R (Vickers) v West London Magistrates Court

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMR JUSTICE GAGE
Judgment Date11 July 2003
Neutral Citation[2003] EWHC 1809 (Admin)
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Docket NumberCO/3126/2003
Date11 July 2003

[2003] EWHC 1809 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2

Before:

Mr Justice Gage

CO/3126/2003

The Queen On The Application Of Paul Vickers
(Claimant)
and
West London Magistrates' Court
(Defendant)

MR S FIDDLER (instructed by Stephen Fiddler & Co) appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANT

MR P PATEL (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the DEFENDANT

MR M SEYMOUR (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) appeared on behalf of the INTERESTED PARTY

MR JUSTICE GAGE
1

This is an application for judicial review challenging the decision of the West London Magistrates' Court made on 26 June of this year. On that date, the claimant was remanded in custody following a ruling by the clerk of the court that reasonable excuse was not a defence to an allegation of a breach of a bail condition under section 7 of Bail Act 1976.

2

The factual background behind this matter is as follows. The claimant was charged on 19 May 2003 at the Chelsea Police Station with two offences. They were affray, contrary to section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986, and a racially aggravated offence contrary to section 4 of the Public Order Act.

3

He made his first appearance at the West London Magistrates' Court on 20 May 2003. On that day the charge of affray was withdrawn and an alternative offence contrary to section 31(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 preferred. He indicated guilty pleas to the two charges. He was granted conditional bail until 10 June 2003 in order for a pre-sentence report to be prepared by the Probation Service. The conditions imposed in respect of bail were that he live at Flat 8, Guiness Court, Cadogan Street, London SW3; that he reported daily between the hours of 2pm and 4pm to the Chelsea Police Station; that he observed a curfew between the hours of 6pm and 10am; that he remained sober and that he committed no further offences.

4

On 22 May 2003, the claimant was arrested and brought before the Reading Magistrates' Court under section 7 of the Bail Act. He admitted failing to comply with the residence, reporting and curfew requirements. He was remanded in custody and on the following day brought before the West London Magistrates' Court. On 23 May —that is the next day —an application for bail was made to the West London Magistrates' Court and he was granted bail on the same conditions as on 20 May. The pre-sentence report was to be prepared for a hearing on 10 June. On 10 June the Probation Service submitted a letter to the West London Magistrates' Court stating that the pre-sentence report had not been completed. It was said that the claimant had not attended an interview arranged, notwithstanding that a letter of appointment for the interview had been sent to him at his address. He was accordingly admitted to bail again on the same conditions for a hearing on 2 July.

5

On 25 June the claimant was arrested pursuant to section 7(3) of the Bail Act because he had, in breach of bail conditions, failed to report daily at the Chelsea Police Station between 14 and 24 June 2003. The following day he was brought back before the West London Magistrates' Court. It was argued on his behalf, in relation to the breach of conditions, that it was open to him to raise a defence of reasonable excuse. The solicitor appearing on his behalf in support of that proposition relied upon the decision of R v Liverpool City Magistrates ex parte DPP [1993] QB 233. At that stage the court clerk advised the justices that the defence of reasonable excuse was not open to a bailed person in section 7 Bail Act proceedings. As a result, the claimant's solicitor advised the claimant to admit the failure to comply with reporting conditions. A full bail application was then heard. The result of this was that the justices remanded the claimant in custody. The justices stated that they were satisfied that a remand in custody was necessary because the claimant had broken his bail conditions and it was otherwise impractical to complete inquiries for the pre-sentence report to be prepared.

6

As a result of that hearing these proceedings for judicial review were instituted. The matter came before Owen J on Tuesday of this week when he gave leave and ordered an expedited hearing. In fact, what has subsequently occurred is that the claimant came before the West London Magistrates' Court yesterday; a pre-sentence report was available and the matter has now been disposed of by way of a sentence. This morning, Mr Fiddler, who appears on the claimant's behalf, at first sought leave to withdraw this claim but subsequently, because all parties submitted that the matter involved a point which is of some importance, I was persuaded that I should deal with the point of law which is now the sole ground before the court. It is not entirely academic because Mr Fiddler has indicated to the court that, if he is successful, he will seek a declaration that the remand in custody was unlawful.

7

I turn to the legal framework in respect of these proceedings. Section 7 of the Bail Act is headed, "Liability to arrest for absconding or breaking conditions of bail". In those parts of section 7 which are material to this matter, it is set out in sub-section 3:

"A person who has been released on bail in criminal proceedings and is under a duty to surrender into the custody of a court may be arrested without warrant by a constable …

(b) if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to break any of the conditions of his bail or has reasonable grounds for suspecting that that person has broken any of those conditions …

(4) A person arrested in pursuance of sub-section 3 —

(a) shall, except where he was arrested within 24 hours of the time appointed for him to surrender to custody, be brought as soon as practical and in any event within 24 hours after his arrest before a justice of the peace of the petty sessions area in which he was arrested; and

(b) in the said excepted case shall be brought before the court at which he was to have surrendered to custody …

"(5) A justice of the peace before whom a person is brought under sub-section (4) above may, subject to sub-section (6) below, if of the opinion that that person —

(a) is not likely to surrender to custody, or

(b) has broken or is likely to break any condition of his bail, remand him in custody or commit him to custody as the case may require, or alternatively, grant him bail subject to the same or to different conditions, but if not of that opinion, shall grant him bail subject to the same conditions (if any) as were originally imposed."

8

The ground put forward by Mr Fiddler on behalf of the claimant is simply stated. He submits that, in considering the matter under sub-section (5) of section 7, the justices must first decide whether or not a breach of a condition has occurred, and in deciding that question, the justices are entitled to, and must take into account, any reasonable excuse which the bailed person may put forward for being in breach of the condition. In short, it is submitted that before a decision that a breach of condition has occurred, the magistrates must consider whether there is a reasonable excuse for such a breach.

9

In support of that submission and that ground, Mr Fiddler makes a number of subsidiary submissions. He submits that logic and common sense dictate that the words "reasonable excuse" must be read into sub-section (5). He refers to sub-section (3) which requires a constable before arresting a person under sub-section (3)(b) to have reasonable grounds for believing that he is...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • R (Thomas) v Greenwich Magistrates Court
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 11 May 2009
    ...view helpfully and accurately, set out by Gage J in R(on the application of Paul Vickers) v West London Magistrates' Court [2003] EWHC 1809 (Admin) at [16], where he says: “There is no dispute between the parties that section 7(5), in effect, involves a two stage operation to be carried out......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT