R v Reid (Barry)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE LAWTON |
| Judgment Date | 18 November 1975 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1975] EWCA Crim J1118-7 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Docket Number | No. 5264/A/74 |
| Date | 18 November 1975 |
[1975] EWCA Crim J1118-7
Lord Justice Lawton
Lord Justice Geoffrey Lane
and
Mr. Justice Goff
No. 5264/A/74
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
MR. J.A. CHADWIN appeared on behalf of the Applicant.
MR. P.M. TAYLOR. Q.C. and MR. F. ROBSON appeared on behalf of the
This appellant, Barry Reid, on the 27th November, 1974 at Durham Crown Court, after a trial lasting twelve days before Mr. Justice Caulfield and a jury, was acquitted of murder but found guilty of manslaughter and of being in joint possession with two other men, named O'Conaill and Kane, tried with him, of offensive weapons, namely a revolver, a knife and an imitation pistol. His two co-accused were convicted of murder and of the joint possession of these weapons. The appellant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for manslaughter and two years' imprisonment for being in possession of offensive weapons, the sentences to run concurrently. He applied for leave to appeal against both his convictions and sentences. On the hearing of his application for leave to appeal against his convictions this Court granted leave and his counsel consented on his behalf to the hearing of the application being treated as the hearing of the appeal.
The prosecution's case against all three accused, as opened, was that they were supporters of a terrorist organisation, the I.R.A.; that they intended to kill the officer commanding the Otter burn training camp, a Colonel Stevenson; that in the early hours of the 8th April 1974, armed with the weapons to which we have referred, they went to his house to kill him. One of them rang the bell. Colonel Stevenson opened the door, O'Conaill then shot him dead, firing three times. The three men left the scene together.
The three accused put forward different defences. O'Conaill alleged that this appellant alone was the one who intended to kill Colonel Stevenson; that he had gone with him to the house, not intending to do any harm to the Colonel; and that when the door began to open he had fired at the door, not expecting the bullets to go through it. Kane's story was that O'Conaill had suggested kidnapping the Colonel and that he had gone to the house to do just that. He had been astonished when O'Conaill fired the revolver.
The appellant put himself forward as an opponent of I.R.A. terrorists. He said that he had heard that the other two, who worked in the same hotel as he did, were supporters of the I.R.A. During the evening, after he had a lot to drink, he decided to find out whether they were what local gossip said they were. He sought them out; pretended to be a supporter himself; found himself let into their plan to kill the Colonel and invited to go with them to do so. He went, not intending to take part in any unlawful act but in the expectation that the other two would reveal themselves as bombastic talkers, not doers of deadly deeds.
Having regard to the evidence, all three defences were optimistic. The Judge had a difficult task in directing the jury as to how the law should be applied to them. He envisaged a number of permutations of possible findings and directed the jury how to apply the law to them. On the defences put forward he had to direct the jury about manslaughter.
He did so in this way. After directing the jury about the verdict which they should return if they were sure there was a common design to kill or to do serious injury, he went on to explain what the consequences would be if one of two or three men intending to attack another but not to do him serious injury, had gone beyond what had been expressly or tacitly or implicitly agreed. He pointed out that the other two would not be guilty of either murder or manslaughter. This direction was unduly favourable to the accused as he did not say how far beyond the common design the odd man out would have to go to justify the acquittal of the others. He then dealt with Kane's defence and directed the jury about the various possibilities which arose on it.
Then came this appellant's turn. The Judge directed the jury about common design, pointing out what would have to be proved to justify a murder verdict. He went on as follows: "Obviously you would acquit Reid of both murder and manslaughter if, on his defence, you thought it might be true, namely … that he was just a spectator out of stupid interest; that he had no intention at all to harm the Colonel; that he did not, had not agreed to the use of the weapon."
Up to that point in his summing up there was no criticism of the Judge's directions. The criticisms made on behalf of the appellant arise from some general observations which" he made about manslaughter. It was submitted that they were misleading.
The Judge started by giving a direction about manslaughter which was founded on R. v. Church (1966) 1 Queen's Bench 59. It was correct. He then said: "You can commit manslaughter … by being so grossly and utterly negligent that a jury … would say 'Well, my goodness me, that was really criminal negligence'." No explanation was given as to...
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