Re-conceptualizing triangular coercion in International Relations
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221098494 |
| Author | Daniel Sobelman |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221098494
Cooperation and Conflict
2023, Vol. 58(3) 356 –373
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00108367221098494
journals.sagepub.com/home/cac
Re-conceptualizing triangular
coercion in International
Relations
Daniel Sobelman
Abstract
Although coercion literature has traditionally focused on two-actor dyads, coercion in three-
actor settings is a prevalent yet understudied strategy in International Relations. Such cases of
“triangular coercion” represent a phenomenon whereby a coercer who lacks direct leverage over
a resilient target coerces a third party who does possess leverage over the target, and to whom
the target is vulnerable, and manipulates it into a clash of interests with the target. By forcing an
otherwise uninvolved intermediary to align with the coercer, a coercer can alter the balance of
vulnerability vis-à-vis its otherwise resilient target and enhance its susceptibility to coercion, albeit
by extension. Existing scholarship tackles triangular coercion from different angles and mostly
focuses on actor typology. This article seeks to promote our understanding of this strategy by
proposing a conceptual model that distills its logic into the abstract components of vulnerability,
resilience, and leverage. To demonstrate the dynamics of triangular coercion, the article draws on
three empirical cases: Israel’s failed attempts to force Lebanon to rein in Hezbollah in the 1990s,
Nazi Germany’s successful manipulation of Britain and France into coercing Czechoslovakia in
1938, and the Soviet Union’s success at forcing the United States to coerce Israel in 1973.
Keywords
coercion, compellence, deterrence, terrorism
Barely had a week passed since President Donald Trump had threatened North Korea, in
early August 2017, with “fire and fury like the world has never seen,” when White House
Chief Strategist Steve Bannon publicly debunked the president’s implied nuclear threat.
“There’s no military solution here,” he confessed, “they got us” (Kuttner, 2017). Faced
with a resilient target over whom it wielded little if any direct leverage, the United States
changed course. Rather than threatening North Korea directly, senior US officials stepped
up their pressure on China, which, as noted by National-Security Adviser H.R. McMaster,
Corresponding author:
Daniel Sobelman, Department of International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount
Scopus, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel.
Email: daniel.sobelman@mail.huji.ac.il
1098494CAC0010.1177/00108367221098494Cooperation and ConflictSobelman
research-article2022
Article
Sobelman 357
possessed, “tremendous coercive economic influence” (MSNBC, 2017) over Pyongyang.
In this context, US Senator Lindsey Graham stated Trump had confided him that “if
there’s going to be a war” to stop North Korea, “it will be over there. If thousands die,
they’re going to die over there. They’re not going to die here.” Claiming that he believed
the president, Graham added that “if I were China, I would believe him, too, and do
something about it” (Ortiz and Yamamoto, 2017). Indeed, to make China lean on North
Korea, the White House accentuated the costs China itself would incur if it failed to
unleash its coercive leverage against Pyongyang (Mattis and Tillerson, 2017).
These purposeful US efforts to produce indirect leverage over North Korea reflected
a prevalent but understudied phenomenon in international politics: coercion in three-
actor settings, or “triangular coercion.”
A central theory of International Relations (IR), coercion pertains to the way in which
states employ threats and promises to make other actors do something they otherwise
would not do, largely by exploiting their vulnerabilities (Art and Greenhill, 2018). A
primary requisite of coercion is the communication of a credible threat of punishment.
To be credible, threats and promises must be accompanied with explicit commitments
from which backing down would seem too costly (Schelling, 1960). However, the very
pursuit of coercion, a strategy designed to achieve a desired objective without having to
pay the cost of military victory, almost inherently calls into question the coercer’s cred-
ibility and resolve (Pape, 1996: 13).
Coercion literature has traditionally focused on inter-state deterrence standoffs and on
bilateral models featuring a coercer and a target. Yet, coercion often involves more than
two actors and rarely unfolds in a linear sequence (Byman and Waxman, 2002: 37–38).
Coercers often circumvent the linear logic, meaning that rather than taking on their
adversaries directly, they enlist outside support or manipulate third parties to do their
bidding. That this mechanism occasionally succeeds merits further empirical and con-
ceptual scrutiny, as the field of IR largely revolves around the ability to influence behav-
iors and shape outcomes. This article proceeds as follows. The following section presents
the extant literature on coercion in three-actor setting. Next, the article proposes a con-
ceptual model that distills the logic of triangular coercion and explains it through the
interplay between vulnerability and leverage. The article proceeds to illustrate the model
using one historical case of triangular coercion failure and two cases of triangular coer-
cion success. The conclusion offers avenues for further research.
Different strands of triangular coercion literature
Existing scholarship on triangular coercion is relatively scant, but also fragmented and
narrow. Some scholars addressed the phenomenon in a nuclear context, namely in situa-
tions involving the United States. In 1998, Robert Harkavy noted the potential emer-
gence of the “wholly new strategic concept” of “triangular deterrence,” whereby “a
weaker power lacking the capability to deter a stronger” and “distant power,” threatens a
riposte against a “smaller, closer or contiguous state.” While Harkavy noted that his
analysis may be applicable to non-nuclear settings, the main thrust of his article was
confined to nuclear settings, specifically examining how rogue states could coerce the
United States by threatening to inflict pain on a US ally. A related variation of coercion
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting