Recent Judicial Decisions

DOI10.1177/0032258X6003300207
Date01 April 1960
Published date01 April 1960
Subject MatterArticle
Reeent
Judieial
Deeisions
THE
ACCUSED'S SILENCE AFTER CAUTION
R. v. Davis
WHEN ARRESTED AND CAUTIONED the accused may make no reply
or simply say, as did the appellant in R. v. Davis (43 Cr.
App.
R.
215),
"I
am saying nothing." The caution administered in
accordance with the Judges' Rules does, of course, tell him that he
is not bound to say anything. Yet in summing-up to the jury trial
judges are sometimes tempted to make pointed comments on the
fact that the accused made no reply denying the charge.
If
this
happens the conviction may be quashed by the Court of Criminal
Appeal, as it was in
R.
v. Davis.
The appellant had been arrested by the police on charges of
store-breaking and larceny and duly cautioned. The deputy-
chairman of quarter sessions observed in his summing-up, "Can
you imagine an innocent man who had behaved like that not saying
something to the police in the course of the evening or the next day,
or even a little time afterwards? He said nothing." This was held
to amount to a misdirection of the jury and the appeal against
conviction was allowed. The Court of Criminal Appeal said: "The
expression 'Can you imagine an innocent man doing this?' is not
a mere comment on the fact that perhaps it was unfortunate he did
not give an answer, but is really saying 'Do you as a jury of
people of common sense really think that a man can be innocent
if he makes no reply in those circumstances?' The accused is
quite entitled to say nothing when he is charged and it is not to be
made a point against him at the trial."
"COSTS AGAINST
THE
POLICE"
R.
v. Sansbury
"I
DO NOT LIKE THE PHRASE 'costs against the police.' The order
that I propose to make is that the costs of the defence, just like the
costs of the police, should be paid out of local
funds."
Mr. Justice
(now Lord Justice) Devlin made this remark after allowing the
defendant his costs after his acquittal at Somerset assizes on a
charge of dangerous driving (1959, 1W.L.R.
1091).
The judge
explained that the police were not to be regarded as arbiters
at
quasi-judges in deciding whether to prosecute or not and that there-
fore the order which he was making for the payment of costs did
108
April-June
1960

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