Recent Judicial Decisions
| Author | Rob R. Jerrard |
| Published date | 01 March 2001 |
| Date | 01 March 2001 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032258X0107400111 |
ROB R. JERRARD
LegalCo"espondent
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/Rob_Jerrard/
Policela.htm
RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Indirect Force Sufficient to Constitute Offence of Battery
Haystead vDirector
of
Public Prosecutions
Queen's Bench Divisional Court
[2000] 3 All ER 850; (2000) The Times, 2 June
The statute
Section 39 Criminal Justice Act 1988:
Common assault and battery shall be a summary offence and a
person guilty of either of them shall be liable to a fine. Triable
summarily, six months' imprisonment.
Common assault was deemed by the legislators to be one of those
offences where it was necessary to increase the maximum penalty
available to the courts if it was committed under racially aggravated
circumstances (see s. 29(1)(c) Crime and Disorder Act 1998). A further
effect of the racially aggravated offence is that it can be tried on
indictment without having to be included alongside another indictable
offence as is the case with common assaults generally (see s. 40,
Criminal Justice Act 1988).
CASES
REFERRED
TO IN
JUDGMENTS
DPP vK (a minor)[1990] 1 WLR 1067, DC.
Fagan vMetropolitan Police Comr [1968] 3 All ER 442; [1969] 1 QB
439; [1968] 3 WLR 1120, DC.
RvCunningham [1957] 2 All ER 412; [1957] 2 QB 396; [1957] 3
WLR 76, CCA.
RvIreland, RvBurstow [1997] 4 All ER 225; [1998] AC 147; [1997]
3 WLR 534, HL; affg [1997] 1 All ER 112; [1997] QB 114; [1996]
3 WLR 650, CA.
RvMartin (1881) 8 QBD 54; [1881-5] All ER Rep 699, CCR.
RvSalisbury [1976] VR 452, Vic sc.
RvWilson (Clarence), R vJenkins (Edward John)[1983] 3 All ER 448;
[1984] AC 242; [1983] 3 WLR 686, HL.
Scott vShepherd (1773) 2 Wm B1892; [1558-1774] All ER Rep 295;
96 ER 525,
CPo
76 The Police Journal, Volume 74 (2001)
The facts
The defendant Haystead had punched W twice in the face while W was
holding her child, and as a direct result of that the child fell from her
arms and hit his head on the floor.
Counsel for the defendant submitted that in order to have com-
mitted the actus reus of battery in the offence of assault against the
child by beating, the defendant had to have used force directly to the
child's person, that a direct application of force required the defendant
to have had direct physical contact with the complainant either through
his body, for example a punch, or through amedium controlled by his
actions, for example aweapon, and that was not made out.
The court considered that the right approach was set out in Smith
and Hogan, Criminal Law (9th edn, 1999) at 406, where it was said:
Most batteries are directly inflicted, as by D striking P with his fist
or an instrument, or by a missile thrown by him, or by spitting upon
P. But it is not essential that the violence should have been so
directly inflicted.
Thus Stephen and Wills JJ thought there would be a battery where D
digs a pit for P to fall into, or as in Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54, he caused
P to rush into an obstruction.
It is submitted that it would undoubtedly be a battery to set a dog on
another.
If
D beat
O's
horse causing it to run down P, this would be
battery by D.
No doubt the famous civil case of Scott vShepherd (1773) 3
Wils 403; (1773) 96 ER 525 is equally good for the criminal law. D
throws a squib into a market house. First E and then F flings the
squib away in order to save himself from injury. It explodes and
injures P.
'The acts of E and F are not "fully voluntary" intervening acts
which break the chain of causation. This is battery by D.'
The court said that the approach was right subject to the qualification
that there might be some cases which could be explained because they
were in truth an infliction of grievous bodily harm without an assault.
But it was not necessary to find a dividing line between cases where
physical harm was inflicted by assault and where it was not, because
even if counsel for the defendant's definition of battery was correct,
that test was made out on the facts of the case.
W's
movements letting
go of the child was a direct result of the defendant punching her. There
was no difference between where he used her as a medium and where
a weapon was used as a medium, save that in the latter case the offence
involved intention, whereas in this case the defendant was reckless.
Therefore the offence was made out and the appeal would be
dismissed.
The Police Journal, Volume 74 (2001) 77
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