A ‘Radical Humanist’ Approach to the Concept of Solidarity

DOI10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00470.x
Date01 March 2004
Published date01 March 2004
Subject MatterArticle
A ‘Radical Humanist’ Approach to the
Concept of Solidarity
Lawrence Wilde
Nottingham Trent University
‘Solidarity’ conjures up positive images of the strength of togetherness and community, but in
practice it is experienced by groups when confronted by a real or perceived threat from other
groups. The ideal of a universal human solidarity appears tenuous and f‌limsy. However, Richard
Rorty and Axel Honneth have attempted, in different ways, to bring this ideal under philosophical
consideration. Their treatment of human solidarity is f‌lawed by their a priori rejection of the nor-
mative idea of a common human nature. Such an idea, termed ‘radical humanism’, is recon-
structed from the work of Erich Fromm, and one of its chief implications – the rejection of liberal
nationalism – is proposed as part of a radical challenge to contemporary social and political theory.
The word ‘solidarity’ carries positive connotations of sympathy, cooperation and
altruism, yet it is most frequently invoked and experienced in situations of bitter
conf‌lict. In protracted strikes or wars, we witness heroic acts of sacrif‌ice and com-
mitment to the common cause, but the antagonistic framework in which actually
existing solidarity operates seems only to remind us how far we are from making
a reality of the ancient dream of human solidarity, a condition of universal respect
for humans qua humans, irrespective of our differences. However, there have been
attempts to rescue the broader ideal of human solidarity from neglect, and two
important contributions will be considered here: Richard Rorty’s liberal pragmatist
argument in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1996; originally published in 1989);
and Axel Honneth’s inter-subjectivist account in The Struggle for Recognition (1996;
originally published in German in 1992). Both conceptions share an opposition to
essentialism – they reject the idea that there is a common human essence that
could serve as an ethical foundation for solidarity. In general, such an ideal is
treated with deep scepticism in modern social science, and this is ref‌lected in
Margaret Canovan’s recent dismissal of the invocation of common humanity as the
‘grandest but f‌limsiest of contemporary imagined communities’ (2001, p. 212).
Nevertheless, I will argue that both anti-foundationalist and inter-subjectivist con-
ceptions of solidarity are f‌lawed and that the concept of human solidarity becomes
more robust when grounded in a normative conception of human nature that I
will term ‘radical humanism’. The term is borrowed from the social psychologist
Erich Fromm, who used it to denote the body of thought that developed as a protest
against the dehumanising tendencies of capitalist society and that held out the
promise of a new form of cooperative, international emancipation (2002,
pp. 154–67).
In the f‌irst section, I will deal with the attempts of Rorty and Honneth to theorise
human solidarity without recourse to a philosophical conception of human
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2004 VOL 52, 162–178
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
A ‘RADICAL HUMANIST’ APPROACH TO SOLIDARITY 163
essence. In Rorty’s case, I will argue, his appeal for solidarity implicitly relies on a
suppressed essentialism, but his anti-foundationalist convictions prevent him from
giving proper consideration to the idea of human essence. In Honneth’s case, the
rejection of a normative view of what it is to be human leaves him without the
means to evaluate which claims for recognition might move us closer to the overall
goal of societal solidarity. In the second section, I will outline the main features of
radical humanism, drawing largely on Fromm’s work, and argue that it provides a
sound ethical basis for criticising existing social relations and for making positive
appeals for solidarity on a global basis. It could also form a basis for the theoreti-
cal formulation of evaluative criteria with which to identify the ideas, practices and
movements that carry the goal forward politically. In the third section, I will return
to the problem of the tension between the normative goal of human solidarity and
particular expressions of solidarity at group or national level. The radical-human-
ist perspective requires the strongest possible rejection of liberal-nationalist claims
that the nation or nation state is the proper locus of political community. Finally,
I will suggest that radical humanism offers a sound philosophical grounding for
appeals to human solidarity without imposing an over-stipulative vision that might
be insensitive to cultural diversity.
Rorty and Honneth
Richard Rorty’s commitment to human solidarity, allied to a traditional liberal
attachment to tolerance and individual liberty, has exerted a strong attraction for
those who share his scepticism towards the professed certainties of traditional
metaphysics and epistemology. Not only has he been openly in favour of pro-
gressing towards greater solidarity among the peoples of the world, but he has also
argued that there is such a thing as moral progress and that it is ‘in the direction
of greater human solidarity’ (1996, p. 192). However, he is at pains to point out
that his conception does not involve an acceptance of some recognition of a core
self, the human essence, in all human beings; rather, it is based on the develop-
ment of an awareness that traditional differences between people are unimportant
‘when concerned with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation’ (p. 192).
For him, moral obligation to our fellow human beings derives from the fact that
they are considered to be ‘one of us’, the ‘us’ referring always to membership of a
specif‌ic group. An appeal to ‘one of us human beings’ will never possess the same
force as an appeal to the ‘us’ that refers to a smaller and more local group. As an
example, he selects the plight of young, urban black men in the US, stating that
an appeal to help them will be both morally and politically more persuasive if
they are described as ‘fellow Americans’ rather than as ‘fellow human beings’
(pp. 190–1). According to him, it is an illusion to conceive of solidarity as some-
thing pre-existing that can be realised once we shed our prejudices; rather, it is
something that has to be created by imagination, the ‘imaginative ability to see
strange people as fellow sufferers’ (p. xvi). This can be achieved in democratic soci-
eties by learning more about others (description), through which we become more
sensitive to the pain suffered by unfamiliar people, and by learning more about
ourselves (redescription), through which we are obliged to reinvestigate ourselves.
Although this can be accomplished through a variety of media, the novel
is accorded particular signif‌icance (p. xvi). So, through this combination of

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