R (Roberts) v Parole Board

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
JudgeLORD STEYN,LORD RODGER OF EARLSFERRY,LORD CARSWELL,LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL,LORD WOOLF
Judgment Date07 July 2005
Neutral Citation[2005] UKHL 45
CourtHouse of Lords
Date07 July 2005
Roberts (FC)
(Appellant)
and
Parole Board
(Respondents)

[2005] UKHL 45

Appellate Committee

Lord Bingham of Cornhill

Lord Woolf

Lord Steyn

Lord Rodger of Earlsferry

Lord Carswell

HOUSE OF LORDS

Appellants:

Tim Owen QC

Alison Macdonald

(instructed by Bhatt Murphy)

Respondents:

Michael Fordham

(instructed by Treasury Solicitor)

Interested party

The Secretary of State for the Home Department

James Eadie

Kate Gallafent

(Instructed by Treasury Solicitor)

Interveners

Keir Starmar QC

Eric Metcalfe

(Instructed by Justice)

LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL

My Lords,

1

On 12 December 1966 the appellant, Mr Harry Roberts, was convicted on three counts of murder, having pleaded guilty to two counts and been convicted of the third. The victims in each case were police officers, killed in cold blood at Shepherd's Bush in August 1966 when, in the course of their duty, they stopped a car in which the appellant and two accomplices were travelling to commit an armed robbery. The trial judge rightly described these crimes, which aroused widespread public outrage, as heinous and suggested that the case was one in which the appellant might never be released. He formally recommended that the appellant serve a term of at least 30 years, and in due course the Home Secretary of the day fixed 30 years as the appellant's punitive or tariff term. That term expired in 1996, when the appellant was aged 60. The fifth review of his case by the Parole Board, still current, began in September 2001, and this appeal concerns the procedure to be followed in that review. The issue to be determined by the House is agreed to be whether the Parole Board, a statutory tribunal of limited jurisdiction, is able, within the powers granted by the Criminal Justice Act 1991, and compatibly with article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (a) to withhold material relevant to the appellant's parole review from the appellant's legal representatives and (b) instead, to disclose that material to a specially appointed advocate, who would represent the appellant, in the absence of the appellant and his legal representatives, at a closed hearing before the Parole Board.

2

Since the House is called upon to decide issues of statutory construction and legal principle, the detailed facts of the appellant's case are of minor importance. In 2000, pursuant to a recommendation of the Parole Board in December 1999, the appellant was transferred to an open prison where he was held when the current Parole Board review began in September 2001. On 1 October 2001 a parole dossier was disclosed to the appellant's solicitors containing a number of reports, all favourable to the appellant and recommending his immediate release on life licence. However, on 2 October 2001 the appellant was removed from open to closed conditions, where he has since remained. The appellant has received a general indication of the allegations against him which led to his removal, but these have not been the subject of any criminal or disciplinary charge, they have not been investigated at any adversarial hearing and they have been consistently challenged by the appellant.

3

On 11 February 2002 the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who appears in this appeal as an interested party, disclosed to the appellant further material that had been submitted by him to the Parole Board for purposes of the parole review. The material related to alleged breaches of trust committed by the appellant while held in open conditions. The appellant was notified on 22 April 2002 that further material was to be withheld from both him and his legal representatives, but would be submitted to the Parole Board (henceforward "the Board") for its consideration. It is the treatment of this further material, conveniently described as "the sensitive material", which gives rise to this appeal. The ground upon which the sensitive material has been withheld is that the safety of the source of the information or evidence would be at risk if the material were to be disclosed. It has not been suggested that there is in this case any threat to national security.

4

In August 2002 the appellant applied for judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to withhold from the appellant and his legal representatives material which would be considered by the Board. These proceedings were compromised in October 2002 when it was, in effect, agreed that issues of disclosure should be resolved by the Board and the possible appointment of a specially appointed advocate was envisaged.

