrick, had an argument with a woman called Viola Foreshaw. He went to her house in the early hours of the morning of 15th July 1984 and, as the jury found, poured paraffin through the letterbox and over the front door and set light to it. No warning was given. As a result of that the house was burnt down and Mrs. Foreshaw's 12-year old son, a boy called Lloyd, died of asphyxiation and burns about the body.
The appellant had a number of interviews with the police. In the course of one, which is recorded in Exhibit 15, he was reported to have said this: "On Friday gone in the morning I saw Viola in the market. She was with a son. She was laughing and I thought she was laughing at me. It upset me and played on my mind. I went back home. On Saturday night I went to the Skybolt. I had one tin of Red Stripe at 12 o'clock. Earlier on at twenty past nine I had one half of lager and lime at the bingo. I left the Skybolt at 3 o'clock. I was talking to the owner of the club, that's why I left late. I drove home. This problem with Viola was still on my mind. The clock was in the sitting room and it all kept coming lack to me. I realised how dishonest and evil she had been. I felt let down by her and my feelings got the better of me. I got some paraffin in a coca cola bottle. I keep it in the bottle for washing brushes and getting grease off the car. I drove to Springhill Lane. I parked the van in a side street first right passed her house. I walked to the house. I poured paraffin on the door and it ran down on the mat. I also poured some through the letter box. I had a bit of paper in my pocket. I struck a match, lit the paper and pushed it inside the letter box. I walked away. I didn't see any flames. I thought it had gone out to be honest. I brought the coca cola bottle back home and put it down the rubbish chute. I thought the smell of the fire would wake Viola up and just frighten her. I never intended to cause injury to anyone, even Viola, and definitely not the children. I just spent Sunday packing then the police came for me. I've told the truth….".
At the trial he said that that statement had been procured from him by illicit means by the police. It was untrue and in fact, he said, he had never been near the house at all on that occasion. He was cross-examined by Mr. Coward for the prosecution and at the outset of the questioning the exchanges were as follows:
"Q. I don't want to talk about you for a moment, but I want you to to put yourself in the position of someone else. You knew Viola Foreshaw well, didn't you? A. Yes, Sir.
"Q. You knew that she had got a number of children? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. You knew that those children lived at home? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. You knew that some of them were quite young? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Chantill was 6, or thereabouts? A. I don't know her age, but I know she was smallest.
"Q. And Lloyd was about 12? A. I don'tknow their age, as I say.
"Q. But roughly, you knew how old they were. Anyone knowing the family, as you did, would know, wouldn't they, that, at about " 4 o'clock in the morning, the odds would be that the whole family were asleep up in their bedrooms? A. Yes, sir, definitely.
"Q. And anyone who visited that house, as often as you had visited it, would know that there was that wooden panelling in the hall and the wooden panelling going up the stairs? A. Yes, I knew that, sir, yes.
"Q. And anyone who visited the house as often as you had, would know there was only one staircase from upstairs to downstairs? A. Yes, sir, I knew.
"Q. And, any person knowing all those things who poured the contents of a Pepsi Cola bottle, a two-litre Pepsi Cola bottle, through the letter-box, a Pepsi Cola bottle that was full, nearly to the top, with paraffin, would know, wouldn't they, that it was highly probable that, if they set fire to that paraffin, someone might be killed or seriously injured? A. Well, they should know that something would happen.
"Q. Something very serious would happen? A. Yes.
"Q. That somebody might be killed? A. Quite possible.
"Q. And if this person that we are talking about knew the telephone number of that house and, having started that fire, failed to ring up the number to make sure that everybody woke up and got out, that would suggest, wouldn't it, that that person wasn't only trying to scare, he was trying to do worse than that? A. Quite possible, sir."
Those are the answers given by the appellant, albeit on a hypothetical basis, and albeit with the hindsight which would be available to him, knowing what in fact had happened. All that serves to show that this was indeed, as Lord Hooson concedes, a very serious case of manslaughter indeed, doing an act which was plainly a dangerous act and an illegal act, for reasons possibly of revenge. We have no medical report. There is no indication that this man suffers from any form of mental trouble, and we have to treat him as a person fully responsible for his actions, and terrible actions they were.
As again Lord Hooson concedes, this is a case at the top end of the bracket for manslaughter of this type. In our judgment the proper sentence would be one of fifteen years' imprisonment, and that is the sentence which we impose.
[1986] EWCA Crim J0710-1
The Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Lane)
Mr. Justice Leggatt
and
Mr. Justice Kennedy
No. 712/B/85
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
LORD HOOSON, Q.C. and MR. D. GUISHARD appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
MR. J. COWARD, Q.C. and MR. B. LEECH appeared on behalf of the Crown.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is the judgment of the Court.
On 25th January 1985 at Stafford Crown Court this appellant, Ransford Delroy Nedrick, was convicted by a majority verdict of murder...
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