Rape as ‘one person’s word against another’s’
| Published date | 01 April 2018 |
| Date | 01 April 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1365712718766478 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Rape as ‘one person’s word
against another’s’: Challenging
the conventional wisdom
Candida Leigh Saunders
University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, UK
Abstract
According to the conventional wisdom, rape is generally a case of ‘one person’s word against
another’s’ and, in the absence of independent evidence, judgements regarding the truth or
otherwise of an allegation are influenced by ‘rape myths’ and gender stereotypes. The meaning
of ‘one person’s word against another’s’, however, and the extent to which it accurately
describes the evidence in most rape cases, or usefully explains case disposal, are largely
unexplored. This article subjects the conventional wisdom of rape as ‘one person’s word
against another’s’, and the implicit claims and assumptions underpinning it, to close critical
scrutiny. Drawing on original empirical data, I argue that the concept of ‘one person’s word
against another’s’ is vague, ambiguous and uninformative. It tells us virtually nothing about what
rape cases look like evidentially, still less about case progression, and presents a partial and
misleading view of English criminal proceedings and the process of proof. If we are to better
understand attrition in rape cases, we need to meaningfully engage with the contentious issue
of witness credibility and reliability—not only in the absence of independent evidence that
supports or corroborates a witness’s account, but in the presence of evidence that undermines
or contradicts it.
Keywords
attrition, corroboration, evidence, fact-finding, proof, rape
Introduction
When it comes to rape in the criminal justice system, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is a
commonplace phrase. Used by criminal justice professionals, scholars and the man (or woman) in the
street alike, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is part of the common vernacular in discussing rape
and is found, quite literally, everywhere: from conversations in the pub, tweets, blogs and comments
Corresponding author:
Candida Leigh Saunders, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK.
E-mail: candida.saunders@nottingham.ac.uk
The International Journalof
Evidence & Proof
2018, Vol. 22(2) 161–181
ªThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1365712718766478
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posted online to newspaper articles (see, for example, Bowcott, 2013; Burrowes, 2016; Dodd and
Bengtsson, 2016; Philipson, 2014; Street-Porter, 2017), research reports (see, for example, Burrowes,
2013), academic and practitioner texts (see, for example, Jordan, 2004a; Radcliffe et al., 2016; Temkin
and Krahe´, 2008), criminal justice policy (see, for example, CPS, 2011; Home Office, 2002a) and
associated press releases (for example, CPS, 2010), Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) legal guidance
(CPS, undated), and law reports.
1
In contrast to, or perhaps by virtue of, its pervasive use, the meaning of
the term is seldom explored or defined. Instead, the discourse is awash with bald, matter-of-fact state-
ments that rape is ‘one person’s word against another’s’. It seems, therefore, to be taken for granted that
the term’s meaning is widely understood or at least readily inferred from the context in which it is used.
Whatever it means, categorising rape as ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is clearly intended to
be descriptive. But it also explains. The ‘attrition problem’ in rape cases (Hohl and Stanko, 2015)—the
so-called ‘justice gap’ (Home Office, 2002b; Kelly et al., 2005) and ‘one person’s word against
another’s’ have long been causally linked (see, for example, Jordan, 2004a; Temkin and Krahe´,
2008). The relationship between the two is concisely summarised by Cunliffe et al (2012: 3–4), who,
exceptionally, also provide a rare insight as to what the authors mean by the term:
In part the low conviction rate may be attributed to the particular characteristics of a rape case. In general,
rape cases lack physical or any objective evidence and boil down to one persons’ [sic] word against another’s.
A lack of objective evidence means that these cases often require jurors to assess whose story they believe—
the complainant’s or the defendant’s ...With little in the way of hard evidence to guide jury decision making
rape cases are exactly the kind of cases that are open to influences of stereotypes and attitudes.
In the absence of independent evidence in rape cases, judgements about the credibility and reliability of
the complainant’s and accused’s conflicting accounts are said to be susceptible to ‘rape myths’, a term
first used by Burt (1980: 217) to describe ‘prejudicial, stereotyped or false beliefs about rape, rape
victims, and rapists’. Although the definition of the ‘rape myth’ has altered drastically since the 1980s
(see, for example, Gerger et al., 2007), and may be contested (Gurnham, 2016a, 2016b; Reece, 2013;
Young, 2017), the prevalence of such myths and their impact on attrition have reportedly not diminished.
According to the conventional wisdom, the trouble with rape is that, evidentially, such cases generally
amount to ‘one person’s word against another’s’ and, prejudiced by ‘rape myths’, police, prosecutors,
judges, juries and society at large routinely fail to take rape victims at their word (Estrich, 1987; Harris
and Grace, 1999; Hohl and Stanko, 2015; Jordan, 2004a, 2004b, 2011; Kelly, 2010; Kelly et al., 2005).
In addition to describing and explaining, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is inherently norma-
tive. It speaks to an evidential case that is limited in both quantity and form. In so doing, the criminal
case involving independent evidence and third-party witnesses is tacitly held up as the probative ideal
against which cases comprised of ‘one person’s word against another’s’ are measured and found to be
wanting. Such cases are, ostensibly, evidentially inferior—deficient, less than, weaker—and, as such,
comparatively less likely to result in conviction. And, if it enables us to anticipate which cases are more
or less likely to progress through the criminal process, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ also has
predictive value.
On the face of it, then, ‘one person’s word against another’s’ is a remarkably efficient and effective
little turn of phrase. It tells us what rape cases look like. It helps us to understand when, and why, rape
cases fail to result in prosecution and conviction. And it usefully informs criminal justice reform in a
targeted effort to reduce rates of attrition (see, for example, demands for ‘enhanced evidence gathering’,
ACPO, 2015; CPS, 2012; Kelly et al., 2005). It does all of these things, however, only if the various
claims and assumptions underpinning ‘one person’s word against another’s’ withstand critical scrutiny.
The argument presented here is that they do not.
1. RvO (Wayne) [2009] EWCA Crim 2520; RvF[2010] EWCA Crim 3096; RvDizaei (Jamshid Ali) [2013] EWCA Crim 88; R
vJain Hua Xie [2014] EWCA Crim 715; RvHunter (Nigel) [2015] EWCA Crim 631.
162 The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 22(2)
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