5

On 15 November 2002 Scott Baker LJ, as vice-chairman of the Board, decided that before a decision was made on the procedure to be adopted in respect of the sensitive material at the substantive hearing before the Board, that material should in the first instance be disclosed to a specially appointed advocate agreeable to both parties, who could then make representations on the disclosure issues. The sensitive material was not to be disclosed to the appellant or his legal representatives or anyone else without the consent of the Board. Scott Baker LJ proposed that a hearing should then take place to resolve the disclosure issues. He acknowledged that the procedure for appointing special advocates was statutory in other fields but he could see no reason why it should not be used in the present circumstances.

6

With the agreement of the appellant and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General appointed Mr Nicholas Blake QC to act as "independent counsel", in effect as a special advocate. In an advice written for the Board before seeing the sensitive material Mr Blake advised that resort to the special advocate procedure infringed ordinary standards of fairness. After seeing the sensitive material he submitted to the Board that it be disclosed to the appellant's solicitor.

7

On 9 May 2003 a hearing took place before Sir Richard Tucker as chairman of the Board's mandatory lifer panel. The appellant and the Secretary of State were represented, and Mr Blake attended. The hearing consisted of an open session when the appellant's solicitor made representations on his behalf, and a closed session when submissions were made about the sensitive material by the Secretary of State's counsel and Mr Blake, in the absence of the appellant and his solicitor. A decision was made by Sir Richard the same day, but complaints about the conduct of the hearing led to a further hearing attended by counsel for the appellant and the Secretary of State on 30 May 2003. In a detailed letter dated 13 June 2003 the Board communicated its decision, which was that the sensitive material should not be disclosed to the appellant or his legal representatives, but should be disclosed to the specially appointed advocate. The Board directed that there should be a two-stage hearing, one considering the open material and the other the sensitive material, the specially appointed advocate appearing at both stages.

8

The judicial review proceedings giving rise to this appeal were initiated to challenge this decision of 13 June. It was agreed that the judge (Maurice Kay J) should read the sensitive material and hear submissions on it in closed session by counsel for the Board and the Secretary of State, and by Mr Blake. There was again a two-stage hearing, one addressed by counsel for the appellant and the other, in the absence of the appellant and his counsel, directed to the sensitive material. The judge delivered two judgments on 19 December 2003. In the first, open, judgment he upheld the lawfulness of the proposed procedure and dismissed the appellant's application: [2003] EWHC 3120 (Admin), [2004] 2 All ER 776. The second was a closed judgment, not disclosed to the appellant or his legal representatives, but disclosed to Mr Blake who advised the appellant that there was no basis for challenging the findings in the closed judgment on appeal.

9

The appellant challenged the lawfulness of the proposed procedure in principle on appeal to the Court of Appeal. It was agreed between the parties that this challenge did not call for disclosure of the sensitive material to the Court of Appeal, and that material was not placed before the court. For reasons given by Tuckey LJ, with which Clarke LJ and Jackson J agreed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal: [2004] EWCA Civ 1031, [2005] QB 410.

10

The House had the benefit of submissions on behalf of the appellant, the Board and the Secretary of State, and also on behalf of JUSTICE which was granted leave to intervene. It received no submissions by Mr Blake or any specially appointed advocate, and did not read or receive submissions on the sensitive material.

11

As a mandatory life sentence prisoner who has served the punitive or tariff term imposed upon him, the appellant has two important rights: a right to be released if and when it is judged that he can safely be released without significant risk to the safety of the public; and a right "to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful". The first of these rights is a product of domestic law, which now provides for the imposition of a punitive or tariff term of imprisonment on convicted murderers, on completion of which (as is now accepted by the Board and the Secretary of State: Girling v Parole Board [2005] EWHC 5469 (Admin), 8 April 2005, para 19) risk to life and limb provides the sole ground for continued detention: R v Lichniak [2002] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 AC 903, paras 8, 29. The second right derives from article 5(4) of the European Convention, which I have quoted above and to which domestic law seeks to give effect. Thus a tariff-expired mandatory life sentence prisoner such as the...

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