R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hindley

In 1966 the applicant and a co-defendant were convicted of the murder of two children and received mandatory life sentences. The applicant was also convicted of being an accessory after the fact to the murder of a third child, of which the co-defendant was convicted, and was sentenced to a determinate custodial term. Immediately following the trial the judge expressed the expectation to the Home Office that the applicant would be kept in prison for “a very long time” and that her co-defendant would not be released in any foreseeable future. Review of any question of release was deferred until 1982 when, in response to the Secretary of State's request, the Lord Chief Justice recommended that, while he would never release her co-defendant, no term less that 25 years would be appropriate for the applicant. In November 1983 the Secretary of State, in a statement to Parliament, announced his policy for the release of mandatory life sentence prisoners, in the exercise of his discretion under the Criminal Justice Act 1967, in particular, that sexual or sadistic child murderers could normally expect to serve a tariff period of at least 20 years to satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence, although a longer period might be necessary in certain cases, and that the first review would take place three years before the expiry of the tariff term. In January 1985, on further consultation, the Lord Chief Justice confirmed his recommendation, but the Secretary of State reached the provisional conclusion that 30 years would be the appropriate period for the applicant and 40 years for her co-defendant. In March 1985 the Secretary of State announced to Parliament that in the case of prisoners whose tariff was longer than 20 years the first formal review by the Parole Board would take place after 17 years in custody. He referred the cases of the applicant and her co-defendant to the board, which declined to recommend their release and decided to review the case of the applicant in five years and that of her co-defendant in ten years. At that time the applicant was not told of, nor could she have calculated, the provisional 30-year period. In 1987 the applicant confessed to the police her complicity in the murder of the third child, of which her co-defendant had been convicted in 1966, and of two other children. In 1990 the Secretary of State concluded that only a whole life tariff was appropriate in the applicant's case. By his policy announced to Parliament in July 1993 the Secretary of State stated that, in the exercise of his release discretion, confirmed by section 35 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, ^F1 a prisoner would be informed of his tariff, the judicial recommendations and any reasons for departing from them, and that exceptionally a tariff might be increased or reduced but that a prisoner might make representations against any such proposed increase. In December 1994 the Secretary of State announced his policy in respect of those serving a whole life tariff, that there would be periodic ministerial review after such a prisoner had served 25 years in custody to consider whether the tariff should be converted to one of determinate length, but that such review would be confined solely to considerations of retribution and deterrence. At that time the applicant was informed of the judicial recommendations, the provisional 30-year period set in 1985 and of the decision to impose a whole life tariff in 1990. On 3 February 1997, following the receipt of representations by the applicant, the Secretary of State fixed her tariff afresh at whole life. In November 1997 the Secretary of State revised the policy of December 1994, in the exercise of his release discretion under section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, ^F2 and stated that on review after the 25-year period account would be taken of exceptional circumstances, including exceptional progress in prison. On 19 November 1997 he informed the applicant that while he would consider her representations on its reduction he saw no reason to depart from the whole life tariff imposed on her. In proceedings for judicial review the applicant sought orders quashing the decisions to impose and to maintain a whole life tariff and declarations that the policy for review was unlawful.

On the application for judicial review: —