Re Marsh and Earl Granville
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Date | 1882 |
| Year | 1882 |
Vendor and Purchaser - Misleading Condition of Sale - Limited Title - Voluntary Deed - Evidence - Recital in Deed more than Twenty Years old -
A contract entered into in 1882 for the sale of freehold estate provided that the title should commence “with an indenture dated the 18th of October, 1845,” and made between persons whose names were mentioned, and that the earlier title should not be investigated or objected to. From the abstract of title delivered by the vendors to the purchaser it appeared that the deed of 1845 was a conveyance by a person, who purported to be the absolute owner, of freehold and leasehold property to trustees, on trust for himself for life, and after his death on trust to sell the property, and to hold the proceeds of sale on the trusts declared by a deed of even date. An express power was reserved to the grantor to revoke the trusts. The deed was a voluntary one, except for the consideration which resulted from the liability assumed by the trustees in respect of the leaseholds:—
Held, by Fry, J., and by the Court of Appeal, that, inasmuch as the fact that the deed of 1845 was a voluntary one would influence the purchaser in determining whether he would agree to accept a title commencing within forty years, the vendors ought to have stated in the condition of sale the nature of the deed; that the omission to state this rendered the condition a misleading one; and that the purchaser was not bound by the contract to accept a title commencing with that deed.
By a deed executed in 1858 (after the death of the settlor) the trustees conveyed the property to a purchaser for value. This deed contained a recital of the deed of 1845, and a recital that the trustees “in pursuance of the trust for sale conferred on them” by that deed had caused the property to be put up for sale:—
Held, by Fry, J., that by virtue of sect. 2 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, this recital, not being shewn to be inaccurate, was conclusive evidence that the deed of 1845 had not been revoked either by an exercise by the settlor of the power of revocation, or by a sale of the property by him for value during his lifetime.
ADJOURNED SUMMONS.
This was a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874.
On the 15th of March, 1882, an agreement was entered into between Eliza M. A. Marsh, widow, Thomas Nesbitt, and Alexander Brodie, of the one part, and Earl Granville of the other part, for the sale by the former to the latter of certain freehold and leasehold premises known as the Ramridge estate, in Hampshire. The 5th clause of the agreement provided that the title to the freehold portion of the estate should commence “with an indenture dated the 18th of October, 1845, and made between Henry Gawler, of the one part, and the Rev. F. J. Courtenay and Edward Harrison of the other part,” and that “the earlier title, whether appearing by recital, covenant for production, or otherwise, or not appearing at all, shall not be investigated or objected to.”
The vendors were the devisees in trust for sale under the will, dated the 21st of May, 1879, of M. H. Marsh, who died on the 26th of January, 1881.
From the abstract of title furnished by the vendors to the purchaser it appeared that the indenture of the 18th of October, 1845, with which the title commenced, was an absolute conveyance by Gawler to Courtenay and Harrison of certain freehold and leasehold properties (which included the properties comprised in the contract with Earl Granville) upon trust for Gawler during his life, and after his decease upon trust to sell the properties and to hold the proceeds of sale on the trusts thereof declared by an indenture of even date made between the same parties. The deed contained a proviso that it should be lawful for Gawler at any time thereafter by any deed or instrument in writing, executed and attested as therein mentioned, to revoke all or any of the trusts, powers, provisoes, and declarations thereinbefore expressed and declared of and concerning the trust premises, and by the same or any other such deed or writing to declare, direct, and appoint any other trusts, powers, provisoes, and declarations of and concerning the trust premises as Gawler should think proper. This deed was made without any consideration, except such consideration as arose from the liability incurred by the trustees in relation to the leasehold part of the property assigned to them.
The subsequent title shewn by the abstract was as follows:—
Gawler died on the 15th of August, 1852.
By a deed dated the 4th of June, 1858, Courtenay and Harrison conveyed for value the freeholds comprised in the deed of the 18th of October, 1845, to M. H. Marsh in fee. This deed contained a recital of the deed of the 18th of October, 1845, and also the following recital:– “Whereas the said F. J. Courtenay and Edward Harrison, in pursuance of the trust for sale conferred on them by the hereinbefore recited indenture, caused the hereditaments hereinafter described to be put up for sale by public auction on the 24th of March last, and the said M. H. Marsh was declared to be the highest bidder and the purchaser at the said auction of the said premises for the price of £1715.”
The will of M. H. Marsh and his death were also recited.
The purchaser's solicitors made (inter alia) the following requisitions on the title:—
(1.) “The conveyance of the 18th of October, 1845, is in part a settlement on the grantor, in part a voluntary conveyance to trustees for sale, with trusts of the sale moneys declared by a contemporaneous deed, and it contains a power to the grantor to revoke the trusts, which would include the trust for sale. Such a deed is not a good root of title, and a good forty years' title must be deduced.
(2.) “What evidence was furnished to the vendors' testator on purchasing, or can the vendors now furnish or obtain proof, (1) that the voluntary conveyance of the 18th of October, 1845, was not avoided by a subsequent conveyance for value; (2) was not revoked under the power of revocation?”
In answer to the first requisition the vendors' solicitors relied on the 5th clause of the contract.
In answer to the second requisition a statutory declaration was made by John Smith, a solicitor at Andover, in which he stated that he knew and was well acquainted with Gawler for ten years and upwards prior to his death, and that his late firm of Earle & Smith acted as Gawler's solicitors from the 1st of February, 1847, until his death; that the deed of the 18th of October, 1845, was prepared in the office of Messrs. Earle & Everett (the predecessors in business of Earle & Smith) for Gawler; that he verily believed that the freehold land comprised in that deed was the property of and in the possession of Gawler for some years previously to the date of that deed, and from that date up to the date of his death. Smith added that he never heard of any revocation of the trusts of that deed, or of any sale by Gawler of the freehold land for money, as he believed he must have done had there been any such revocation or sale.
It was admitted that the possession of the land had been in accordance with the title shewn by the abstract.
The purchaser insisting on his requisitions, the summons was taken out by the vendors, asking a declaration that the purchaser was precluded by the contract and the provisions of the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, or otherwise, from making or insisting on his objections or requisitions on title Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, and that the purchaser might be ordered to pay the costs of the application.
The summons came on for hearing before Mr. Justice Fry on the 18th of November, 1882.
H. A. Giffard, Q.C., and N. R. Smart, for the summons:—
It has never yet been laid down that a voluntary conveyance is not a good root of title. The text-books shew that a settlement is as good a root of title as any other deed, and they draw no distinction between an ante-nuptial and a post-nuptial settlement: Preston on AbstractsF1; Hayes' ConveyancingF2; Bythewood and Jarman's ConveyancingF3; Dart's Vendors and PurchasersF4. The condition only shortens the length of the title which is to be shewn; any document which would have been a good root of title on an open contract is equally good in the present case.
[FRY, J.:– Is not the objection rather that, when you limit the purchaser as to the length of title which he is to have, you ought to tell him if you intend to start with a voluntary deed? A vendor should give full information to the purchaser; he ought to state that which, if it is not stated, makes that which he does state ambiguous or misleading: In re BanisterF5.]
There is nothing unfair in this condition, nothing to mislead an ignorant person.
Then the deed of 1845 was not a voluntary deed, for it comprised some leaseholds in respect of which the trustees came under liabilities. That is sufficient consideration to prevent the deed from being a voluntary one: Price v. JenkinsF6.
And, if it is a voluntary deed, it could only be rendered void by reason of a subsequent sale by the settlor to a purchaser for value. For this purpose the title...
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