Reason, Ground, Intention, Motive and Purpose
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1990.tb01822.x |
| Published date | 01 May 1990 |
| Author | Jenifer Ross |
| Date | 01 May 1990 |
May
19901
Reason, Ground,
Intention, Motive
and
Purpose
cation order to be made where a director ‘acted dishonestly, or failed to exercise a reasonable
degree of care and diligence.
’
Finally, what
of
the possibility
of
distinguishing excusable incompetence from the
inexcusable,
of
identifying the correct class of incompetent to be disqualified? This is
however no more difficult a task than that being attempted currently by the judges with
blameworthiness as the yardstick, contained within such poorly-defined concepts as (really)
gross negligen~e,~~ irresponsible and incompetent management,50 total incompetence5’ and
even reckles~ness.~~ Moreover, the seeds of a purely protective principle do exist. In
Re
Bath Glass,
Peter Gibson
J53
referred to the prerequisite of ‘serious failure
. . .
through
incompetence’ and in
Re Douglas Construction54
Harman
J
referred to a director’s
exploitation of limited liability because ‘he is
so
stupid and ignorant that he is incapable
of
appreciating what has happened and thereby causes large losses by, in a sense,
incompetence.
’55
It is perhaps time that the judges’ lip service to public protection was turned into consumer
service.
Reason, Ground, Intention, Motive and Purpose
Jenifer
Ross”
The Sex Discrimination Act
1975
and the Race Relations Act
1976
prohibit discrimination
on ground of sex and race, and victimisation by reason that a complaint was made under
the Acts. In
R
v
Birmingham City Council ex
p
EOC‘
the House of Lords stated that
‘[Tlhe intention
or
motive of the defendant to discriminate, though it may be relevant
so
far as remedies are concerned
. .
.
is not a necessary condition to liability.’? However,
two decisions of the Court of Appeal,
James
v
Eastleigh Borough Council3
decided after
Birmingham City Council,
and
Aziz
v
Trinity Street Taris
Ltd
which predates it and is
concerned with victimisation, appear to incorporate elements of motive and intention into
the definitions of discrimination and victimisation. The difference between the statutory
words, ‘ground’, ‘reason’, and ‘intention’ is not intuitively obvious. Other related words
such as ‘motive’, ‘purpose’ or ‘aim’ scarcely clarify the concepts. For example, in
James
Browne-Wilkinson VC said: ‘There is no suggestion that the reason for the Council adopting
that proposed by the Jenkins Committee (above n 34) saying directors should be disqualified if they had
‘acted in an improper, reckless
or
incompetent manner in relation to the companies affairs.’
Re Lo-Line
(above n 15).
Re
Dawson
Print
(above n 13).
Re Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Lrd
[1988] BCLC
341.
Re
Douglas
Construction
(above n 17).
Re
D
J
Matthews
(above n 16).
Re Lo-Line
(above n 15).
Re Stanford Services
(above n 8).
Re
Dawson
Print
(above n 13).
(1988) 4 BCC 130, 133.
Indeed Harman
J
again referred
to
protecting the public against incompetence in
Re
Rolus
Properties
(above n 47) at
447.
49
50
5
1
52
53
54 Above n 17 at 557.
55
*Lecturer in Law, University of Strathclyde.
The author wishes
to
thank Professor J.M. Thomson for his helpful comments
1
[1989] 2 WLR
520;
[I9891 IRLR 173. See Ellis (1989) 52 MLR 710.
2
[1989] IRLR 173, 175
per
Lord Goff.
3 119891 3 WLR 139; [1989] IRLR 318.
4
119891 QB 463; [1988] IRLR
204.
39
1
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