R v Reid

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date29 October 1992
Date29 October 1992
CourtHouse of Lords
[HOUSE OF LORDS] REGINA RESPONDENT AND REID APPELLANT 1992 May 18, 19, 20, 21; July 20 Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Roskill, Lord Ackner, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Browne-Wilkinson

Road Traffic - Reckless driving - Causing death by - Direction to jury - Whether specimen direction appropriate - Whether subjective or objective test to be applied - Road Traffic Act 1972 (c. 20), s. 1 (as substituted by Criminal Law Act 1977 (c. 45), s. 50(1))

At the defendant's trial at the the Crown Court for causing death by reckless driving, contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1972, as substitutedF1 (since re-enacted in section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988), the judge in his summing up directed the jury in accordance with Lord Diplock's specimen direction in Reg. v. Lawrence [1982] A.C. 510, that the prosecution had to show both that the defendant was driving his car in such a manner as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who might happen to be using the road, and that in driving in that manner the defendant did so without having given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or, having recognised that there was some risk involved, had nonetheless gone on to take it. The defendant was convicted and he appealed against conviction. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

On appeal by the defendant: —

Held, dismissing the appeal, that in the context of the offence of reckless driving, “recklessness” could not be restricted to a subjective test, but included heedlessness of the presence of a risk as well as disregard of a recognised risk; and that it was not always necessary to direct the jury precisely in the terms of Lord Diplock's specimen direction in Reg. v. Lawrence, but that it should be regarded as epitomising the law and as a model to be adapted to suit the circumstances of each case (post, pp. 795F–H, 796C, E, 797A–B, 801B, 804E–G, 805G–H, 806H, 807C–D, 812C, 813G–H, 814H, 815A–C, 816F–G, 818H–819A, H–820A).

Reg. v. Lawrence (Stephen) [1982] A.C. 510, H.L.(E.) followed.

Decision of the Court of Appeal [1990] R.T.R. 276, C.A. affirmed.

The following cases are referred to in the opinions of their Lordships:

Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234; [1966] 3 All E.R. 77, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Caldwell [1982] A.C. 341; [1981] 2 W.L.R. 509; [1981] 1 All E.R. 961, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Evans [1963] 1 Q.B. 412; [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1457; [1962] 3 All E.R. 1086, C.C.A.

Reg. v. Kimber [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1118; [1983] 3 All E.R. 316, C.A.

Reg. v. Lawrence (Stephen) [1982] A.C. 510; [1981] 2 W.L.R. 524; [1981] 1 All E.R. 974, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Madigan [1983] R.T.R. 178; (1982) 75 Cr.App.R. 145, C.A.

Reg. v. Murphy (William) [1980] Q.B. 434; [1980] 2 W.L.R. 743; [1980] 2 All E.R. 325, C.A.

Reg. v. Pigg [1982] 1 W.L.R. 762; [1982] 2 All E.R. 591, C.A.

Reg. v. Stephenson [1979] Q.B. 695; [1979] 3 W.L.R. 193; [1979] 2 All E.R. 1198, C.A.

The following additional cases were cited in argument:

Allan v. Patterson [1980] R.T.R. 97

Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] A.C. 576; [1937] 2 All E.R. 552, H.L.(E.)

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Newbury [1977] A.C. 500; [1976] 2 W.L.R. 918; [1976] 2 All E.R. 365, H.L.(E.)

Elliott v. C. [1983] 1 W.L.R. 939; [1983] 2 All E.R. 1005, D.C.

Labone v. Litherland Urban District Council [1956] 1 W.L.R. 522; [1956] 2 All E.R. 215

Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd. [1962] A.C. 446; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 186; [1962] 1 All E.R. 1, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Conway [1989] Q.B. 290; [1988] 3 W.L.R. 1238; [1988] 3 All E.R. 1025, C.A.

Reg. v. Crossman [1986] R.T.R. 49, C.A.

Reg. v. Cunningham [1957] 2 Q.B. 396; [1957] 3 W.L.R. 76; [1957] 2 All E.R. 412, C.C.A.

Reg. v. Hancock [1986] A.C. 455; [1986] 2 W.L.R 357; [1986] 1 All E.R. 641, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Khan (Mohammed Iqbal) [1990] 1 W.L.R. 813; [1990] 2 All E.R. 783, C.A.

Reg. v. Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. [1973] A.C. 435; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 143; [1972] 2 All E.R. 898, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Morgan [1976] A.C. 182; [1975] 2 W.L.R. 913; [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Nuri [1990] V.R. 641

Reg. v. Parmenter [1992] 1 A.C. 699; [1991] 3 W.L.R. 914; [1991] 4 All E.R. 698, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Parker (Daryl) [1977] 1 W.L.R. 600; [1977] 2 All E.R. 37, C.A.

Reg. v. R. (Stephen Malcolm) (1984) 79 Cr.App.R. 334, C.A.

Reg. v. Satnam S. (1983) 78 Cr.App.R. 149, C.A.

Reg. v. Sharp (1984) 12 C.C.C. (3d) 428

Reg. v. Shivpuri [1987] A.C. 1; [1986] 2 W.L.R. 988; [1986] 2 All E.R. 334, H.L.(E.)

Reg. v. Spencer [1985] Q.B. 771; [1985] 2 W.L.R. 197; [1985] 1 All E.R. 673, C.A.

Reg. v. Staines (1974) 60 Cr.App.R. 160, C.A.

Reg. v. Tolson (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168, C.C.R.

Reg. v. Tutton (1989) 48 C.C.C. (3d) 129

Reg. v. Vale of Glamorgan Juvenile Justices, Ex parte Beattie (1985) 82 Cr.App.R. 1, D.C.

Reg. v. Venna [1976] Q.B. 421; [1975] 3 W.L.R. 737; [1975] 3 All E.R. 788, C.A.

Sansregret v. The Queen (1985) 18 C.C.C. (3d) 223

Sweet v. Parsley [1970] A.C. 132; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 470; [1969] 1 All E.R. 347, H.L.(E.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).

This was an appeal by leave, granted on 27 November 1991, of the House of Lords (Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Ackner and Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle) by the defendant, John Joseph Reid, from the judgment dated 11 July 1989 (reasons being given on 28 September 1989), of the Court of Appeal (Mustill L.J. and Nolan and Saville JJ.) (1989) 91 Cr.App.R. 263, dismissing the defendant's appeal against his conviction in the Crown Court at Wood Green, London (Judge Beddard and jury). The defendant was convicted of causing death by reckless driving contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1972, as substituted by section 50(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977, and re-enacted by section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

On 19 July 1991 the Court of Appeal certified that a point of law of general public importance was involved in the decision to dismiss the appeal, namely:

“(1) In a case of reckless driving, should the jury be directed in the terms of the the ipsissima verba of Lord Diplock's suggested instruction to the jury from Reg. v. Lawrence [1982] A.C. 510, 526–527, without modification? (2) If the answer to question 1 be ‘No,’ in what other terms should the jury be directed?”

The facts are stated in the opinion of Lord Ackner.

Michael Hill Q.C. and Graham Cooke for the defendant.

R. Alun Jones Q.C. and Samuel Parrish for the Crown.

Their Lordships took time for consideration.

20 July. LORD KEITH OF KINKEL. My Lords, the question principally debated at the hearing of this appeal was whether the formulation by Lord Diplock in Reg. v. Lawrence [1982] A.C. 510 of the meaning of “driving recklessly” in section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 (as amended) was incorrect, so that the decision in that case should be departed from under the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234. It was argued for the defendant that the formulation was mistaken in respect that Lord Diplock expressed the mens rea for the statutory offence as including not only a state of mind where the accused drove as he did recognising that his action created a risk of injury or of substantial damage to property but nevertheless went on to take that risk, but also a state of mind where the accused drove as he did without giving any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk, notwithstanding that the risk was obvious. In truth, so it was maintained, it was only the former state of mind which constituted the relevant mens rea.

In common with my noble and learned friends, Lord Ackner and Lord Goff of Chieveley, I am satisfied that, for the reasons they give, the argument is unsound. Lord Diplock described the actus reus of the offence as driving a vehicle in such a manner as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who might happen to be using the road or of doing substantial damage to property. The important thing here is that the risk created must be an obvious and serious one. No criticism has been or could be made of that. The precise state of mind of a person who drives in the manner indicated must in the vast majority of cases be quite incapable of ascertainment. Absence of something from a person's mind is as much part of his state of mind as its presence. Inadvertence to risk is no less a subjective state of mind than is disregard of a recognised risk. If there is nothing to go upon apart from what actually happened, the natural inference is that the driver's state of mind was one or other of those described by Lord Diplock. It would, however, be quite impossible for any juryman to say which it was, and in particular for him to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was the first state of mind rather than the second. So logically, if only the first state of mind constituted the relevant mens rea, it would be impossible ever to get a conviction. There is no room for doubt, in my opinion, that a large proportion of drivers who drive in such a manner as to create the relevant sort of risk do so without giving any thought to the possibility of risk. Indeed, the very attempt to exclude such drivers from the ambit of the statutory offence recognises that this must be so. Driving a motor vehicle is potentially an extremely dangerous activity, requiring a high degree of self-discipline. Those who fail to display the requisite degree of self-discipline through failing to give any thought to the possibility of the serious risks they are creating may reasonably be regarded as no less blameworthy than those who consciously appreciate a risk but nevertheless go on to take it. The word “reckless” in its ordinary meaning is apt to embrace the former category no less than the latter, and I feel no doubt that Parliament by its use intended to cover both of them.

The substance of Lord Diplock's formulation of a specimen jury direction is accordingly apt, in my opinion...

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  • Recklessness—The Continuing Search for a Definition
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    • Journal of Criminal Law, The No. 72-4, August 2008
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    ...defend-ant for any of the same reasons had not given it any thought he would34 Note the judgments of Lords Goff and Ackner in R v Reid [1992] 3 All ER 673where they consider that directions such as the model direction should be adaptedto f‌it the facts of a particular case and should be cap......
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